晴读（42）：精读期刊论文

摘要：Today, I will present the design of incentive mechanisms under asymmetric capacity information for the Design of Incentive Mechani

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“晴读（42）：精读复刻论文《基于委托代理理论的逆向供应链激励机制设计与回收模式选择》的能力信息不对称下的激励机制设计”

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"Qing Du (42): Intensive Reproduction and Interpretation of the Incentive Mechanism Design under Asymmetric Capacity Information in the Paper Design of Incentive Mechanism and Selection of Recovery Mode for Reverse Supply Chain Based on Principal-agent Theory"

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今天小编将从思维导图、精读内容、知识补充三个板块为大家带来《基于委托代理理论的逆向供应链激励机制设计与回收模式选择》的能力信息不对称下的激励机制设计。

Today, I will present the design of incentive mechanisms under asymmetric capacity information for the Design of Incentive Mechanism and Selection of Recovery Mode for Reverse Supply Chain Based on Principal-agent Theory, organized into three sections: mind map, intensive reading content, and knowledge supplement.

一、思维导图（Mind Mapping）

二、精读内容（Conduct in-depth reading of the material）

1.模型核心设定（Core Settings of the Model）

（1）主体关系：制造商（委托人）委托两个竞争型回收商（代理人），回收商能力禀赋θᵢ为私有信息，努力行为不可观测。

（2）关键约束：参与约束（回收商接受契约需满足保留效用）、逆向选择约束（避免回收商谎报能力）、道德风险约束（激励回收商最优努力）。

（3）收益与效用：制造商风险中性，期望效用等于期望收益；回收商风险规避，用确定性等价收益表示效用，需考虑风险成本。

(1) Principal-Agent Relationship: The manufacturer (principal) entrusts two competitive recyclers (agents). The recyclers' capacity endowment θᵢ is private information, and their effort behaviors are unobservable.

(2) Key Constraints: Participation constraint (recyclers must meet the reservation utility to accept the contract), adverse selection constraint (preventing recyclers from falsely reporting their capacity), and moral hazard constraint (incentivizing recyclers to make optimal efforts).

(3) Revenue and Utility: The manufacturer is risk-neutral, with expected utility equal to expected revenue; the recyclers are risk-averse, and their utility is expressed by certainty equivalent income, which needs to consider risk costs.

2.核心结论与推导（Core Conclusions and Derivations）

（1）最优契约结构。回收绩效分享比例β(θᵢ)ᴰᴺ∗：随回收商能力θᵢ增大而增大，随努力成本a、风险规避系数ρ、市场不确定性σ²增大而减小；竞争强度k较低时随k增大而增大，超过阈值K₁后随k增大而减小。固定支付α(θᵢ)ᴰᴺ∗：需覆盖回收商保留效用，同时补偿风险成本与努力成本，且与回收商能力、竞争强度动态关联。

（2）回收商最优努力水平。eᵢᴰᴺ∗随自身能力θᵢ、竞争强度k、努力产出系数b增大而增大，随a、ρ、σ²增大而减小，体现能力越强、竞争越充分，回收商努力意愿越高。

（3）期望效用分配。回收商：除最弱能力者（θᵢ=θ̲）仅获保留效用外，其余回收商获取额外信息租金，且租金随能力提升而增加。制造商：需承担信息租金成本，收益受竞争强度与回收商能力双重影响，需在激励强度与租金支出间权衡。

(1) Optimal Contract Structure: Recovery performance sharing ratio β(θᵢ)ᴰᴺ∗: Increases with the recycler’s capacity θᵢ, decreases with the increase of effort cost a, absolute risk aversion coefficient ρ, and market uncertainty σ²; increases with the competition intensity k when k is low, and decreases with k when k exceeds the threshold K₁. Fixed payment α(θᵢ)ᴰᴺ∗: Must cover the recycler’s reservation utility, compensate for risk cost and effort cost simultaneously, and is dynamically associated with the recycler’s capacity and competition intensity.

(2) Recyclers’ Optimal Effort Level: eᵢᴰᴺ∗ increases with the recycler’s own capacity θᵢ, competition intensity k, and effort output coefficient b, and decreases with the increase of a, ρ, and σ². This indicates that the stronger the capacity and the more competitive the market, the greater the recycler’s willingness to make efforts.

(3) Allocation of Expected Utility: Recyclers: Except for the weakest recycler (θᵢ=θ̲), who only obtains reservation utility, all other recyclers gain additional information rent, which increases with the improvement of capacity. Manufacturer: Must bear the cost of information rent; its revenue is affected by both competition intensity and recyclers’ capacity, and it is necessary to balance incentive intensity and rent expenditure.

3.结论启示（Conclusion Implications）

（1）针对高能力回收商：适度提高绩效分享比例，但需控制竞争强度，避免恶性竞争导致激励失效。

（2）风险与成本控制：市场不确定性高或回收商风险规避时，降低激励强度，通过固定支付保障回收商参与积极性。

（3）信息甄别：利用契约菜单差异化设计，通过绩效分享比例与固定支付组合，区分不同能力回收商，规避“劣币驱逐良币”。

(1) For high-capacity recyclers: Appropriately increase the performance sharing ratio, but control the competition intensity to avoid incentive failure caused by vicious competition.

(2) Risk and cost control: When market uncertainty is high or recyclers are risk-averse, reduce the incentive intensity and ensure recyclers' participation enthusiasm through fixed payments.

(3) Information screening: Utilize the differentiated design of contract menus, and distinguish recyclers of different capacities through the combination of performance sharing ratio and fixed payment to avoid "bad money driving out good money".

三、知识补充（Supplementary knowledge）

1.保留效用：保留效用是回收商参与逆向供应链回收业务的“最低收益底线”，是制造商设计激励契约时需满足的基础条件，核心作用是保障回收商愿意接受契约而非退出合作。

2.确定性等价收益：确定性等价收益是用于衡量风险规避型回收商对“不确定收益”的“主观价值换算”工具，核心是将包含风险的随机收益转化为回收商认为“无风险且等价”的固定收益，从而简化效用计算与契约设计逻辑。

3.契约菜单：契约菜单是制造商在“回收商能力信息不对称”场景下，用于“甄别回收商真实能力”的差异化契约组合，核心是为不同能力类型的回收商设计“专属契约”，促使回收商“如实报告能力”（规避逆向选择问题）。

1. Reservation Utility: Reservation utility is the "minimum income threshold" for recyclers to participate in the reverse supply chain recycling business. It is a basic condition that manufacturers must meet when designing incentive contracts, and its core role is to ensure that recyclers are willing to accept the contract rather than withdraw from cooperation.

2. Certainty Equivalent Income: Certainty equivalent income is a "subjective value conversion" tool for risk-averse recyclers to measure "uncertain income". Its core is to convert risky random income into fixed income that recyclers consider "risk-free and equivalent", thereby simplifying the logic of utility calculation and contract design.

3. Contract Menu: A contract menu is a differentiated contract combination used by manufacturers to "identify the true capacity of recyclers" in the scenario of "asymmetric information on recyclers' capacity". Its core is to design "exclusive contracts" for recyclers of different capacity types to prompt recyclers to "truthfully report their capacity" (avoiding adverse selection problems).

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