摘要：Recently, when responding to a question in the Diet, Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi claimed that a "contingency involving

A file photo of the Taipei 101 skyscraper. [Photo/Xinhua]

By Kong Qingjiang

Recently, when responding to a question in the Diet, Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi claimed that a "contingency involving Taiwan (region)" might constitute an "existential crisis situation" that would justify the exercise of the right to collective self-defense.

Her remarks sparked an angry response from China. On the same day, a spokesperson for China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs posed three consecutive questions: "What signal is the Japanese leader trying to send to 'Taiwan independence' separatist forces? Is Japan up to the challenge of defending China's core interests and preventing its reunification? Where exactly does Japan want to take its relations with China?"

Such a response is justified in the following context: Firstly, it was Japan's aggression against China and the rest of the region that inflicted enormous disasters on Asian countries and their peoples during World War II, and China was the victim that suffered the most from the Japanese aggression before 1945.

Secondly, it was only after the Chinese people made enormous sacrifices in the War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression that Taiwan was retroceded to China. A series of documents with international legal effect, such as the Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Proclamation, affirmed China's sovereignty over the Taiwan region, which is an integral part of the outcomes of victory in World War II. Japan was not in a position to discuss the "right to self-defense" or the "collective right of defense" as a former aggressor against the invaded country, particularly in relation to China's territory.

Thirdly, in the 1972 Sino-Japanese Joint Statement, it is stated in black and white that "The Government of Japan recognizes the Government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal Government of China," and that "The Government of Japan fully understands and respects the stand of the Government of the People's Republic of China that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of the People's Republic of China." Takaichi's remarks are a sheer violation of Japan's commitments and a widely recognized fact that Taiwan is part of China.

In fact, the "Enemy State Clauses" of the Charter of the United Nations remain a reminder of what can be done against Japan's ambitions in the Taiwan region.

The Charter of the United Nations lies at the heart of the world order in the post-World War II era. Articles 53 and 107, together with Article 77 of the UN Charter, are often referred to as the "Enemy State Clauses". They are special provisions embedded therein to prevent the recurrence of aggressive wars that target the fascist Axis powers (including Japan) of World War II.

Here, only Articles 53 and 107 are mentioned. Article 53 provides that if an enemy state of World War II resumes an aggressive policy, regional organizations or anti-fascist allied countries may take direct peaceful measures or enforcement actions without prior authorization from the UN Security Council. This clause grants the victorious powers the authority to "act preemptively" and serves as a crucial legal tool to prevent the resurgence of militarism.

Article 107 serves as the core basis for victorious powers to deal with defeated states. It stipulates that all war-related actions taken by anti-fascist allied countries against World War II enemy states, such as occupation and war crimes trials, are legally valid and do not require approval from the UN Security Council. This clause permits member states to implement post-war measures without the Security Council's approval.

The clauses, marked by a strong emphasis on "settling accounts for the post-war order," represent a legal crystallization of the anti-fascist victory. Their core goal is to prevent the resurgence of fascism by establishing a three-dimensional control system through authorization of actions, regional deterrence, and territorial constraints.

If Japan dared to meddle in the Taiwan-related issue by force in the name of "collective defense" – as Takaichi suggested, this would amount to an act of aggression, and would thus trigger Articles 55 and 107. That happened, not only would China be able to use force as self-defense, but China and other anti-fascist allied countries would be entitled to resort to "all war-related actions" against Japan. Japan's act of aggression would likely elicit a firm response, as China's Foreign Ministry spokesman said.

Since the 1960s, Japan has repeatedly attempted to have these clauses deleted to shed its status as a defeated state. However, due to its repeated backtracking on historical issues and even acts of glorifying aggression, the international community - especially Asian neighbors that once suffered from Japan's aggression - has remained highly vigilant against such attempts.

Although the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution in 1995 recommending the deletion of these clauses, the effort failed due to the resolution's lack of legal force and the requirement for unanimous consent from the five permanent members of the Security Council to amend the UN Charter. Countries such as China and Russia view the clauses as the "cornerstone" of the post-war international order.

In recent years, Japan's right-wing forces have continued to expand, actively promoting constitutional amendments to strengthen its military, and have shown, from time to time, their wolfish ambition of coveting China's Taiwan, making the existence of the Enemy State Clauses even more relevant today.

The Enemy State Clauses have never been formally repealed. Articles 53 and 107 remain legally valid in principle and still hold significance as a "legal deterrent" against the resurgence of aggression. They will stay as a reminder to all the anti-fascist countries of their right and their people, and as a reminder to the right-wing forces of Japan.

Kong Qingjiang, a special commentator for CGTN, is the vice dean of the School of International Law, China University of Political Science and Law.

来源：中国网一点号