喆学（175）：精读硕士论文支撑理论基础和国内外研究现状

摘要：This post will introduce the theoretical basis and current research status at home and abroad of the intensive reading master's th

分享兴趣，传播快乐，

增长见闻，留下美好。

亲爱的您，这里是LearingYard学苑！

今天小编为您带来文章

“喆学（175）：精读硕士论文

《双重信息不对称下SaaS云外包激励机制研究》

支撑理论基础和国内外研究现状”

欢迎您的访问！

Share interest, spread happiness,

increase knowledge, and leave beautiful.

Dear, this is the LearingYard Academy!

Today, the editor brings the

“Zhexue (175): Intensive reading of

《Research on the Incentive Mechanism of SaaS Cloud Outsourcing

under Double Information asymmetry》

Supporting theoretical foundation and current research status at home and abroad”

Welcome to visit!

本期推文将从思维导图、精读内容、知识补充三个方面介绍精读硕士论文《双重信息不对称下SaaS云外包激励机制研究》撑理论基础和国内外研究现状。

This post will introduce the theoretical basis and current research status at home and abroad of the intensive reading master's thesis "Research on Incentive Mechanism of SaaS Cloud outsourcing under Double Information Asymmetry" from three aspects: mind map, intensive reading content, and knowledge supplement.

一、思维导图（Mind Maps）

二、精读内容（Intensive reading content）

(1)理论基础(Theoretical Basis)

1.信息不对称理论(Information Asymmetry Theory)

信息不对称理论指出市场交易各方信息掌握不均，卖方通常占优。George等70年代提出，二手车、劳动力及保险市场均现逆向选择与道德风险：签约前劣币驱逐良币，签约后隐藏行为减效。SaaS云外包四阶段同样受此影响，客户难辨服务商真实能力，签约后双方或降低努力致损，故需设计激励机制以缓解信息差异风险。

Information asymmetry theory states that market participants have unequal access to information, with sellers generally having an advantage. George et al. proposed in the 1970s that the used car, labor, and insurance markets all exhibit adverse selection and moral hazard: bad money drives out good money before the contract is signed, and hidden behavior reduces efficiency after the contract is signed. The four stages of SaaS cloud outsourcing are also affected by this phenomenon. Customers find it difficult to discern the true capabilities of service providers, and after the contract is signed, both parties may reduce their efforts and suffer losses. Therefore, it is necessary to design incentive mechanisms to mitigate the risk of information asymmetry.

2.委托代理理论(Principal-Agent Theory)

委托代理理论用于解决信息不对称，委托人因信息劣势委托代理人，通过设计契约激励代理人采取最优行动，兼顾双方效用最大化。研究将问题定量化，模型要求代理接受契约所获效用不低于保留水平，且任何偏离都无法获得更高收益，从而保证其真实行动。在SaaS云外包中，客户作为委托人把服务交给云提供商代理，运用该理论构建报酬机制，促使提供商如实展现实力并投入最佳努力，实现服务质量与双方收益的共同提升。

Principal-agent theory addresses information asymmetry. Principals, due to information disadvantages, entrust agents with services. Contracts are designed to incentivize agents to take optimal actions, maximizing utility for both parties. This research quantifies the problem, using a model that requires the agent to receive utility no less than a reservation level upon accepting the contract, and that any deviation from the agreement will result in no higher returns, thus ensuring true action. In SaaS cloud Outsourcing, the client, acting as the principal, entrusts services to a cloud provider. This theory is applied to construct a compensation mechanism that encourages providers to demonstrate their capabilities and exert their best efforts, thereby improving both service quality and the profitability of both parties.

3.期望效用理论(Expected Utility Theory)

风险与收益正相关，不同决策者在同一情境下因风险偏好差异而选择不同：偏好者趋高险高收益，规避者选低险低收益，中性者无差别；同一人在不同情境也会改变偏好顺序。期望效用理论用数理模型刻画不确定性下理性人行为，提出连通、传递、保序及相对优劣四条公理，保证决策者在满足理性时使期望效用最大。后续主观期望效用理论进一步强调主观判断。该理论广泛应用于外包研究：学者引入公平偏好修正理性人假设，发现能提升代理人努力；在云服务外包中，提供商通常风险规避，其名义收益与实际期望效用不符，需用风险规避系数校正激励参数，以设计更有效的契约。

Risk and return are positively correlated. Different decision makers in the same situation will make different choices due to their varying risk preferences: those who prefer high risk and high return, those who avoid risk and low return, and those who are neutral are indifferent. Even the same person will change their preferences in different situations. Expected utility theory uses mathematical models to characterize rational behavior under uncertainty. It proposes four axioms: connectivity, transitivity, order preservation, and relative merit. These axioms ensure that decision makers maximize expected utility while maintaining rationality. Subsequent developments such as subjective expected utility theory further emphasize subjective judgment. This theory has been widely used in outsourcing research: scholars have introduced fairness preferences to modify the rational agent assumption and found that it can increase agent effort. In cloud service outsourcing, providers are often risk-averse, and their nominal returns do not align with their actual expected utility. Therefore, a risk aversion coefficient is needed to adjust incentive parameters to design more effective contracts.

(2)国内外研究现状(Current Research Status at Home and Abroad)

1.IT产品和服务外包激励机制研究(Research on Incentive Mechanisms for IT Product and Service Outsourcing)

学界基于委托代理理论，围绕IT外包契约中的道德风险与逆向选择展开丰富研究。道德风险方面，学者引入接包方风险规避、资金约束及二元价值变量，发现固定与可变奖励受风险、资金及权重影响，进而左右激励效果。逆向选择方面，研究通过甄别契约对不同能力服务商分类筛选，证明混合分配方式优于传统支付，可促使双方真实披露信息并提升努力。SaaS云外包作为IT外包新形态，凭按需付费、免硬件优势正被企业广泛采用，为后续契约设计提供新场景。

Based on the principal-agent theory, the academic community has conducted extensive research on moral hazard and adverse selection in IT outsourcing contracts. In terms of moral hazard, scholars introduced the risk aversion, capital constraints, and binary value variables of the contractor, and found that fixed and variable rewards are affected by risk, capital, and weight, which in turn influence the incentive effect. In terms of adverse selection, the study classified and screened service providers with different capabilities through the screening contract, proving that the mixed distribution method is superior to traditional payment and can encourage both parties to disclose information truthfully and improve their efforts. As a new form of IT outsourcing, SaaS cloud outsourcing is being widely adopted by enterprises due to its advantages of on-demand payment and hardware-free, providing a new scenario for subsequent contract design.

2.Saas云外包契约研究(Research on SaaS Cloud Outsourcing Contracts)

学界以委托代理理论为基，聚焦IT外包契约的道德风险与逆向选择。道德风险研究指出，接包方的风险规避度、市场不确定、自有资金及二元价值权重均会削弱固定与可变奖励，降低激励。逆向选择研究则通过甄别契约对服务商能力筛选，证实产出分享加固定转移支付的混合方式最能促使双方真实披露信息并提升努力。SaaS云外包作为IT外包新形态，凭按需付费、省硬件、提效率的优势正被广泛采用，为后续契约设计提供新场景。

Based on principal-agent theory, academic research focuses on moral hazard and adverse selection in IT outsourcing contracts. Moral hazard research indicates that the contractor's risk aversion, market uncertainty, capital availability, and binary value weighting can weaken fixed and variable rewards, reducing incentives. Adverse selection research, through the use of contract screening to identify service provider capabilities, confirms that a hybrid approach of output sharing and fixed transfer payments is most effective in encouraging both parties to disclose information truthfully and increase their efforts. SaaS cloud outsourcing, a new form of IT outsourcing, is gaining widespread adoption due to its advantages of pay-as-you-go, hardware savings, and improved efficiency, providing new scenarios for subsequent contract design.

3.基于多任务委托代理的激励机制研究(Research on Incentive Mechanisms Based on Multi-Task Principal-Agent)

SaaS云外包需同时激励软硬件服务，传统单任务模型已不适用。学界引入多任务委托代理：一是对单任务设多维指标，显性权重小、隐性权重大，可引导努力；二是关注任务间投入关联，研究表明关联度影响激励强度，多任务设计优于单任务；三是面对共同代理情形，为客户企业设计合作与非合作机制，促使云服务商披露实力并付出最优努力。本文亦沿用此框架，结合逆向选择继续探讨激励契约。

SaaS cloud outsourcing requires incentivizing both software and hardware services, making the traditional single-task model inadequate. Academia has introduced multi-task principal-agent models: First, multi-dimensional indicators are assigned to individual tasks, with small explicit weights and large implicit weights to guide effort; second, the correlation between inputs across tasks is considered. Research has shown that correlation influences incentive intensity, and multi-task designs are superior to single-task designs; third, in situations of joint agency, cooperative and non-cooperative mechanisms are designed for client companies to encourage cloud service providers to disclose their capabilities and exert optimal effort. This article also uses this framework, incorporating adverse selection to further explore incentive contracts.

4.外包动态激励机制研究(Research on Dynamic Incentive Mechanisms for Outsourcing)

单阶段静态激励仅适于短期外包，长期合作中客户需逐步获知服务商私有信息，学者遂构建多阶段动态机制。刘惠萍引入声誉，显隐结合可抑制经理人讨价还价；卢纪华、周建亨的两阶段甄别模型提升参与及努力，解决分期付款与供应链长期协作；张旭梅、楚岩枫用两阶段博弈应对逆向选择和道德风险，实现利润帕累托改进。SaaS云外包合作周期长，服务商每阶段均可能隐藏信息，客户须动态更新契约，故设计多阶段动态激励机制成为重要研究课题。

Single-stage static incentives are only suitable for short-term outsourcing. In long-term collaborations, clients need to gradually gain access to the service provider's private information. Therefore, scholars have developed multi-stage dynamic incentive mechanisms. Liu Huiping introduced reputation, combining explicit and implicit factors to curb manager bargaining. Lu Jihua and Zhou Jianheng's two-stage screening model improves participation and effort, addressing the issues of installment payments and long-term supply chain collaboration. Zhang Xumei and Chu Yanfeng used a two-stage game theory to address adverse selection and moral hazard, achieving a Pareto improvement in profits. SaaS cloud outsourcing partnerships are long, and service providers may conceal information at each stage. Clients must dynamically update their contracts, making the design of multi-stage dynamic incentive mechanisms a key research topic.

(3)SaaS 云外包研究主要存在的问题(Major Problems in SaaS Cloud Outsourcing Research)

现有SaaS云外包激励研究尚存三大缺口：一是忽视软硬件并行的多任务场景，仍沿用单任务框架；二是多聚焦签约后的道德风险，却少兼顾签约前因信息不明导致的逆向选择；三是普遍采用一次性静态契约，未引入随合作进程动态调整的机制。因此，亟需构建同时处理多任务、双重信息不对称与多阶段动态更新的激励模型，以提升客户效用并降低合作风险。

Existing SaaS cloud outsourcing incentive research still has three major gaps: First, it ignores the multi-task scenario of parallel software and hardware, and still uses the single-task framework; second, it focuses more on the moral hazard after the contract is signed, but pays less attention to the adverse selection caused by unclear information before the contract is signed; third, it generally adopts a one-time static contract and does not introduce a mechanism for dynamic adjustment as the cooperation progresses. Therefore, it is urgent to build an incentive model that can handle multiple tasks, dual information asymmetry, and multi-stage dynamic updates to improve customer utility and reduce cooperation risks.

三、知识补充（Knowledge supplement）

甄别契约模型（Screening Contract Model）通常出现在信息经济学和博弈论中，指的是一种合同设计机制，旨在解决信息不对称问题，特别是在一方（通常是委托人）无法直接观察另一方（代理人）的私人信息（如能力、偏好或努力程度）时，通过设计特定的契约条款来“甄别”不同类型的代理人，从而诱导他们选择对自己类型最优的合同，间接揭示其私人信息。这种模型广泛应用于劳动市场、保险市场、产品定价和金融合同等领域。

The Screening Contract Model, commonly found in information economics and game theory, refers to a contract design mechanism designed to address information asymmetry. Specifically, when one party (usually the principal) cannot directly observe the private information of the other party (the agent), such as ability, preferences, or effort, the screening contract mechanism is designed to "screen" different types of agents, thereby inducing them to choose the contract that best suits their type and indirectly revealing their private information. This model is widely used in labor markets, insurance markets, product pricing, and financial contracts.

甄别契约模型旨在解决信息不对称背景下的逆向选择(Adverse Selection)问题。在交易发生前，一方(通常是委托人)无法获知另一方(代理人)的私人信息，例如保险公司不清楚投保人的风险水平，或雇主无法判断员工的能力高低。这种信息不对称可能导致委托人面临不利选择，因此甄别契约模型的目标是通过精心设计的合同条款，引导不同类型的代理人(如高风险/低风险、高能力/低能力)选择与其类型相匹配的契约，从而实现“自我甄别”。

The discriminating contract model aims to address the adverse selection problem in the context of information asymmetry. Before a transaction occurs, one party (usually the principal) cannot access the private information of the other party (the agent). For example, an insurance company may not know the risk level of the policyholder, or an employer may not be able to judge the ability of an employee. This information asymmetry can lead to adverse selection for the principal. Therefore, the discriminating contract model aims to guide different types of agents (e.g., high-risk vs. low-risk, high-ability vs. low-ability) to choose contracts that match their types through carefully designed contract terms, thereby achieving "self-selection."

甄别契约模型的核心在于激励相容约束(Incentive Compatibility Constraint)，即合同条款必须确保代理人根据自身真实类型选择最优契约，而不会冒充其他类型以获取更大利益。自我选择(Self-Selection)是这一机制的关键，通过提供差异化的契约选项(如不同的保险保费与保额组合)，让代理人自愿选择与其私人信息相符的合同。例如，保险公司可能设计高保费-高保额和低保费-低保额两种方案，高风险客户倾向选择前者，低风险客户则选择后者，从而间接揭示其风险类型。

The core of the discriminating contract model lies in the incentive compatibility constraint: the contract terms must ensure that agents choose the optimal contract based on their true type, rather than impersonating other types to maximize their benefits. Self-selection is the key to this mechanism. By offering differentiated contract options (e.g., different premium and coverage combinations), agents are encouraged to voluntarily choose contracts that align with their private information. For example, an insurance company might design a high-premium, high-sum-of-insurance contract or a low-premium, low-sum-of-insurance contract. High-risk customers tend to choose the high-premium contract, while low-risk customers tend to choose the low-premium contract, indirectly revealing their risk type.

除了激励相容，甄别契约还需满足参与约束(Participation Constraint)，以确保代理人愿意接受合同。这意味着契约提供的效用必须不低于代理人的保留效用，即其在不接受合同时的替代选择所能获得的收益。只有当契约对代理人具有足够吸引力时，他们才会参与交易，从而保证契约机制的有效性。

In addition to incentive compatibility, a discriminating contract must also satisfy a participation constraint to ensure the agent's willingness to accept the contract. This means that the utility provided by the contract must be no less than the agent's retention utility—the benefit they would receive if they did not accept the contract. Only when the contract is sufficiently attractive to the agent will they participate in the transaction, thus ensuring the effectiveness of the contract mechanism.

甄别契约模型的典型结构由委托人设计一组针对不同代理人类型的契约组成，例如工资-绩效组合或价格-质量组合。每种契约针对特定类型代理人的特征和偏好，诱导他们根据自身类型选择最合适的合同，从而向委托人传递私人信息。例如，保险公司通过提供高保费-高保额和低保费-低保额的方案，促使高风险客户选择高保额合同，低风险客户选择低保额合同。这种结构通过差异化设计实现信息甄别，同时优化委托人的收益和资源分配效率。

The typical structure of a discriminating contract model consists of a principal designing a set of contracts tailored to different agent types, such as a salary-performance package or a price-quality package. Each contract targets the characteristics and preferences of a specific agent type, inducing them to choose the most appropriate contract based on their type, thereby conveying private information to the principal. For example, by offering a high-premium, high-sum-of-insurance contract and a low-premium, low-sum-of-insurance contract, an insurance company can encourage high-risk customers to choose the high-sum-of-insurance contract and low-risk customers to choose the low-sum-of-insurance contract. This structure achieves information screening through differentiated design, while optimizing the client's benefits and resource allocation efficiency.

应用场景如下：

Application scenarios are as follows:

1.劳动市场

1. Labor Market

雇主设计工资-绩效合同，区分高能力与低能力员工。例如，高能力员工可能被激励选择高绩效目标以获得更高报酬，而低能力员工选择较低目标。企业提供固定工资和绩效奖金两种方案，高能力员工倾向选择奖金驱动的合同。

Employers design wage-performance contracts to differentiate between high- and low-ability employees. For example, high-ability employees may be incentivized to achieve high performance goals in exchange for higher compensation, while low-ability employees may choose lower goals. Companies offer both fixed salary and performance bonus options, with high-ability employees tending to choose bonus-driven contracts.

2.保险市场

2. Insurance Market

保险公司通过不同保费和保额组合，甄别高风险和低风险客户。例如，高风险客户更愿意接受高保费高保额的保险，而低风险客户选择低保费-低保额的方案。

Insurance companies use different premium and coverage combinations to differentiate between high- and low-risk customers. For example, high-risk customers prefer insurance with high premiums and high coverage, while low-risk customers choose plans with low premiums and low coverage.

3.产品定价

3. Product Pricing

企业通过提供不同质量或功能的产品版本(如基础版、高级版)来甄别消费者类型。例如，软件公司提供免费版和付费高级版，吸引不同支付意愿的用户。xAl的SuperGrok计划(参考你的问题背景)可视为一种甄别契约，通过免费版(低使用配额)和SuperGrok付费版(高使用配额)区分普通用户和高频/专业用户，诱导用户根据需求选择适合的版本。

Companies differentiate between consumer types by offering product versions with varying quality or functionality (e.g., basic and premium). For example, software companies offer free and paid premium versions to attract users with different willingness-to-pay. xAI's SuperGrok plan (referring to the context of your question) can be seen as a differentiation contract, distinguishing between average users and high-frequency/specialized users through a free version (low usage quota) and a paid SuperGrok version (high usage quota), encouraging users to choose the version appropriate for their needs.

4.金融市场

4.Financial Markets

银行设计不同贷款利率和担保要求，甄别高风险和低风险借款人。例如，高风险借款人可能接受更高利率以换取贷款资格。

Banks design different loan interest rates and collateral requirements to distinguish between high-risk and low-risk borrowers. For example, high-risk borrowers may accept higher interest rates in exchange for loan eligibility.

今天的分享就到这里了。

如果您对文章有独特的想法，

欢迎给我们留言，让我们相约明天。

祝您今天过得开心快乐！

That's all for today's sharing.

If you have a unique idea about the article,

please leave us a message,

and let us meet tomorrow.

I wish you a nice day!

翻译：谷歌翻译

参考资料：谷歌、Chat GPT

参考文献：吴琦超. 双重信息不对称下SaaS云外包激励机制研究 [D]. 合肥工业大学, 2020.