摘要：Share interest, spread happiness,Increase knowledge, leave a beautiful!Dear, this is LearningYard Academy.Today, the editor brings

分享兴趣，传播快乐，

增长见闻，留下美好！

亲爱的您，这里是LearningYard新学苑。

今天小编为大家带来文章

“小宇分享（九）：

精读《上下游联合减排与低碳宣传的微分博弈模型》结论”

Share interest, spread happiness,
Increase knowledge, leave a beautiful!
Dear, this is LearningYard Academy.
Today, the editor brings you an article.

Xiaoyu's Sharing (Ⅸ):

A Close Reading of the Conclusions of "A Differential Game Model for Upstream and Downstream Joint Emission Reduction and Low-Carbon Promotion"

一、思维导图（Mind mapping）

二、精读内容（Intensive reading content）

无成本分担的分散式决策

Decentralized decision-making without cost sharing

当2πM＞πＲ时，与无成本分担的分散式决策相比，在有成本分担的分散式决策下，制造商的减排努力程度没有变化，零售商的低碳宣传努力程度有所提高，协同控制的集中式决策下，制造商的减排努力程度和零售商的低碳宣传努力程度都最高; 当 2πM＜πＲ时，此时制造商不但不给零售商提供补贴，而且会从零售商收取一定的费用，这时与无成本分担的分散式决策相比，零售商的低碳宣传努力程度有所下降，降低了零售商进行低碳宣传的积极性．

When 2πM>πR, compared with the decentralized decision-making without cost sharing, under the decentralized decision-making with cost sharing, the manufacturer's emission reduction efforts remain unchanged, while the retailer's low-carbon publicity efforts increase. Under the centralized decision-making with collaborative control, both the manufacturer's emission reduction efforts and the retailer's low-carbon publicity efforts are the highest. When 2πM

有成本分担的分散式决策

Decentralized decision making with cost sharing

当2πM＞πＲ时，在有成本分担的分散式决策下，制造商和零售商的利润都大于无成本分担的分散式决策时的利润，这说明成本分担契约满足制造商和零售商的参与约束，具有自执行的性质，且可以实现制造商利润和零售商利润的Pareto改善; 当 2πM＜ πＲ时，成本分担契约可以使制造商的利润得到改善，却降低了零售商的利润，不满足零售商的参与约束．因此，2πM＞ πＲ才是成本分担契约成立的必要条件．

When 2πM > πR, under decentralized decision-making with cost sharing, both the manufacturer and the retailer's profits are greater than under decentralized decision-making without cost sharing. This indicates that the cost-sharing contract satisfies the manufacturer and retailer's participation constraints, is self-enforcing, and can achieve a Pareto improvement in both manufacturer and retailer profits. When 2πM πR is a necessary condition for the cost-sharing contract to hold.

零售商对制造商的改善

Retailer-to-manufacturer improvements

当πＲ＜2πM ＜ 3πＲ时对零售商利润改善的效果大于对制造商利润改善的效果，当 2πM＞3πＲ时对制造商利润的改善效果大于对零售商利润的改善效果． 这说明当制造商边际收益足够大时对制造商利润的 Pareto 改善效果更明显，制造商更应该利用成本分担契约激励零售商进行低碳宣传

When πR 3πR, the improvement in manufacturer profits is greater than that in retailer profits. This suggests that when the manufacturer's marginal revenue is large enough, the Pareto effect on manufacturer profits is more significant, and manufacturers should use cost-sharing contracts to encourage retailers to promote low-carbon products.

成本分担对制造商与零售商的改善

Cost sharing improves manufacturers and retailers

成本分担契约对制造商和零售商利润的Pareto 改善效果，受消费者对零售商低碳宣传敏感性的系数 β、零售商低碳宣传成本系数ηＲ、制造商和零售商边际收益的差值以及折现率 ρ的影响，部分参数的影响关系将在算例中进行分析．

The Pareto improvement effect of a cost-sharing contract on the profits of manufacturers and retailers is influenced by the coefficient β of consumer sensitivity to retailers' low-carbon advertising, the coefficient ηR of retailers' low-carbon advertising costs, the difference in marginal revenue between manufacturers and retailers, and the discount rate ρ. The influence of some of these parameters will be analyzed in a numerical example.

协同控制的集中式决策

Centralized decision-making for collaborative control

协同控制的集中式决策情形下，供应链系统的最优利润大于两种分散式决策情形下的最优利润．但值得注意的是，只有使制造商和零售商协同控制时各自的利润大于非协同控制时各自的利润时的最优策略才能被制造商和零售商所接受．至于制造商和零售商各自所占系统利润的增量份额，则取决于双方的谈判( 讨价还价)能力．

Under the centralized decision-making scenario of collaborative control, the optimal profit of the supply chain system is greater than the optimal profit under the two decentralized decision-making scenarios. However, it is worth noting that only the optimal strategy that makes the manufacturer and retailer's respective profits under collaborative control greater than their respective profits under non-cooperative control is acceptable to both manufacturers and retailers. The share of the incremental system profit that each manufacturer and retailer receives depends on the bargaining power of both parties.

今天的分享就到这里了。
如果您对文章有独特的想法，
欢迎给我们留言，
让我们相约明天。
祝您今天过得开心快乐！
That's all for today's sharing.
If you have a unique idea about the article,
please leave us a message,
and let us meet tomorrow.
I wish you a nice day!

翻译：谷歌翻译

资料来源：ChatGPT、百度百科

参考文献：[1]徐春秋,赵道致,原白云,等.上下游联合减排与低碳宣传的微分博弈模型[J].管理科学学报,2016,19(02):53-65.

本文由LearningYard学苑整理并发出，如有侵权请后台留言沟通。

文案：qiao

排版：qiao

审核：李杰

来源：LearningYard学苑