俊学（26）：《商品及服务竞争下平台供应链议价模式选择策略》

摘要：This issue of the tweet will introduce the model description of the intensive reading journal article "Platform Supply Chain Barga

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“俊学（26）：精读期刊论文《商品及服务竞争下平台供应链议价模式选择策略》的模型说明”

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“Junxue (26): In-depth reading of the journal article "Platform Supply Chain Bargaining Model Selection Strategy under Goods and Services Competition”

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本期推文将从思维导图、精读内容、知识补充三个方面介绍精读期刊论文《商品及服务竞争下平台供应链议价模式选择策略》的模型说明。

This issue of the tweet will introduce the model description of the intensive reading journal article "Platform Supply Chain Bargaining Model Selection Strategy under Goods and Services Competition" from three aspects: mind map, intensive reading content, and knowledge supplement.

一、思维导图（Mind Maps）

二、精读内容（Intensive reading content）

1.单制造商—双平台的在线销售系统结构。首先，本文研究仅考虑由单个制作商和两个竞争性平台构成的在线销售系统。上游制造商以单位批发价将生产的产品通过批发销售给平台，然后平台再通过其在线销售渠道，将产品以单位零售价转售给末端消费者。制造商赚取批发利润，而平台的利润来源于二次销售所产生的差价。

1.Single-Manufacturer-Dual-Platform Online Sales System Structure. This study primarily considers an online sales system consisting of a single manufacturer and two competing platforms. The upstream manufacturer sells its products to the platform at a unit wholesale price. The platform then resells the products to end consumers at a unit retail price through its online sales channels. The manufacturer earns a wholesale Profit, while the platform profits from the difference in price generated by secondary sales.

2.平台订单需求量函数。平台向消费者提供一站式运营服务，这些服务包括产品信息展示，客服，订单履行，售后以及金融等，不同的服务水平会影响消费者的购买决策。参考已有数据，得到平台的订单需求量函数。其中，假设价格弹性系数介于0到1之间，确保对手平台的产品定价对产品需求的影响低于其自身产品定价所带来的影响。

2. Platform order demand function. The platform provides consumers with one-stop operational services, including product information display, customer service, order fulfillment, after-sales service, and financing. Different service levels influence consumer purchasing decisions. Using existing data, we derive the platform's order demand function. We assume a price elasticity coefficient between 0 and 1, ensuring that the impact of rival platforms' product pricing on product demand is smaller than that of the platform's own product pricing.

3.平台服务投入成本。一般地，在产品售卖过程中，平台提供的运营服务水平越高，平台相应的服务投入成本也就越高。参考已有数据，得到平台提供服务时所产生的成本函数。其中，服务成本系数越高，平台想要提高运营水平时所投入的成本越高。

3. Platform service input costs. Generally speaking, during the product sales process, the higher the level of operational services provided by the platform, the higher the corresponding service input costs. By referring to existing data, we can derive the cost function incurred by the platform when providing services. The higher the service cost coefficient, the higher the cost the platform must invest to improve its operational level.

4.其他假设。不同于一般的批发价格契约，平台供应链中关于产品批发价格的制定不再是简单地由上游制造商单方面控制的情形，而是基于制造商与平台之间讨价还价能力对比下的博弈结果。假设平台的议价能力为k，相应的，制造商的议价能力就为1-k。双方只有一次议价机会，且制造商和两个平台的议价是分开进行的，谈判内容其他参与者无法得知。

4. Other Assumptions. Unlike typical wholesale price contracts, wholesale pricing in platform supply chains is no longer unilaterally controlled by upstream manufacturers. Instead, it is the result of a game of bargaining power between manufacturers and platforms. Assume the platform's bargaining power is k, and the manufacturer's bargaining power is 1-k. Both parties have only one chance to negotiate, and the manufacturer and the two platforms negotiate separately, making the content of the negotiations invisible to other participants.

5.利润函数。若双方关于产品批发价格的议价成果，则得到平台和制造商的利润函数。

5. Profit function. If the two parties reach a bargaining result on the wholesale price of the product, the profit function of the platform and the manufacturer will be obtained.

6.引入辅助变量。为了简化表达并降低计算分析的复杂性，故引入辅助变量。

6. Introducing auxiliary variables. In order to simplify the expression and reduce the complexity of the calculation and analysis, auxiliary variables are introduced.

从而得到新的平台与制造商利润函数：

Thus we get the new platform and manufacturer profit function:

7.主要变量及参数的定义

7. Definition of main variables and parameters

三、知识补充（Knowledge Supplement）

1.交叉价格弹性系数（Cross-price elasticity coefficient）

交叉价格弹性系数是微观经济学中常用的一个概念，用来衡量某种商品x的需求量对另一种商品y的价格变动的敏感程度。

Cross-price elasticity is a commonly used concept in microeconomics, which is used to measure the sensitivity of the demand for a certain commodity x to the price change of another commodity y.

2.风险中立（Risk Neutral）

风险中立是指个体在面对不确定性时，只关心结果的期望收益，而不在意风险大小，即将不确定的收益等同于其数学期望来评价，不会像风险厌恶者那样因担心损失而降低价值判断，也不会像风险偏好者那样因追求刺激而高估潜在收益。

Risk neutrality means that when faced with uncertainty, an individual only cares about the expected benefits of the outcome, rather than the size of the risk. That is, they evaluate uncertain benefits by equating them with their mathematical expectations. They will not lower their value judgments for fear of loss like risk-averse individuals, nor will they overestimate potential benefits for the pursuit of excitement like risk-seekers.

3.逆向归纳法（Backward induction）

逆向归纳法是一种从博弈或决策过程的最后一步开始，逐步向前推理以确定各阶段最优策略的方法，它基于未来的最优结果来指导当前选择，常用于分析有限次、完全信息的动态博弈，能够推导出子博弈精炼纳什均衡，是解决序贯决策问题的重要工具。

Backward induction is a method that starts from the last step of the game or decision-making process and reasoned forward step by step to determine the optimal strategy for each stage. It guides current choices based on the optimal future results. It is often used to analyze dynamic games with finite times and complete information. It can derive subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium and is an important tool for solving sequential decision-making problems.

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翻译：Google翻译

参考资料：百度百科、Chat GPT

参考文献：李慧,徐琪.商品及服务竞争下平台供应链议价模式选择策略[J].管理学报,2025,22(08):1537-1546.