慧学（57）：精读博士论文引言

摘要：In this issue, the editor will introduce the introduction of the doctoral dissertation "Coopetition Strategies for Low-Carbon Supp

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“慧学（57）：精读博士论文《考虑电商平台绿色推广的低碳供应链竞合策略研究》引言”。

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“Hui Xue (57): Intensive reading of doctoral dissertation ‘Coopetition Strategies for Low-Carbon Supply Chain Considering E-Commerce Platform Green Promotion’ introduction”.

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本期推文小编将从思维导图、精读内容、知识补充三个方面为大家介绍博士论文《考虑电商平台绿色推广的低碳供应链竞合策略研究》的引言。

In this issue, the editor will introduce the introduction of the doctoral dissertation "Coopetition Strategies for Low-Carbon Supply Chain Considering E-Commerce Platform Green Promotion" from three aspects: mind mapping, intensive reading content, and knowledge supplement.

一、思维导图（Mind mapping）

二、精读内容（Intensive reading content）

1、研究背景（Background）

在国家“双碳”战略目标的推动下，制造企业被要求在绿色生产、碳减排技术应用以及低碳产品市场推广等方面全面提升标准。《“十四五”工业绿色发展规划》和《促进绿色消费实施方案》明确提出从“生产端＋消费端”协同推进的政策方向，强调零售企业在供应链绿色化中的枢纽作用。然而，传统依靠企业自主研发与内部推广的减排模式在复杂市场环境与多重政策约束下已显现局限，难以支撑全面的绿色转型。电子商务平台凭借其强大的市场渗透力和精准营销能力，成为低碳产品推广和绿色消费引导的重要载体。数据显示，中国B2C电商市场规模已达13.8万亿元，覆盖8.4亿消费者。阿里巴巴、京东等平台通过设立绿色专区、碳积分激励等方式推动低碳产品销售，展现出数字化平台在促进供应链低碳化中的独特优势。

Driven by the country's "dual carbon" strategic goals, manufacturing companies are required to comprehensively improve standards in green production, the application of carbon reduction technologies, and the market promotion of low-carbon products. The "14th Five-Year Plan for Industrial Green Development" and the "Implementation Plan for Promoting Green Consumption" clearly advocate a coordinated policy approach from the "production and consumption ends," emphasizing the pivotal role of retail companies in greening the supply chain. However, the traditional emission reduction model, which relies on independent research and development and internal promotion, has shown its limitations in a complex market environment and multiple policy constraints, making it difficult to support a comprehensive green transformation. E-commerce platforms, with their strong market penetration and precision marketing capabilities, have become a key vehicle for promoting low-carbon products and guiding green consumption. Data shows that China's B2C e-commerce market has reached 13.8 trillion yuan, covering 840 million consumers. Platforms such as Alibaba and JD.com are promoting the sales of low-carbon products through the establishment of green zones and carbon credit incentives, demonstrating the unique advantages of digital platforms in promoting low-carbon supply chains.

2、核心研究问题（Core research questions）

在“双碳”背景下，制造商是否以及如何采用平台绿色推广服务成为关键问题。不同制造商在平台推广服务的应用上策略差异显著，这不仅影响其减排投入与生产规模，也关系到整体市场竞争格局。然而，现实中平台绿色推广服务的实际转化率低于预期。与此同时，信息不对称导致制造商可能虚报减排数据以获取更多推广资源，平台亟需建立公平高效的资源分配与激励机制。此外，制造商通过技术授权或联合研发提升减排能力虽可增强竞争力，但合作与竞争并存，需在博弈中实现平衡。随着区块链等新技术的应用，数据透明度得到提升，但技术不确定性又可能影响长期合作的稳定性和收益分配机制的合理性，这也对平台与制造商关系的设计提出新挑战。

In the context of the "dual carbon" initiative, whether and how manufacturers adopt platform green promotion services has become a key question. Different manufacturers exhibit significant differences in their strategies for utilizing platform promotion services, which not only impacts their emission reduction investment and production scale but also the overall market competition landscape. However, in reality, the actual conversion rate of platform green promotion services has fallen short of expectations. Furthermore, information asymmetry can lead manufacturers to falsify emission reduction data to secure additional promotion resources, necessitating the establishment of fair and efficient resource allocation and incentive mechanisms for platforms. Furthermore, while manufacturers can enhance their competitiveness by improving their emission reduction capabilities through technology licensing or joint R&D, this balance between cooperation and competition requires a balance. While the application of new technologies such as blockchain is improving data transparency, technological uncertainty may also impact the stability of long-term collaboration and the rationality of profit distribution mechanisms, posing new challenges for the design of relationships between platforms and manufacturers.

3、研究意义（Research significance）

本研究在理论层面具有多重意义。首先，它扩展了低碳供应链的研究框架，将研究对象从传统线下零售延伸至电子商务平台，揭示数字平台在低碳转型中的新作用。其次，通过引入信息不对称理论，系统分析平台差异化推广机制对制造商减排信息传递和市场信号作用的影响，丰富了相关理论应用。再次，研究通过竞合视角构建长期稳定的合作契约模型，为供应链可持续协同提供新的分析范式。在实践层面，本文为制造商制定绿色推广策略、优化生产与减排决策提供量化依据，并为政府和监管机构完善低碳供应链的政策设计与激励机制提供现实参考，从而促进平台经济与绿色转型的融合发展。

This study has multiple theoretical implications. First, it expands the research framework of low-carbon supply chains, extending the research object from traditional offline retail to e-commerce platforms, revealing the new role of digital platforms in low-carbon transformation. Second, by introducing information asymmetry theory, it systematically analyzes the impact of the platform's differentiated promotion mechanism on manufacturers' emission reduction information transmission and market signaling, enriching the relevant theoretical applications. Third, the study constructs a long-term and stable cooperative contract model from a competitive perspective, providing a new analytical paradigm for sustainable supply chain collaboration. At the practical level, this article provides a quantitative basis for manufacturers to formulate green promotion strategies, optimize production and emission reduction decisions, and provide a practical reference for governments and regulators to improve the policy design and incentive mechanism of low-carbon supply chains, thereby promoting the integrated development of platform economy and green transformation.

4、研究方法与技术路线（Research methods and technical routes）

本研究综合运用博弈论、最优化理论与数值分析法相结合的多层次研究方法。首先，通过Nash、Stackelberg、信号博弈、随机微分博弈等模型，分析制造商与平台在绿色推广背景下的竞争与合作策略演化。其次，利用最优化理论构建多约束下的决策优化模型，确保各主体策略的最优性与稳定性。最后，借助Matlab R2024a与Mathematica 12.0等工具，对模型进行数值仿真与敏感性分析。在技术路线方面，研究将从横向竞争出发，探讨不同推广策略对减排绩效与产量决策的影响；进一步在纵向信息不对称条件下，分析制造商与平台的定价与推广博弈机制；同时研究制造商间的减排合作与价格竞合策略；最终设计基于区块链信息透明化的纵向动态合作契约模型，以应对技术不确定性并保障长期合作稳定性。

This study utilizes a multi-level research approach combining game theory, optimization theory, and numerical analysis. First, using models such as Nash, Stackelberg, signaling games, and stochastic differential games, we analyze the evolution of competitive and cooperative strategies between manufacturers and platforms in the context of green promotion. Second, we utilize optimization theory to construct a multi-constrained decision-making optimization model to ensure the optimality and stability of each agent's strategy. Finally, using tools such as Matlab R2024a and Mathematica 12.0, we conduct numerical simulations and sensitivity analyses of the model. Regarding technical approaches, the study will explore the impact of different promotion strategies on emission reduction performance and production decisions, focusing on horizontal competition. Furthermore, under conditions of vertical information asymmetry, we analyze the pricing and promotion game mechanisms between manufacturers and platforms. Furthermore, we examine emission reduction cooperation and price competition strategies among manufacturers. Finally, we design a vertical dynamic cooperation contract model based on blockchain information transparency to address technological uncertainty and ensure long-term cooperative stability.

5、创新点（Innovation）

本研究的创新主要体现在三方面。首先，首次将平台绿色推广纳入制造商横向竞争分析框架，构建三种不同的推广应用情境，系统比较企业利润、减排绩效及市场格局的差异，从而揭示平台介入对供应链低碳化的动态影响。其次，构建制造商与平台间的信息不对称博弈模型，深入分析主导结构与信息结构的交互作用，提出应对制造商虚报减排数据问题的激励约束机制，为平台管理提供理论依据。最后，结合横向减排合作与纵向推广合作，设计长期稳定的协作契约方案，兼顾收益分配与激励兼容性，为供应链低碳治理提供可操作、可复制的制度化解决路径。

The innovations of this study are mainly reflected in three aspects. First, for the first time, the platform's green promotion is incorporated into the manufacturer's horizontal competition analysis framework, three different promotion application scenarios are constructed, and differences in corporate profits, emission reduction performance, and market structure are systematically compared, thereby revealing the dynamic impact of platform intervention on the low-carbonization of the supply chain. Second, an information asymmetry game model between manufacturers and platforms is constructed, and the interaction between the dominant structure and information structure is deeply analyzed. An incentive and constraint mechanism is proposed to address the problem of manufacturers falsifying emission reduction data, providing a theoretical basis for platform management. Finally, combining horizontal emission reduction cooperation with vertical promotion cooperation, a long-term and stable collaborative contract plan is designed, taking into account both benefit distribution and incentive compatibility, providing an operational and replicable institutional solution path for low-carbon governance of the supply chain.

三、知识补充（Knowledge supplementation）

1、非对称信息博弈理论（Asymmetric information game theory）

非对称信息博弈理论是管理博弈论的重要研究方向，旨在探讨信息不完全或不对称条件下最优契约的设计问题。该理论起源于非合作博弈在经济学中的拓展应用，重点分析当事人在信息掌握不均的情境中如何制定策略、协调行为与配置激励。其分析框架通常以委托—代理模型为核心，通过设计满足参与约束与激励相容约束的契约机制，促使代理方在自身利益驱动下仍能采取符合委托方目标的行动。根据信息差异的表现形式，信息不对称可分为时间维度（如事前与事后）和内容维度（如行动难以观测或知识不对等），并据此衍生出逆向选择、道德风险、隐蔽行动及隐蔽信息等四类模型。该理论在方法论上与非合作博弈论密切相关，依托状态空间设定与分布函数参数化等技术手段，探索能够实现帕累托改进的契约结构。相较而言，非对称信息博弈理论更强调契约优化与单一目标效率，而管理博弈论则聚焦于多目标协调与组织激励，两者在研究取向上相辅相成。

Asymmetric information game theory is a key research area in management game theory, exploring the design of optimal contracts under conditions of incomplete or asymmetric information. Originating from the extended application of non-cooperative game theory in economics, this theory focuses on how parties develop strategies, coordinate behavior, and configure incentives in situations with unequal information. Its analytical framework is typically centered on the principal-agent model. By designing contractual mechanisms that satisfy participation constraints and incentive compatibility, it encourages agents, driven by their own interests, to take actions that align with the principal's objectives. Based on the manifestations of information differences, information asymmetry can be categorized into temporal dimensions (e.g., ex ante vs. ex post) and content dimensions (e.g., unobservable actions or knowledge asymmetry), leading to four types of models: adverse selection, moral hazard, covert action, and hidden information. Methodologically, this theory is closely related to non-cooperative game theory, leveraging techniques such as state space specification and distribution function parameterization to explore contract structures that can achieve Pareto improvements. In comparison, asymmetric information game theory emphasizes contract optimization and single-target efficiency, while management game theory focuses on multi-target coordination and organizational incentives. The two complement each other in research orientation.

2、动态博弈概述（Dynamic game overview）

动态博弈是博弈论的重要分支，其基本特征在于参与者按照既定的时间顺序依次行动，后行动者能够观察到前行动者的决策并据此调整自身策略。与静态博弈相比，动态博弈强调策略的时间演化性，其策略不局限于单一阶段行为，而是涵盖所有可能情境的完整决策计划。在此过程中，由于信息不对称或观察受限，参与者可能面临相机选择问题，导致纳什均衡结果的不稳定。根据信息完备性不同，动态博弈可划分为完全信息与不完全信息两类：前者中先行动者能预判后行动者的反应，而后者则要求后行动者依据观察结果修正先验信念。典型的动态博弈形式包括序列博弈与重复博弈，不同类型的博弈可能表现出先动优势、后动优势或无优势的特征，如产量竞争与价格竞争等情境。动态博弈的分析通常借助扩展式表示法构建博弈树，以便通过子博弈完美纳什均衡（完全信息）或完美贝叶斯纳什均衡（不完全信息）确定理性预期的均衡结果。该理论在企业市场进入策略、竞争对策及棋类决策等多阶段互动场景中得到广泛应用。

Dynamic games are a key branch of game theory. Their fundamental characteristic is that participants act sequentially in a predetermined time sequence, with later movers able to observe the decisions of earlier movers and adjust their own strategies accordingly. Compared to static games, dynamic games emphasize the temporal evolution of strategies. Strategies are not limited to single-stage actions but rather encompass comprehensive decision plans across all possible scenarios. During this process, due to information asymmetry or limited observation, participants may face discretionary choices, leading to unstable Nash equilibrium outcomes. Based on the level of information completeness, dynamic games can be categorized as either complete information or incomplete information. In the former, the first mover can predict the next mover's response, while in the latter, the next mover must revise their prior beliefs based on observations. Typical dynamic game forms include sequential games and repeated games. Different types of dynamic games may exhibit first-mover advantages, second-mover advantages, or no advantages, such as in scenarios like output competition and price competition. Analysis of dynamic games often utilizes an extended representation to construct a game tree, allowing for the identification of rational expectations equilibrium outcomes through subgame perfect Nash equilibria (with complete information) or perfect Bayesian Nash equilibria (with incomplete information). This theory has been widely used in multi-stage interactive scenarios such as corporate market entry strategies, competitive countermeasures, and chess decision-making.

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翻译：Google翻译

参考资料：百度、Chatgpt