俊学（27）：《商品及服务竞争下平台供应链议价模式选择策略》

摘要：This issue of the tweet will introduce the equilibrium analysis of the intensive reading journal article "Platform Supply Chain Ba

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“俊学（27）：精读期刊论文《商品及服务竞争下平台供应链议价模式选择策略》的均衡分析”

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“Junxue (27): An Equilibrium Analysis of the Journal Paper "Platform Supply Chain Bargaining Model Selection Strategy under Goods and Services Competition"

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本期推文将从思维导图、精读内容、知识补充三个方面介绍精读期刊论文《商品及服务竞争下平台供应链议价模式选择策略》的均衡分析。

This issue of the tweet will introduce the equilibrium analysis of the intensive reading journal article "Platform Supply Chain Bargaining Model Selection Strategy under Goods and Services Competition" from three aspects: mind mapping, intensive reading content, and knowledge supplement.

一、思维导图（Mind Maps）

二、精读内容（Intensive reading content）

1.单独议价模式(Individual bargaining model)

在市场实践中，某知名体育用品品牌与电商平台进行合作销售。一个平台凭借完善的电商生态和大数据分析优势，与品牌方进行采购批发价谈判，获得了优惠的批发价格。另一个平台则利用特价促销和较强的用户粘性，在与品牌方的谈判中成功争取到具有竞争力的批发价格。

In market practice, a well-known sporting goods brand partnered with an e-commerce platform for sales. Leveraging its comprehensive e-commerce ecosystem and big data analytics, one platform negotiated favorable wholesale prices with the brand. Another platform, leveraging special promotions and strong user engagement, successfully secured competitive wholesale prices in negotiations with the brand.

根据已有研究，具有不同议价能力的两个平台同时单独与制造商进行讨价还价博弈，以此得到两平台与制造商的讨价还价效用。

According to existing research, two platforms with different bargaining powers engage in bargaining games with manufacturers separately at the same time to obtain the bargaining utility of the two platforms and the manufacturer.

再联立最大化平台与各自与制造商之间的讨价还价效用，可以得到在单独议价模式情形下的相应均衡决策和均衡利润。

By combining the maximization of the bargaining utility between the platform and each party and the manufacturer, we can obtain the corresponding equilibrium decision and equilibrium profit under the single bargaining model.

当一个平台的议价能力较高时，该平台支付的批发价格低于其他平台。同时，如果该平台的议价能力超过某一阈值，它会设定较低的产品零售价；反之，当该平台的议价能力达到另一个更高的阈值时，其产品的运营服务水平会低于其他平台。

When a platform's bargaining power is high, it pays lower wholesale prices than other platforms. At the same time, if the platform's bargaining power exceeds a certain threshold, it will set lower retail prices for its products. Conversely, when the platform's bargaining power reaches another higher threshold, its product operation service level will be lower than that of other platforms.

2.对称单独议价(Symmetrical individual bargaining)

为进一步分析议价实力相当的两个平台与制造商之间关于批发价谈判的情形，将两个实力相当的电商平台具有相同议价能力的讨价还价博弈标记为SBP情形。此情形下，两个平台具有相同的议价能力k，而制造商对应的议价能力为1-k，得到此时博弈双方之间的讨价还价效用。

To further analyze the wholesale price negotiation scenario between two platforms with comparable bargaining power and a manufacturer, we denote the bargaining game involving two platforms with equal bargaining power as the SBP scenario. In this scenario, the two platforms have the same bargaining power, k, while the manufacturer's corresponding bargaining power is 1-k. The bargaining utility between the two players in this scenario is obtained.

同样的，联立双方的讨价还价效用，可以得到相应的均衡结果。再进一步将平台供应链成员的均衡决策结果进行总结，则可以得到博弈双方的均衡决策关系。

Similarly, by combining the bargaining utilities of both parties, we can obtain the corresponding equilibrium result. Further summarizing the equilibrium decision-making results of the platform supply chain members, we can obtain the equilibrium decision-making relationship between the two parties in the game.

一般来说，电商平台通过提升议价能力，可以有效降低采购成本并提高价格竞争力。当两个平台的议价能力高于某一阈值时，平台的批发价格和零售价会受到影响，通常议价能力较高的平台能够获得更有利的条件。同时，当两个平台的议价能力处于较高水平时，较强议价能力的平台不仅能设定较低的批发和零售价，还能提供更高的运营服务水平。

Generally speaking, e-commerce platforms can effectively reduce procurement costs and improve price competitiveness by enhancing their bargaining power. When the bargaining power of two platforms exceeds a certain threshold, their wholesale and retail prices are affected, and the platform with greater bargaining power generally obtains more favorable conditions. Furthermore, when the bargaining power of two platforms is at a high level, the platform with greater bargaining power can not only set lower wholesale and retail prices but also provide higher levels of operational service.

3.基于领导者的集体议价模式(Leader-based collective bargaining model)

基于同等价格机制下，两个平台先组成议价联盟，并选派一个代表同制造商关于产品批发价格进行讨价还价博弈。议价联盟代表和成员支付相同的批发价格w，且联盟成员仅向联盟代表支付产品批发费用，而联盟代表不会从集体议价采购中获得任何额外利润。根据逆向归纳法和广义纳什议价解结构，可以得到：

Based on the equal price mechanism, the two platforms first form a bargaining alliance and select a representative to bargain with the manufacturer on the wholesale price of the product. The bargaining alliance representative and members pay the same wholesale price w, and alliance members only pay the alliance representative for the product wholesale fee. The alliance representative does not receive any additional profit from collective bargaining purchases. According to the backward induction method and the generalized Nash bargaining solution structure, we can obtain:

在集体议价情形下，产品的均衡批发价与联盟代表的议价能力呈递减关系，而与平台的服务影响因子无关。随着联盟代表议价能力的提升，议价联盟在与制造商谈判时能够获得更优惠的批发价格，从而争取到更多的利润空间。

Under collective bargaining, the equilibrium wholesale price of a product decreases with the bargaining power of alliance representatives, regardless of the platform's service impact factor. As the bargaining power of alliance representatives increases, the bargaining alliance can obtain more favorable wholesale prices when negotiating with manufacturers, thereby gaining greater profit margins.

在集体议价模式下，产品服务成为影响两个电商平台竞争的关键因素。当联盟代表平台的服务影响因子较高时，该平台的零售价、运营服务水平以及利润均高于另一平台；反之，若服务影响因子较低，则这些决策和利润均低于对方。特别地，当两个平台的服务影响因子相同，联盟代表平台与成员平台会制定相同的均衡决策，并获得相同的利润。

Under the collective bargaining model, product and service become key factors influencing competition between two e-commerce platforms. When the alliance representative platform's service impact factor is high, its retail price, operational service level, and profits are higher than the other platform. Conversely, if the service impact factor is low, these decisions and profits are lower than the other platform. In particular, when the service impact factors of two platforms are the same, the alliance representative platform and the member platforms will make the same equilibrium decision and achieve the same profit.

三、知识补充（Knowledge Supplement）

1.广义纳什解结构(Generalized Nash solution structure)

广义纳什议价解结构（GNBS）是博弈论中的扩展概念，适用于多个参与方和复杂约束条件的议价过程。与传统纳什议价解不同，GNBS考虑了多个约束因素，如资源限制、市场规则等，并旨在通过最大化各方效用，找到一种平衡的解决方案。它不仅关注参与方的个体利益，还需要在共同利益与冲突中找到最优分配，确保解的公平性和稳定性。GNBS广泛应用于多方谈判、合同设计等领域，提供理论支持以实现各方利益的最佳平衡。

The generalized Nash bargaining structure (GNBS) is an extended concept in game theory, applicable to bargaining processes involving multiple parties and complex constraints. Unlike traditional Nash bargaining solutions, GNBS considers multiple constraints, such as resource limitations and market rules, and aims to find a balanced solution by maximizing the utility of all parties. It not only focuses on the individual interests of the participants but also seeks to find the optimal allocation between common interests and conflicts, ensuring fairness and stability of the solution. GNBS is widely used in multi-party negotiations, contract design, and other fields, providing theoretical support for achieving an optimal balance of interests among all parties.

2.同等价格机制(Equal price mechanism)

同等价格机制是一种市场定价机制，在这种机制下，所有参与者在交易中支付或接受相同的价格，无论其需求或供给条件如何。这种机制的核心在于确保价格一致性，从而避免因价格差异引发的不公平竞争或交易不均等。它通常用于拍卖、市场定价以及政府调控场景，能够提高交易的公平性和效率，尤其适用于供需关系复杂或信息不对称的情况。

The parity price mechanism is a market pricing mechanism in which all participants in a transaction pay or receive the same price, regardless of their demand or supply conditions. The core of this mechanism is to ensure price consistency, thereby avoiding unfair competition or unequal trading due to price differences. It is commonly used in auctions, market pricing, and government regulation scenarios to improve transaction fairness and efficiency, and is particularly suitable for situations with complex supply and demand relationships or information asymmetry.

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翻译：Google翻译

参考资料：百度百科、Chat GPT

参考文献：李慧,徐琪.商品及服务竞争下平台供应链议价模式选择策略[J].管理学报,2025,22(08):1537-1546.