《软件平台系统的治理策略与第三方开发商的接入决策研究》绪论

摘要：This issue of the tweet will introduce the introduction of the intensive reading doctoral thesis "Research on the Governance Strat

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“喆学（195）：精读博士论文

《软件平台系统的治理策略与第三方开发商的接入决策研究》

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“Zhexue (195): Intensive reading of doctoral thesis

“Research on the Governance Strategy of Software Platform Systems

and the Access Decisions of Third-Party Developers”

Introduction(3)”

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本期推文将从思维导图、精读内容、知识补充三个方面介绍精读博士论文《软件平台系统的治理策略与第三方开发商的接入决策研究》绪论。

This issue of the tweet will introduce the introduction of the intensive reading doctoral thesis "Research on the Governance Strategy of Software Platform Systems and Access Decision-making of Third-Party Developers" from three aspects: mind mapping, intensive reading content, and knowledge supplement.

一、思维导图（Mind Maps）

二、精读内容（Intensive reading content）

(1)创新点和研究成果(Innovation points and research results)

本文结合平台经济特性与行为特征，针对撇脂或渗透定价、技术投资与开发工具等新现象提出科学问题，从非对称跨边网络效应、技术功能水平、开发商整合能力及预装溢出等视角展开研究，得出文献未有的结论，形成四方面知识创新，为信息系统经济学理论添新贡献。

This paper, combining the characteristics and behavioral features of the platform economy, raises scientific questions regarding new phenomena such as skimming or penetration pricing, technology investment and development tools. It conducts research from the perspectives of asymmetric cross-side network effects, technology functional levels, developer integration capabilities, and pre-installation spillover, drawing conclusions not found in the literature and forming four aspects of knowledge innovation, thus making new contributions to the theory of information systems economics.

本文首次从非对称跨边网络效应新视角，研究平台对第三方开发商应选撇脂还是渗透定价这一被忽视的问题。核心发现：当用户到开发商的网络效应弱时，平台宜逐段高价撇脂；反之宜初期低价渗透。若平台不收用户进门费，开发商到用户的网络效应增强或第二阶段拉长，平台更倾向渗透；开发商预期收益高，平台更愿撇脂。若收用户进门费，第二阶段延长使渗透意愿先升后降。撇脂阶段平台始终向开发商收费；渗透阶段可在首期补贴开发商，收用户费时两期均可补贴，补贴幅度受用户到开发商网络效应及开发商收益预期影响。

This paper, for the first time, examines the neglected issue of whether platforms should choose skimming or penetration pricing when dealing with third-party developers from the novel perspective of asymmetric cross-side network effects. Key findings: When the network effect from users to developers is weak, platforms should skim at higher prices in stages; conversely, they should penetrate at lower prices initially. If the platform does not charge users an entry fee, and the network effect from developers to users strengthens or the second stage is prolonged, the platform is more inclined to penetrate; if developers expect high returns, the platform is more willing to skim. If users are charged an entry fee, the extended second stage causes the willingness to penetrate to initially increase and then decrease. During the skimming stage, the platform consistently charges developers; during the penetration stage, the platform can subsidize developers in the first phase, and when charging users, subsidies can be provided in both phases, with the subsidy amount influenced by the network effect from users to developers and the developers' expected returns.

本研究聚焦平台对新兴技术的投资，关注开发商在采纳技术时的额外成本与竞争关系，填补了平台投资与开发商竞争互动研究的空白。研究发现，当仅具备技术与产品优势的开发商采纳技术时，平台利润高于两者都采纳的情形。开发商是否采纳技术，取决于其整合成本与平台技术功能水平：整合成本低时，两者采纳；成本升高，能力弱者退出；成本极高时，两者皆放弃。平台技术功能提升，更可能促成高能力者单独采纳。此时消费者剩余增加，但社会福利可能下降。若平台可设定技术功能，当开发商整合成本或平台开发成本较高时，平台应选择低功能水平，促使两者采纳，实现均衡。

This study focuses on platform investment in emerging technologies, examining the additional costs and competitive relationships developers face when adopting these technologies, filling a gap in research on the interaction between platform investment and developer competition. The study finds that when only developers with technological and product advantages adopt technologies, platform profits are higher than when both developers adopt them. Whether a developer adopts a technology depends on its integration costs and the platform's technological capabilities: low integration costs lead to adoption by both; rising costs cause weaker developers to exit; and extremely high costs result in both abandoning the technology. Improved platform technological capabilities are more likely to encourage adoption by the more capable developer alone. This increases consumer surplus but may decrease social welfare. If platforms can configure technological capabilities, when developer integration costs or platform development costs are high, the platform should choose a lower level of capability to encourage adoption by both, achieving equilibrium.

本文研究两竞争平台在已有相似服务下的顺序技术投资：先投者定功能水平，后投者决定是否跟进。发现只有当开发商整合成本与平台开发成本均低，或整合成本低且先投功能不高时，后投方才宜跟进；若整合成本高，或先投功能已高，则宜放弃。用户到开发商的网络效应越强，后投跟进意愿越高；开发商到用户的网络效应作用则受先投功能调节。平台可据此结合预期功能水平，制定最优跟进投资与定价策略，填补顺序投资与功能互动研究空白。

This paper studies the sequential technology investment of two competing platforms with similar existing services: the first investor determines the level of functionality, and the second investor decides whether to follow suit. It finds that the second investor should only follow suit when both the developer's integration costs and the platform's development costs are low, or when integration costs are low and the first-invested functionality is not high-level; if integration costs are high, or the first-invested functionality is already high-level, it is advisable to abandon the investment. The stronger the network effect from users to developers, the higher the willingness of the second investor to follow suit; the network effect from developers to users is moderated by the first-invested functionality. Based on this, platforms can formulate optimal follow-up investment and pricing strategies according to the expected level of functionality, filling a gap in research on sequential investment and functional interaction.

本研究聚焦正版可卸载预装软件，区别于以往关注含风险臃肿软件文献，首次探讨平台提供预装机会时竞争开发商最优预装与定价策略。从溢出效应、忠诚用户、匹配成本降低及用户偏好等多视角分析，发现：忠诚用户与偏好预装用户增多，推高该开发商价格却压低对手价格；预装溢出效应增强，双方提价且利润增；匹配成本下降则使双方价格与利润齐跌。当忠诚用户多的开发商预装且偏好用户比例高时，市场更可能呈现仅其预装的均衡，反之亦然。

This study focuses on legitimate, uninstallable pre-installed software, differing from previous literature that focused on risky and bloated software. It is the first to explore the optimal pre-installation and pricing strategies of competing developers when platforms offer pre-installation opportunities. Analyzing from multiple perspectives, including spillover effects, loyal users, reduced matching costs, and user preferences, the study finds that: an increase in loyal users and users who prefer pre-installation drives up the developer's price while suppressing competitors' prices; a stronger pre-installation spillover effect leads to price increases and increased profits for both sides; and a decrease in matching costs causes both prices and profits to fall. When a developer with a large number of loyal users pre-installs software and has a high proportion of users who prefer it, the market is more likely to exhibit an equilibrium where only that developer pre-installs, and vice versa.

(2)理论价值(Theoretical Value)

本研究聚焦软件平台治理与开发商接入，拓展信息经济学边界：首次探讨平台对开发商的撇脂与渗透定价选择、新兴技术投资决策及竞争环境下的技术采纳和预装策略，补充多阶段定价与技术投资理论，丰富第三方接入决策研究，为平台经济提供新分析框架。

This study focuses on software platform governance and developer access, expanding the boundaries of information economics. It is the first to explore platform skimming and penetration pricing choices for developers, investment decisions in emerging technologies, and technology adoption and pre-installation strategies in a competitive environment. It supplements multi-stage pricing and technology investment theories, enriches research on third-party access decisions, and provides a new analytical framework for the platform economy.

本研究引入非对称跨边网络效应、新兴技术整合成本、开发商技术能力、预装偏好及匹配成本等新视角，探讨平台多阶段定价、技术投资与接入决策，补充相关理论空白，为后续研究提供新思路与理论支持。

This study introduces new perspectives such as asymmetric cross-side network effects, emerging technology integration costs, developer technical capabilities, pre-installation preferences, and matching costs to explore platform multi-stage pricing, technology investment, and access decisions. It fills relevant theoretical gaps and provides new ideas and theoretical support for subsequent research.

(3)现实意义(Practical Significance)

本研究通过建模刻画平台、开发商与用户行为，引入非对称网络效应、技术功能、整合能力及忠诚用户等因素，解释平台在不同市场下对开发商采取差异定价、技术投资及预装策略的现象，为平台定价与新技术投入提供理论支持，帮助开发商制定接入决策。同时，研究探讨平台治理与投资策略对行业、用户及社会的影响，结合开发与整合成本，为社会规划者在不同市场情境下制定引导政策提供参考，丰富平台政策研究。

This study, through modeling and characterizing the behavior of platforms, developers, and users, introduces factors such as asymmetric network effects, technical functions, integration capabilities, and loyal users to explain the phenomenon of platforms adopting differentiated pricing, technology investment, and pre-installation strategies for developers in different markets. This provides theoretical support for platform pricing and new technology investment, helping developers make access decisions. Simultaneously, the study explores the impact of platform governance and investment strategies on the industry, users, and society. Combined with development and integration costs, it provides a reference for social planners to formulate guiding policies in different market scenarios, enriching platform policy research.

(4)框架结构(Framework Structure)

全文共七章：首章述背景与思路，次章评文献，三章论平台定价，四章研技术投资与采纳，五章析跟进投资策略，六章探预装策略，末章总结并展望。

The full text consists of seven chapters: Chapter 1 describes the background and ideas, Chapter 2 reviews the literature, Chapter 3 discusses platform pricing, Chapter 4 studies technology investment and adoption, Chapter 5 analyzes follow-up investment strategies, Chapter 6 explores pre-installation strategies, and Chapter 7 summarizes and looks ahead.

三、知识补充（Knowledge supplement）

预装偏好是指消费者在购买或使用带有预装软件、应用或服务的产品时，倾向于直接接受或继续使用预装选项，而非主动更换或下载其他替代品的行为倾向。它体现出一种由“默认设置效应（default effect）”引发的心理惯性，即人们更容易沿用系统或厂商预设的选项，而不愿意花费额外成本去改变。例如：智能手机出厂时预装的浏览器、搜索引擎或App被用户长期使用；新电脑系统预装的办公软件、杀毒软件往往成为用户的首选；智能电视或车载系统中预装的视频或导航服务被高频使用。预装偏好背后涉及多种行为与认知机制：

Pre-installation preference refers to the tendency of consumers to accept or continue using pre-installed software, applications, or services when purchasing or using products, rather than actively replacing or downloading alternatives. It reflects a psychological inertia caused by the "default effect," meaning people are more likely to use system or manufacturer-preset options and are unwilling to incur additional costs to change them. For example, browsers, search engines, or apps pre-installed on smartphones are used by users for extended periods; office software and antivirus software pre-installed on new computer systems are often the first choice for users; and video or navigation services pre-installed on smart TVs or in-car systems are used frequently.

Pre-installation preference involves multiple behavioral and cognitive mechanisms:

1.默认效应（Default Effect）

人们倾向于接受默认选项，因为更改需要认知努力与时间成本。厂商通过将产品预设为“默认”，即可显著提高其使用率。

People tend to accept default options because changing them requires cognitive effort and time. Manufacturers can significantly increase product usage by pre-setting them as the "default."

2.认知惰性与切换成本（Cognitive Inertia & Switching Cost）

更换预装选项常需要学习新操作界面、重新设置账户或下载内容，因此消费者往往选择“继续使用现有选项”，从而形成路径依赖。

Changing pre-installed options often requires learning a new user interface, resetting an account, or downloading content, so consumers often choose to "continue using the existing options," thus creating path dependence.

3.信任与熟悉效应（Familiarity Effect）

预装软件通常由设备厂商或知名品牌提供，消费者基于对品牌的信任与熟悉感，更容易产生“安全可靠”的心理认知。

Pre-installed software is usually provided by the device manufacturer or a well-known brand. Consumers are more likely to have a "safe and reliable" mindset based on their trust and familiarity with the brand.

4.可得性与曝光效应（Availability & Exposure Effect）

预装产品在首次接触时即具备可见性与可用性优势，频繁的使用曝光进一步增强偏好黏性。

Pre-installed products offer advantages in visibility and usability from the first encounter, and frequent exposure further enhances preference stickiness.

预装偏好的强弱会受到多种因素的综合影响。首先，从产品类型来看，预装偏好在数字化产品中表现最为显著，尤其是软件、移动应用与系统服务等领域。由于这些产品往往内嵌于终端设备中，消费者更容易接受系统自带的功能与界面，从而产生长期使用的路径依赖；而在实体商品领域，这种偏好效应则相对较弱。

The strength of pre-installation preference is influenced by a combination of factors. First, from a product type perspective, pre-installation preference is most pronounced in digital products, especially in software, mobile applications, and system services. Because these products are often embedded in terminal devices, consumers are more likely to accept the built-in functions and interfaces, thus creating a path dependency for long-term use; however, this preference effect is relatively weaker in the realm of physical goods.

其次，消费者特征也是影响预装偏好的关键变量。年龄较高、技术熟练度较低或信息搜索能力有限的用户，通常更倾向于直接使用预装选项，以避免学习新系统或安装新应用所带来的时间与心理成本。相比之下，具有较强数字技能和自主探索意识的用户则更可能主动更换或删除预装内容，以追求个性化的使用体验。

Secondly, consumer characteristics are also a key variable influencing pre-installation preferences. Older users, those with lower technical proficiency, or those with limited information search capabilities are generally more inclined to use pre-installed options directly to avoid the time and psychological costs of learning a new system or installing new applications. In contrast, users with strong digital skills and a proactive spirit of exploration are more likely to actively replace or delete pre-installed content to pursue a personalized user experience.

再次，市场结构会在很大程度上放大或削弱预装偏好的效果。当平台或厂商在生态系统中处于主导地位时，预装机制往往成为其强化市场控制力的重要手段。例如，移动操作系统通过预装自有搜索引擎或浏览器，可形成“默认锁定效应”，显著提升用户留存率和数据获取能力。

Thirdly, market structure can significantly amplify or weaken the effects of pre-installation preferences. When a platform or manufacturer holds a dominant position in the ecosystem, pre-installation mechanisms often become an important means for them to strengthen market control. For example, mobile operating systems, by pre-installing their own search engines or browsers, can create a "default lock-in effect," significantly improving user retention and data acquisition capabilities.

此外，政策与监管环境也对预装偏好的形成与影响范围具有重要调节作用。反垄断法规和“用户自主选择权”制度能够在一定程度上抑制企业利用预装形成市场壁垒的行为。例如，监管机构要求设备在初次启动时提供可选界面，或强制保障预装应用可卸载，从而削弱预装偏好所带来的竞争失衡。

Furthermore, policies and the regulatory environment also play a significant role in regulating the formation and scope of pre-installation preferences. Antitrust regulations and the "user's right to choose" system can, to some extent, curb companies' use of pre-installation to create market barriers. For example, regulatory agencies may require devices to provide optional interfaces upon initial startup or mandate that pre-installed applications be uninstallable, thereby mitigating the competitive imbalances caused by pre-installation preferences.

在经济与管理意义方面，预装偏好对市场竞争格局、消费者福利以及政策治理均具有重要影响。首先，从竞争策略角度看，预装已成为厂商提升市场份额和生态黏性的常见手段。通过预装自有产品，企业能迅速建立用户基础并强化品牌路径依赖，从而在竞争中占据先发优势。其次，从消费者福利的视角来看，预装偏好一方面减少了搜索和学习成本，提高了便利性；但另一方面，也可能降低选择自由，导致消费者在信息不对称下做出次优决策。最后，从监管角度出发，过度依赖预装机制可能造成“软垄断”或“算法歧视”等问题，因此应通过界面透明、默认选项多样化以及用户选择提示等方式，维护公平竞争与用户权益。

In terms of economic and managerial significance, pre-installation preference has a significant impact on market competition, consumer welfare, and policy governance. First, from a competitive strategy perspective, pre-installation has become a common means for manufacturers to increase market share and ecosystem stickiness. By pre-installing their own products, companies can quickly build a user base and strengthen brand path dependence, thereby gaining a first-mover advantage in the competition. Second, from a consumer welfare perspective, while pre-installation preference reduces search and learning costs and improves convenience, it may also reduce freedom of choice, leading consumers to make suboptimal decisions due to information asymmetry. Finally, from a regulatory perspective, over-reliance on pre-installation mechanisms may cause problems such as "soft monopoly" or "algorithmic discrimination." Therefore, fair competition and user rights should be maintained through methods such as transparent interfaces, diversified default options, and user selection prompts.

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翻译：谷歌翻译

参考资料：谷歌、Chat GPT

参考文献：苑楠. 软件平台系统的治理策略与第三方开发商的接入决策研究 [D]. 天津大学, 2022.