摘要：《American Economic Review》(美国经济评论)创刊于1911年，是美国历史最悠久、最受学者尊敬、全球公认的经济学领域顶级期刊之一，涵盖了经济理论、应用经济学、经济政策、经济史以及实证研究等多个领域，致力于发表高质量的经济学研究，推动经济学

声明：本系列文章基于原期刊目录和摘要内容整理而得，仅限于读者交流学习。如有侵权，请联系删除。

期刊介绍：

《American Economic Review》(美国经济评论)创刊于1911年，是美国历史最悠久、最受学者尊敬、全球公认的经济学领域顶级期刊之一，涵盖了经济理论、应用经济学、经济政策、经济史以及实证研究等多个领域，致力于发表高质量的经济学研究，推动经济学理论的发展和实践应用。该刊每年发行12期，每期发表文章8篇左右，内容涉及经济学领域广泛主题，2024年影响因子为10.5。

《Econometrica》(计量经济学期刊)发表经济学的所有分支的原创文章，题涵盖经济学整个领域，无论是理论、实证型的论文，还是抽象、应用型的论文。其主旨是促进经济问题的理论定量方法和实证定量方法的统一，强调具有建设性和严谨性思维的研究。该期刊每年都会探索一系列独特的主题，从许多新的重要领域的理论发展前沿，到当前和应用经济问题的研究，再到计量经济学的方法创新、理论和应用研究。该刊每年发行6期，每期发表文章14篇左右，2024年影响因子为6.6。

《The Review of Economic Studies》(《经济研究评论》)是本国际知名的经济学学术期刊，由牛津大学经济系和伦敦政治经济学院经济系共同出版，为广泛认可的经济学5大顶级期刊之一。该期刊于1933年首次出版，旨在提供对经济学各个领域的前沿研究的深入理解，包括宏观经济学、微观经济学、计量经济学和应用经济学等、吸引了全球范围内的顶尖经济学家和研究学者投稿和发表。该刊每年发行6期，每期发表文章15篇左右，2024年影响因子为5.9。

本期看点：

●健康风险：美国65岁以上家庭面临的暂时性收入冲击和健康风险中，消费对收入冲击有反应而自付医疗费用没有反应，但二者对健康冲击均有反应，健康冲击通过改变消费边际效用，影响消费与最优医疗转移支付。

●价格风险：如果收入的边际效用与价格之间的协方差为正，实物转移支付将提供抵御价格风险的保险收益。印度旗舰实物食品转移项目的扩展不仅增加了卡路里摄入量，还降低了卡路里对价格的敏感性。

●工资风险：家庭能够自我保险的程度取决于家庭结构和工资风险，允许丰富的工资动态对于正确评估政策具有一定的重要性。

●保险产品选择：减少保险产品数量的选择可以通过改善选择、节约信息成本、设定自付费用上限来更大的福利收益。

●残疾保险：研究奥地利的两项限制性残疾保险改革后发现，相比降低福利而言，严格的残疾保险资格规则带来了更高的财政成本节约和更低的保险损失。

●医疗保险：在不同医疗保险定价行为假设之间的实证比较中，寡头垄断定价优于完全竞争。考虑不同的补贴设计表明，在均衡状态下，将补贴慷慨度向“年轻健康群体”倾斜，将降低所有参保者的保费，同时增加参保人数和利润。

●遗嘱福利：在有资格获得遗属福利的寡妇中，配偶死亡事件并没有导致劳动力供给的增加，这表明她们几乎没有剩余的自我保险需求。

※ 本期目录

●Coyne, David, Itzik Fadlon, Shanthi P. Ramnath, and Patricia K. Tong. 2024. “Household Labor Supply and the Value of Social Security Survivors Benefits.” American Economic Review, 114 (5): 1248–80.

●Blundell, Richard, Margherita Borella, Jeanne Commault, and Mariacristina De Nardi. 2024. “Old Age Risks, Consumption, and Insurance.” American Economic Review, 114 (2): 575–613.

●Gadenne, Lucie, Samuel Norris, Monica Singhal, and Sandip Sukhtankar. 2024. “In-Kind Transfers as Insurance.” American Economic Review, 114 (9): 2861–97.

●Brown, Zach Y., and Jihye Jeon. 2024. “Endogenous Information and Simplifying Insurance Choice.” Econometrica, 92 (3): 881-911.

●Haller, Andreas, Stefan Staubli, and Josef Zweimüller. 2024. “Designing Disability Insurance Reforms: Tightening Eligibility Rules or Reducing Benefits?” Econometrica, 92 (1): 79-110.

●Tebaldi, Pietro. 2025. “Estimating Equilibrium in health insurance Exchanges: Price Competition and Subsidy Design under the ACA.” The Review of Economic Studies, 92 (1): 586–620.

●Aizawa, Naoki, Soojin Kim, and Serena Rhee. 2025. “Labour Market Screening and the Design of Social Insurance: An Equilibrium Analysis of the Labour Market for the Disabled.” The Review of Economic Studies, 92 (1): 1–39.

●De Nardi, Mariacristina, Giulio Fella, and Gonzalo Paz-Pardo. 2024. “Wage Risk and Government and Spousal Insurance.” The Review of Economic Studies.

Household Labor Supply and the Value of Social Security Survivors Benefits

家庭劳动力供给与社会保障遗属福利的价值

作者

David Coyne（美国财政部税务分析办公室），Itzik Fadlon（加州大学圣地亚哥分校；国家经济研究局（NBER）），Shanthi P. Ramnath（芝加哥联邦储备银行），Patricia K. Tong（兰德公司）

摘要：We combine quasi-experimental variation in spousal death and age eligibility for survivors benefits using US tax records to study the effects on American households' labor supply and the design of social security's survivors insurance. Benefit eligibility at the exact age of 60 induces sharp reductions in the labor supply of newly widowed households, highlighting the value of survivors benefits and the liquidity they provide following the shock. Among eligible widows, the spousal death event induces no increases in labor supply, suggesting little residual need to self-insure. Using theory, we underscore the program's protective insurance role and its high valuation among survivors.

我们利用美国税务记录中的配偶死亡和遗属福利年龄资格的准实验变化，研究了这些因素对美国家庭劳动力供给以及社会保障遗属保险制度设计的影响。在60岁这一确切年龄获得福利资格，会导致新丧偶家庭的劳动力供给显著减少，这突显了遗属福利及其在遭受打击后所提供的流动性的价值。在有资格获得遗属福利的寡妇中，配偶死亡事件并没有导致劳动力供给的增加，这表明她们几乎没有剩余的自我保险需求。通过理论分析，我们强调了该项目的保护性保险作用以及遗属对生存者的重要性。

Old Age Risks, Consumption, and Insurance

老年风险、消费与保险

作者

Richard Blundell（伦敦大学），Margherita Borella（都灵大学），Jeanne Commault（巴黎政治学院），Mariacristina De Nardi（明尼苏达大学）

摘要：In the United States, after age 65, households face income and health risks, and a large fraction of these risks are transitory. While consumption significantly responds to transitory income shocks, out-of-pocket medical expenses do not. In contrast, both consumption and out-of-pocket medical expenses respond to transitory health shocks. Thus, most US elderly keep their out-of-pocket medical expenses close to a satiation point that varies with health. Consumption responds to health shocks mostly because adverse health shocks reduce the marginal utility of consumption. The effect of health on marginal utility changes the optimal transfers due to health shocks.

在美国，65岁以上的家庭面临收入和健康风险，而且这些风险很大一部分是暂时性的。虽然消费对暂时性收入冲击有显著反应，但自付医疗费用却并非如此。相比之下，消费和自付医疗费用对暂时性健康冲击都有反应。因此，大多数美国老年人会将自付医疗费用维持在一个随健康状况而变化的饱和点附近。消费对健康冲击做出反应，主要是因为负面健康冲击会降低消费的边际效用。健康对边际效用的影响改变了因健康冲击而产生的最优转移支付。

In-Kind Transfers as Insurance

实物转移支付作为保险

作者

Lucie Gadenne (伦敦大学), Samuel Norris（不列颠哥伦比亚大学）, Monica Singhal（加利福尼亚大学戴维斯分校）, Sandip Sukhtankar（弗吉尼亚大学）

摘要：Households in developing countries often face variation in the prices of consumption goods. We develop a model demonstrating that in-kind transfers will provide insurance benefits against price risk if the covariance between the marginal utility of income and price is positive. Using calorie shortfalls as a proxy for marginal utility, we find that this condition holds for low-income Indian households. Expansions in India's flagship in-kind food transfer program not only increase caloric intake but also reduce caloric sensitivity to prices. Our results contribute to ongoing debates about the optimal form of social protection programs.

发展中国家的家庭常常面临消费品价格的波动。我们构建了一个模型，表明如果收入的边际效用与价格之间的协方差为正，实物转移支付将提供抵御价格风险的保险收益。以卡路里缺口作为边际效用的代理变量，我们发现这一条件适用于印度的低收入家庭。印度旗舰实物食品转移项目的扩展不仅增加了卡路里摄入量，还降低了卡路里对价格的敏感性。我们的研究结果有助于当前关于社会保护计划最佳形式的讨论。

Endogenous Information and Simplifying Insurance Choice

内生信息与保险选择的简化

作者

Zach Y. Brown（密歇根大学），Jihye Jeon（波士顿大学）

摘要：In markets with complicated products, individuals may choose how much time and effort to spend understanding and comparing alternatives. Focusing on insurance choice, we find evidence consistent with individuals acquiring more information when there are larger consequences from making an uninformed choice. Building on the rational inattention literature, we develop and estimate a parsimonious demand model in which individuals choose how much to research difficult-to-observe characteristics. We use our estimates to evaluate policies that simplify choice. Reducing the number of plans can raise welfare through improved choice as well as savings in information costs. Capping out-of-pocket costs generates larger welfare gains than standard models. The empirical model can be applied to other settings to examine the regulation of complex products.

在产品复杂的市场中，个人可能会选择花多少时间和精力去了解和比较替代品。以保险选择为重点，我们发现有证据表明，如果做出不知情的选择会产生较大后果时，个人会去获取更多信息。在理性疏忽（rational inattention）文献的基础上，我们建立并估算了一个简明的需求模型，在这个模型中，个人会选择对难以观察到的特征进行多少研究。我们利用估算结果来评估能够简化选择的政策。减少计划数量可以通过改善选择和节约信息成本来提高福利。与标准模型相比，设定自付费用上限能带来更大的福利收益。该实证模型可应用于其他环境，以研究复杂产品的监管问题。

Designing Disability Insurance Reforms: Tightening Eligibility Rules or Reducing Benefits?

设计残疾保险改革：收紧资格规则还是减少福利？

作者

Andreas Haller(挪威经济学院)，Stefan Staubli(卡尔加大学)，Josef Zweimüller(苏黎世大学)

摘要：This paper develops a sufficient statistics framework for analyzing the welfare effects of disability insurance (DI). We derive social-optimality conditions for the two main DI policy parameters: (i) eligibility rules and (ii) benefit levels. Applying this framework to two restrictive DI reforms in Austria, we find that tighter DI eligibility rules triggered higher fiscal cost savings and lower insurance losses. Hence, tighter DI eligibility rules dominate DI benefit reductions in scaling back the Austrian DI system.

本文构建了一个充分统计框架，用于分析残疾保险（DI）的福利影响。我们推导出残疾保险两个主要参数的社会最优条件：（i）资格规则和（ii）福利水平。将该框架应用于奥地利的两项限制性DI改革后发现，更严格的DI资格规则带来了更高的财政成本节约和更低的保险损失。因此，在缩减奥地利的DI体系时，更严格的资格规则优于减少福利水平。

Estimating Equilibrium in Health Insurance Exchanges: Price Competition and subsidy Design under the ACA

估计健康保险交易所的均衡：《平价医疗法案》下的价格竞争与补贴设计

作者

Pietro Tebaldi（哥伦比亚大学；国家经济研究局（NBER））

摘要：Regulations to design private yet publicly sponsored health insurance markets are increasingly adopted in many OECD countries. Here I combine data and economic theory to analyse the interaction between insurers’ competition and the design of premium subsidies in determining equilibrium outcomes. My empirical model includes adverse selection, rich heterogeneity in preferences for vertically and horizontally differentiated plans and accommodates alternative assumptions on pricing conduct. In the context of the Affordable Care Act in the U.S., I estimate the joint distribution of preferences and expected cost using Californian administrative records on 3.4 million plan choices between 2014 and 2017, combined with plan and survey data on medical claims. An empirical horse race between conduct assumptions favours oligopoly pricing over perfect competition. Considering alternative subsidy designs shows that, in equilibrium, shifting subsidy generosity toward the “young invincibles” would lower premiums for all enrolees while increasing enrolment and profits.

设计私人但由公共资助的医疗保险市场的法规在许多经合组织国家被越来越多的采用。在这里，本文结合数据和经济理论来分析保险公司竞争与保费补贴设计在决定均衡结果中的相互作用。本文的实证模型包括逆向选择、对垂直和水平差异化计划的丰富偏好异质性，并容纳了关于定价行为的不同假设。在美国《平价医疗法案》的背景下，我利用2014年至2017年间加州340万份计划选择的行政记录，结合计划和医疗索赔的调查数据，估计了偏好和预期成本的联合分布。在不同定价行为假设之间的实证比较中，寡头垄断定价优于完全竞争。考虑不同的补贴设计表明，在均衡状态下，将补贴慷慨度向“年轻健康群体”倾斜，将降低所有参保者的保费，同时增加参保人数和利润。

原文链接：

https://academic.oup.com/restud/article-abstract/92/1/586/7612959?redirectedFrom=fulltext

Labour Market Screening and the Design of Social Insurance: An Equilibrium Analysis of the Labour Market for the Disabled

劳动力市场筛选与社会保险设计：残疾人劳动力市场的均衡分析

作者

Naoki Aizawa（威斯康星大学麦迪逊分校；美国国家经济研究所）, Soojin Kim（美国乔治亚州立大学）, Serena Rhee（中央大学）

摘要：This article studies how firms’ screening incentives in the labour market affect the optimal design of social insurance programs and quantitatively assesses the U.S. disability policies accounting for firms’ screening of the disabled. We develop an equilibrium search model where workers with different productivities have heterogeneous preferences over non-wage benefits and firms cannot offer an employment contract that explicitly depends on worker types. In this environment, firms may use contracts to screen out a certain type of workers, distorting employment rates and contracts in equilibrium. Therefore, the optimal structure of social insurance policies depends on firms’ screening incentives. We extend and structurally estimate this framework to quantitatively understand the inefficiencies arising from firms’ incentives to screen out disabled workers and examine the optimal joint design of disability insurance (DI) and various forms of firm subsidies. We find that hiring subsidies mitigate screening distortions; at the same time, they interact with DI by reducing the labour supply disincentives it generates. The optimal policy structure leads to a considerable welfare gain by simultaneously making firm subsidies and DI benefits more generous.

本文研究了企业在劳动力市场上的筛选激励如何影响社会保险计划的优化设计，并定量评估了美国残疾政策对企业筛选残疾人的影响。我们开发了一个均衡搜索模型，在该模型中，具有不同生产力的工人对非工资福利有不同的偏好，公司不能提供明确取决于工人类型的雇佣合同。在这种环境下，企业可能会利用合同筛选出某种类型的工人，扭曲均衡的就业率和合同。因此，社会保险政策的最优结构取决于企业的筛选激励。我们扩展并从结构上估计了这一框架，以定量了解企业筛选残疾工人的激励措施所导致的效率低下，并研究了残疾保险（DI）和各种形式的企业补贴的最佳联合设计。我们发现，雇佣补贴可以缓解筛查扭曲；与此同时，它们通过减少DI产生的劳动力供应抑制因素与DI相互作用。最优政策结构通过同时使企业补贴和DI福利更加慷慨，带来了可观的福利收益。

Wage Risk and Government and Spousal Insurance

工资风险、政府与配偶保险

作者

Mariacristina De Nardi（明尼苏达大学、明尼阿波利斯联邦储备银行、欧洲经济政策研究中心（CEPR）和国家经济研究局（NBER））, Giulio Fella（英国伦敦玛丽女王大学和意大利博洛尼亚大学、欧洲经济政策研究中心（CEPR）、系统性风险理事会（CFM）和英国财政研究所（IFS））, Gonzalo Paz-Pardo（德国欧洲中央银行）

摘要：The extent to which households can self-insure depends on family structure and wage risk. We calibrate a model of couples and singles’ savings and labour supply under two types of wage processes. The first wage process is the canonical—age-independent, linear—one that is typically used to evaluate government insurance provision. The second wage process is a flexible one. We use our model to evaluate the optimal mix of the two most common types of means-tested benefits—IW versus income floor. The canonical wage process underestimates wage persistence for women and thus implies that IW benefits should account for most benefit income. In contrast, the richer wage process that matches the wage data well, implies that the income floor should be the main benefit source, similarly to the system in place in the U.K. This stresses that allowing for rich wage dynamics is important to properly evaluate policy.

家庭能够自我保险的程度取决于家庭结构和工资风险。我们在两种类型的工资流程下校准了夫妻和单身者的储蓄和劳动力供应模型。第一种工资流程是规范的——与年龄无关的、线性的——通常用于评估政府保险的提供。第二种工资流程是灵活的。我们使用我们的模型来评估两种最常见的经济状况调查福利类型的最佳组合——工作福利（IW）与收入底线福利。规范工资流程低估了女性的工资持久性，因此意味着工作福利应占福利收入的大部分。相比之下，与工资数据匹配良好的更丰富的工资流程则表明，收入底线应该是主要的福利来源，类似于英国现有的制度。这强调了允许丰富的工资动态对于正确评估政策的重要性。

来源：13个精算师