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“小宇分享（十二）：

精读《上下游联合减排与低碳宣传的微分博弈模型》结束语

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Today, the editor brings you an article.

Xiaoyu's Sharing (12):

In-depth reading of the conclusion of "Differential Game Model of Upstream and Downstream Joint Emission Reduction and Low-Carbon Promotion"

一、思维导图（Mind mapping）

二、精读内容（Intensive reading content）

总结

Summarize

近年来，各国政府、企业和学者已经形成共识，温室效应是全球气候变暖以及极端气候出现日趋频繁的主要原因，而人类在经济活动中产生的碳排放是导致温室效应的主要原因． 一方面，企业作为人类经济活动的主要载体，应当承担气候变化的主要责任． 另一方面，随着消费者低碳意识的增强，企业也开始意识到减排的重要性，只有减排才能得到消费者的认可． 但是，只有制造商的减排是绝对不够的，还需要通过零售商将制造商节能减排的信息传达给消费者，这样才能获得消费者的认可，获得更多的利润． 鉴于此，本文从上下游长期动态联合减排与低碳宣传的角度，构建了三种上下游联合减排与低碳宣传的微分博弈模型． 通过对模型求解与分析可以得到以下结论．

In recent years, governments, businesses, and scholars worldwide have reached a consensus that the greenhouse effect is the primary cause of global warming and the increasing frequency of extreme weather events, and that carbon emissions generated by human economic activities are the primary driver of the greenhouse effect. On the one hand, businesses, as the primary vehicle for human economic activity, should bear primary responsibility for climate change. On the other hand, with growing consumer awareness of low-carbon initiatives, businesses are also beginning to realize the importance of emission reduction, which is the only way to gain consumer recognition. However, manufacturers' emission reductions alone are not sufficient; they also need to communicate these energy-saving and emission-reduction messages to consumers through retailers to gain consumer recognition and maximize profits. In light of this, this paper constructs three differential game models of upstream and downstream joint emission reduction and low-carbon promotion from the perspective of long-term dynamic collaboration between upstream and downstream manufacturers. The following conclusions are drawn from the solution and analysis of these models.

结论

conclusion

首先，当制造商边际收益和零售商边际收益具有2πM＞ πＲ的关系时，由制造商分担零售商低碳宣传成本的成本分担契约可以实现制造商和零售商利润的 Pareto 改善，且当制造商边际收益足够大时成本分担契约对制造商利润的 Pareto 改善效果越明显，制造商利用成本分担契约激励零售商进行低碳宣传的动机越大。

First, when the manufacturer's marginal revenue and the retailer's marginal revenue have a relationship of 2πM, a cost-sharing contract in which the manufacturer shares the retailer's low-carbon promotion costs can achieve a Pareto improvement in the profits of both manufacturers and retailers. Moreover, when the manufacturer's marginal revenue is large enough, the more obvious the Pareto improvement effect of the cost-sharing contract on the manufacturer's profit, the greater the manufacturer's motivation to use the cost-sharing contract to encourage retailers to carry out low-carbon promotion.

其次，成本分担契约对制造商和零售商利润的改善程度与 2πM－ πＲ的差值和消费者对零售商低碳宣传敏感性的系数 β 正相关，与零售商的低碳宣传成本系数 ηＲ和折现率 ρ 负相关．

Secondly, the degree to which the cost-sharing contract improves the profits of manufacturers and retailers is positively correlated with the difference between 2πM-πR and the coefficient β of consumers' sensitivity to retailers' low-carbon promotion, and negatively correlated with the retailer's low-carbon promotion cost coefficient ηR and the discount rate ρ.

最后，通过数值算例对 3 种上下游联合减排与低碳宣传的微分博弈均衡结果进行了对比分析，并对一些典型参数的敏感性进行了分析．

Finally, numerical examples are used to compare and analyze the differential game equilibrium results of three upstream and downstream joint emission reduction and low-carbon publicity scenarios, and the sensitivity of some typical parameters is analyzed.

未来研究方向

Future research directions

文章重在分析成本分担契约改善供应链绩效的情况，建立模型时并没有考虑政府补贴政策、碳交易政策等环保法规对制造商产品减排量和供应链成员决策的影响，未来加入政府补贴、碳交易等政策的约束，是进一步的研究方向; 其次，本文设计的成本分担契约可以实现制造商、零售商和整个供应链系统利润的 Pareto 改善，但并没有达到集中决策时的理想情况，进一步设计其他的契约机制以实现理想情况，也是进一步的研究方向; 另外，还可以在多级供应链和复杂供应链网络框架下对这一问题进行研究．

The article focuses on analyzing how cost-sharing contracts can improve supply chain performance. However, the model was not designed to consider the impact of environmental regulations, such as government subsidies and carbon trading policies, on manufacturers' product emissions reductions and the decisions of supply chain members. Incorporating constraints such as government subsidies and carbon trading into the model is a future research direction. Secondly, the cost-sharing contract designed in this article can achieve a Pareto improvement in the profits of manufacturers, retailers, and the entire supply chain system, but it falls short of the ideal situation under centralized decision-making. Further research is also needed to design alternative contract mechanisms to achieve this ideal situation. Furthermore, this issue can be studied within the framework of multi-echelon supply chains and complex supply chain networks.

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翻译：谷歌翻译

资料来源：ChatGPT、百度百科

参考文献：[1]徐春秋,赵道致,原白云,等.上下游联合减排与低碳宣传的微分博弈模型[J].管理科学学报,2016,19(02):53-65.

本文由LearningYard学苑整理并发出，如有侵权请后台留言沟通。

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审核：李杰

来源：LearningYard学苑