慧学（63）：精读博士论文低碳供应链竞争与合作

摘要：In this issue, the editor will introduce the competition and cooperation in low-carbon supply chains of e-commerce platforms of th

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“慧学（63）：精读博士论文《考虑电商平台绿色推广的低碳供应链竞合策略研究》低碳供应链竞争与合作”。

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“Hui Xue (63): Intensive reading of doctoral dissertation ‘Coopetition Strategies for Low-Carbon Supply Chain Considering E-Commerce Platform Green Promotion’ competition and cooperation in low-carbon supply chains”.

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本期推文小编将从思维导图、精读内容、知识补充三个方面为大家介绍博士论文《考虑电商平台绿色推广的低碳供应链竞合策略研究》的低碳供应链竞争与合作。

In this issue, the editor will introduce the competition and cooperation in low-carbon supply chains of e-commerce platforms of the doctoral dissertation "Coopetition Strategies for Low-Carbon Supply Chain Considering E-Commerce Platform Green Promotion" from three aspects: mind mapping, intensive reading content, and knowledge supplement.

一、思维导图（Mind mapping）

二、精读内容（Intensive reading content）

1、竞争策略（Competitive strategy）

主要探讨制造商之间在价格、产量和减排努力方面的竞争行为及其对低碳绩效的影响。研究表明，竞争能够提升产品溢价和市场接受度，从而推动企业增加减排投资。在电商平台绿色推广的作用下，竞争还可以进一步降低整体碳排放。然而，这种正向作用具有情境依赖性，过度竞争在高交叉价格弹性市场中可能导致价格恶性循环，抑制绿色转型。因此，竞争策略应在生产成本与收益预期之间寻求平衡。

This study primarily explores the competitive behavior among manufacturers regarding price, output, and emissions reduction efforts, and their impact on low-carbon performance. Research indicates that competition can increase product premiums and market acceptance, thereby encouraging companies to increase emissions reduction investments. Furthermore, competition can further reduce overall carbon emissions through the green promotion efforts of e-commerce platforms. However, this positive effect is context-dependent; excessive competition in markets with high cross-price elasticity can lead to a vicious cycle of prices, inhibiting green transition. Therefore, competitive strategies should strike a balance between production costs and expected benefits.

2、信息不对称（Information asymmetry）

分析信息不对称对供应链中减排策略、契约设计与信号传递的影响。现有研究主要包括四类：减排技术水平信息不对称，主要通过区块链信息共享机制进行缓解；减排成本信息不对称，强调信息披露与合同设计；需求信息不对称，通过契约菜单机制促进真实信息披露；消费者偏好信息不对称，则基于委托代理模型设计多重减排机制。研究方法已由传统静态信息假设转向信号博弈分析，更能反映信息互动的动态性。在电商平台情境中，成本信息不对称与渠道选择问题尤为突出，但“减排技术信息不对称”研究仍存在空白。

This study analyzes the impact of information asymmetry on emission reduction strategies, contract design, and signaling in the supply chain. Existing research mainly falls into four categories: information asymmetry regarding emission reduction technology levels, primarily mitigated through blockchain information sharing mechanisms; information asymmetry regarding emission reduction costs, emphasizing information disclosure and contract design; demand information asymmetry, promoting truthful information disclosure through contract menu mechanisms; and consumer preference information asymmetry, which is addressed by designing multiple emission reduction mechanisms based on a principal-agent model. The research methodology has shifted from traditional static information assumptions to signaling game analysis, better reflecting the dynamic nature of information interaction. In the context of e-commerce platforms, cost information asymmetry and channel selection issues are particularly prominent, but research on "emission reduction technology information asymmetry" remains lacking.

3、合作模式选择（Cooperation model selection）

探讨制造商间及上下游间不同合作模式（联合研发、技术授权、联合减排）的经济与环境绩效。合作模式分为横向合作与纵向合作两类。横向合作主要指制造商之间的合作，其中联合研发可提升利润并降低碳排放，技术授权通过许可合同实现激励协调。现有研究多数仅比较单一模式，缺乏系统对比。纵向合作主要发生在制造商与零售商或平台之间，聚焦联合减排与绿色推广，研究方法包括差分博弈与随机微分博弈。研究趋势逐渐转向考虑需求波动、政策不确定性和技术不确定性对合作稳定性的影响。

This study explores the economic and environmental performance of different cooperation models (joint R&D, technology licensing, and joint emissions reduction) among manufacturers and between upstream and downstream companies. Cooperation models are categorized into horizontal and vertical cooperation. Horizontal cooperation primarily refers to collaboration between manufacturers, where joint R&D can increase profits and reduce carbon emissions, and technology licensing achieves incentive coordination through licensing agreements. Existing research mostly compares single models, lacking systematic comparisons. Vertical cooperation mainly occurs between manufacturers and retailers or platforms, focusing on joint emissions reduction and green promotion. Research methods include difference game theory and stochastic differential game theory. Research trends are gradually shifting towards considering the impact of demand fluctuations, policy uncertainty, and technological uncertainty on the stability of cooperation.

4、合作机制设计（Cooperation mechanism design）

主要研究如何通过契约或博弈设计协调竞争与合作，以实现供应链整体最优。现有文献主要分为两类路径：非合作契约机制与合作博弈机制。前者以激励相容为核心，常见类型包括批发价格契约、两部定价、收益共享、成本共担、回购与期权契约等，其优点是优化激励结构并实现帕累托改善，但难以形成长期共赢关系；后者以联盟收益分配为主，常用工具包括Shapley值、核心与置信指数等，能够分析联盟稳定性与收益分配，但忽略合作形成前的竞争互动。为弥补这一不足，学者提出了两型博弈框架，能同时描述竞争阶段（非合作）与合作阶段（联盟分配），并已在投资决策与供应链协调中得到应用。相关实证研究如绿色创新投资以及线上分销策略进一步验证了其有效性。

This research primarily focuses on how to coordinate competition and cooperation through contractual or game theory design to achieve overall supply chain optimization. Existing literature mainly categorizes these approaches into two types: non-cooperative contractual mechanisms and cooperative game theory mechanisms. The former centers on incentive compatibility, with common types including wholesale price contracts, two-part pricing, profit sharing, cost sharing, buyback and option contracts, etc. Its advantage lies in optimizing the incentive structure and achieving Pareto improvement, but it struggles to form long-term win-win relationships. The latter focuses on alliance profit distribution, using tools such as Shapley values, core and confidence indices, which can analyze alliance stability and profit distribution, but neglect the competitive interaction before cooperation is formed. To address this deficiency, scholars have proposed a two-type game theory framework that can simultaneously describe the competitive phase (non-cooperative) and the cooperative phase (alliance distribution), and it has been applied in investment decisions and supply chain coordination. Empirical studies, such as green innovation investment and online distribution strategies, further validate its effectiveness.

三、知识补充（Knowledge supplementation）

1、两型博弈（Two-type game）

非合作–合作双重博弈是一种结合非合作与合作博弈思想的综合性分析框架。在非合作博弈中，个体参与者独立作出决策，以实现自身利益最大化，其分析核心为纳什均衡；而在合作博弈中，各方可通过结成联盟、协同制定策略来提升整体收益。该双型博弈的显著特征在于兼顾竞争与协作两种属性，适用于策略优化、联盟构建及收益分配等问题。相较于传统博弈模型，这一框架具备更高的灵活性，能够更准确刻画现实中复杂的决策互动情境。

Non-cooperative-cooperative dual game theory is a comprehensive analytical framework that combines the ideas of non-cooperative and cooperative games. In non-cooperative games, individual participants make independent decisions to maximize their own interests, with Nash equilibrium as the core of the analysis. In cooperative games, parties can improve overall gains by forming alliances and coordinating strategies. The significant characteristic of this dual-type game theory is that it takes into account both competitive and cooperative attributes, making it applicable to problems such as strategy optimization, alliance building, and payoff distribution. Compared to traditional game models, this framework offers greater flexibility and can more accurately depict complex decision-making interactions in reality.

2、夏普利值（Shapley value）

博弈论奠基人之一夏普里在研究非策略型多人合作的收益分配问题上具有深厚造诣。他提出的“夏普里值”方法为合作收益的合理分配提供了重要工具，被认为是一种科学且公正的分配机制。对于诸如成本分摊、收益分配等难以协调的问题，夏普里值法均能提供有效的解决思路。其核心目标在于构建一种兼顾各方诉求的折中效用分配方案，从而实现结果的公平与平衡。

Alexey Shapley, one of the founders of game theory, had profound expertise in studying the distribution of benefits in non-strategic multi-party cooperation. His "Shapley value" method provides an important tool for the rational distribution of cooperative benefits and is considered a scientific and fair allocation mechanism. For problems that are difficult to coordinate, such as cost sharing and benefit allocation, the Shapley value method can provide effective solutions. Its core objective is to construct a compromise utility allocation scheme that takes into account the demands of all parties, thereby achieving fairness and balance in the outcome.

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翻译：Google翻译

参考资料：百度、Chatgpt