晴读（30）：精读期刊论文的研究对象和关键词定义

摘要：逆向供应链。从供应链专业视角看，逆向供应链是相对正向供应链（从制造商到消费者的产品生产、运输、销售流程）的反向物流与管理体系，核心围绕已进入消费端的产品或废弃物，通过回收、检测、拆解、再利用或无害化处理等环节，实现资源循环或价值再生，比如论文中制造商主导的回收

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“晴读（30）：精读期刊论文《基于委托代理理论的逆向供应链激励机制设计与回收模式选择》的研究对象与关键词定义”

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"Qing Du (30): Careful reading of the journal paper "Design of Incentive Mechanism and Selection of Recycling Mode in Reverse Supply Chain Based on Principal-Agent Theory"

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今天小编将从思维导图、精读内容、知识补充三个板块为大家带来《基于委托代理理论的逆向供应链激励机制设计与回收模式选择》的研究对象与关键词定义。

一、思维导图（Mind Map）

二、内容精读（Conduct in-depth reading of the material）

1.逆向供应链。从供应链专业视角看，逆向供应链是相对正向供应链（从制造商到消费者的产品生产、运输、销售流程）的反向物流与管理体系，核心围绕已进入消费端的产品或废弃物，通过回收、检测、拆解、再利用或无害化处理等环节，实现资源循环或价值再生，比如论文中制造商主导的回收商对产品的回收流程，就是逆向供应链的关键实践，其效率直接影响供应链的资源利用率与可持续性。

1. Reverse Supply Chain. From the perspective of supply chain professionals, the reverse supply chain is a reverse logistics and management system relative to the forward supply chain (the process of product production, transportation, and sales from manufacturers to consumers). It mainly focuses on products or wastes that have entered the consumer end, and realizes resource circulation or value regeneration through links such as recycling, testing, disassembly, reuse, or harmless treatment. For example, the product recycling process led by manufacturers and carried out by recyclers, as mentioned in the paper, is a key practice of the reverse supply chain, and its efficiency directly affects the resource utilization rate and sustainability of the supply chain.

2.激励机制。在物流与供应链领域，激励机制是供应链核心企业（如论文中的制造商）为推动合作方（如回收商）达成自身期望目标而设计的契约与制度安排，通常以“绩效-支付”为核心逻辑，比如根据回收商的回收量、回收效率等绩效指标制定报酬规则，以此引导回收商主动显示真实能力、付出最优努力，解决合作中的目标不一致问题，保障逆向供应链的稳定运行。

2. Incentive Mechanism. In the field of logistics and supply chains, an incentive mechanism is a contractual and institutional arrangement designed by core supply chain enterprises (such as the manufacturer in the paper) to promote partners (such as recyclers) to achieve their expected goals. It usually takes "performance-payment" as the core logic. For example, a remuneration rule is formulated based on the recyclers' performance indicators, such as recycling volume and recycling efficiency. This guides recyclers to proactively reveal their true capabilities and make optimal efforts, solves the problem of inconsistent goals in cooperation, and ensures the stable operation of the reverse supply chain.

3.回收模式。从物流与供应链专业出发，回收模式指逆向供应链中产品回收环节的组织形式与合作关系架构，核心差异体现在回收主体间的关系类型，如论文中提及的“竞争型回收模式”（双回收商间相互竞争以获取回收业务）与“合作型回收模式”（双回收商协同配合完成回收任务），不同模式会影响回收效率、成本控制及制造商的契约设计方向。

3. Recycling Mode. From the perspective of logistics and supply chain professionals, the recycling mode refers to the organizational form and cooperative relationship structure in the product recycling link of the reverse supply chain. The core difference lies in the type of relationship between recycling entities, such as the "competitive recycling mode" (where two recyclers compete with each other to obtain recycling business) and the "cooperative recycling mode" (where two recyclers cooperate to complete recycling tasks) mentioned in the paper. Different modes will affect recycling efficiency, cost control, and the direction of manufacturers' contract design.

4.信息不对称。在供应链场景中，信息不对称指供应链各参与方（如论文中的制造商与回收商）掌握的关键信息存在差异且难以完全共享，比如回收商知晓自身的能力禀赋（如回收技术水平、运营成本）和实际努力程度，而制造商无法直接观测或验证这些信息，这种信息差可能导致制造商决策偏差，降低逆向供应链的配置效率，是论文中激励机制设计需解决的核心问题。

4. Information Asymmetry. In supply chain scenarios, information asymmetry refers to the situation where key information is held by various participants in the supply chain, such as the manufacturer and recyclers in the paper industry. It is inconsistent and difficult to fully share. For instance, recyclers are aware of their own capability endowments (e.g., recycling technology level, operating costs) and actual effort level, while manufacturers cannot directly observe or verify such information. This information gap may lead to decision-making biases of manufacturers and reduce the allocation efficiency of the reverse supply chain, and it is a core problem that needs to be solved in the design of the incentive mechanism in the paper.

5.机制设计。从供应链专业角度看，机制设计是供应链核心企业为化解信息不对称、优化资源配置而构建的规则体系，需结合委托代理理论，明确参与方的权利、义务与利益分配方式，比如论文中制造商通过设定“回收绩效-支付”契约的可行配置集、制定激励相容约束条件，构建同时解决逆向选择与道德风险的最优机制，确保双回收商的行为与制造商目标一致，提升逆向供应链效率。

5. Mechanism Design. From the perspective of supply chain professionals, mechanism design is a system of rules constructed by core supply chain enterprises to resolve information asymmetry and optimize resource allocation. It needs to integrate the principal-agent theory and clarify the rights, obligations, and profit distribution methods of participants. For example, in the paper, manufacturers establish an optimal mechanism that addresses both adverse selection and moral hazard by defining the feasible configuration set of the "recycling performance-payment" contract and formulating incentive compatibility constraints, ensuring that the behaviors of the two recyclers align with the manufacturers' goals and improving the efficiency of the reverse supply chain.

6.逆向选择。在供应链合作中，逆向选择是信息不对称引发的事前问题，指在合作关系建立前，拥有信息优势的一方因自身利益考量，隐瞒不利于合作的真实信息，导致信息劣势方（制造商）做出错误选择，比如制造商可能误选能力不足的回收商，进而降低逆向供应链的回收效率，是论文中激励机制需优先规避的风险。

6. Adverse Selection. In supply chain cooperation, adverse selection is a pre-contractual problem caused by information asymmetry. It refers to a scenario where, before a cooperative relationship is established, the party with information advantages conceals true information that is unfavorable to the cooperation out of consideration for its own interests. This leads the party at an information disadvantage (i.e., manufacturers) to make wrong decisions—for example, manufacturers may mistakenly select recyclers with insufficient capabilities, which in turn reduces the recycling efficiency of the reverse supply chain. It is a risk that needs to be prioritized and avoided through the incentive mechanism in the paper.

7.道德风险。从物流与供应链专业出发，道德风险是信息不对称引发的事后问题，指合作关系建立后，拥有信息优势的一方，如论文中的回收商在自身行为难以被观测的情况下，为降低自身成本或规避风险，减少应有的努力投入，比如减少回收人力、降低检测标准，损害信息劣势方（制造商）利益，比如回收商虽具备高能力却“偷懒”，导致回收绩效下降，是论文中激励机制需重点约束的行为。

7. moral hazard. From the perspective of logistics and supply chain professionals, moral hazard is a post-contractual problem caused by information asymmetry. It refers to a situation where, after a cooperative relationship is established, the party with information advantages (such as the recyclers in the paper) reduces the necessary effort input to cut its own costs or avoid risks when its behaviors are difficult to observe. Examples include reducing recycling personnel and lowering inspection standards, which harm the interests of the party at an information disadvantage (i.e., manufacturers). For instance, recyclers may 'slack off' even though they have high capabilities, leading to a decline in recycling performance. This is a behavior that requires key restraint through the incentive mechanism in the paper.

三、知识补充（Supplementary Knowledge）

1.委托代理理论。在供应链领域，委托代理理论是分析核心企业（委托人，如论文中制造商）与合作方（代理人，如回收商）关系的重要工具。由于双方目标常不一致，委托人需通过设计契约协调关系，比如制造商希望以低成本实现高回收效率，而回收商可能更关注自身收益，该理论正是通过明确双方权利、义务与利益分配，为化解信息不对称、设计有效激励机制提供逻辑依据，是逆向供应链机制设计的核心理论支撑。

1. Principal-Agent Theory. In the field of supply chains, the principal-agent theory is an important tool for analyzing the relationship between core enterprises (principals, such as the manufacturer in the paper) and their partners (agents, such as the recyclers). Since the goals of the two parties are often inconsistent, the principal needs to coordinate the relationship by designing contracts. For example, a manufacturer aims to achieve high recycling efficiency at low costs, while recyclers may focus more on their own profits. This theory provides a logical basis for resolving information asymmetry and designing effective incentive mechanisms by clarifying the rights, obligations, and profit distribution of both parties, and serves as the core theoretical support for the design of reverse supply chain mechanisms.

2.回收绩效分享比例。这是逆向供应链激励机制的关键量化指标，指制造商将回收业务产生的收益（或节约成本）按一定比例分配给回收商的规则。如论文所示，该比例并非固定，会受回收商间竞争/合作强度影响——合作强度越高，分享比例往往越大以激励协同；竞争强度则需结合具体条件调整，其合理设定直接关系回收商的努力动力，是平衡制造商成本与回收商收益的核心杠杆。

2. Recycling Performance Sharing Ratio. As a key quantitative indicator of the incentive mechanism in reverse supply chains, the recycling performance sharing ratio refers to the rule by which manufacturers distribute a certain proportion of the profits (or cost savings) generated from recycling operations to recyclers. As shown in the paper, this ratio is not fixed and is affected by the intensity of competition/cooperation among recyclers—higher cooperation intensity usually leads to a larger sharing ratio to encourage collaboration, while the intensity of competition needs to be adjusted based on specific conditions. The reasonable setting of this ratio is directly related to the motivation of recyclers to make efforts, and it serves as a core lever for balancing manufacturers’ costs and recyclers’ profits.

3.信息租金。在供应链信息不对称场景中，信息租金是拥有私有信息的一方（如论文中掌握自身能力的回收商）因信誉优势获得的额外收益。当制造商无法完全知晓回收商真实能力时，为避免逆向选择，需允许高能力回收商保留部分超额收益以激励其披露真实信息，这虽会增加制造商短期成本，但能保障逆向供应链长期配置效率，是信息不对称下机制设计需权衡的重要因素。

3. Information Rent. In the context of information asymmetry in supply chains, information rent refers to the additional benefit obtained by the party with private information (such as the recycler that knows its own capabilities in the paper) due to its information advantage. When manufacturers cannot fully understand the true capabilities of recyclers, they should allow high-capability recyclers to retain part of the excess benefits to incentivize them to disclose accurate information, thereby avoiding adverse selection. Although this will increase the short-term costs of manufacturers, it can ensure the long-term allocation efficiency of the reverse supply chain, and it is an important factor that needs to be balanced in mechanism design under information asymmetry.

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