晴读（36）：精读期刊论文

摘要：在逆向供应链场景中，回收商的能力禀赋属于企业高度保密的商业信息，制造商通常无法准确获知这一信息，因此本文进一步研究回收商能力信息不对称的情况。依据显示原理，制造商需要设计一揽子契约菜单，以此实现对回收商的信息甄别，并激励回收商付出最优努力，其事件发生顺序具体为

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“晴读（36）：精读期刊论文《基于委托代理理论的逆向供应链激励机制设计与回收模式选择》的能力信息不对称下的激励机制设计”

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"Qing Du (36): Intensive Reading of the Journal Paper "Design of Incentive Mechanism and Selection of Recycling Mode in Reverse Supply Chain Based on Principal-Agent Theory"-Design of Incentive Mechanism Under Asymmetric Capability Information

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今天小编将从思维导图、精读内容、知识补充三个板块为大家带来《基于委托代理理论的逆向供应链激励机制设计与回收模式选择》的能力信息不对称下的激励机制设计。

一、思维导图（Mind Map）

二、内容精读（Conduct in-depth reading of the material）

1.在逆向供应链场景中，回收商的能力禀赋属于企业高度保密的商业信息，制造商通常无法准确获知这一信息，因此本文进一步研究回收商能力信息不对称的情况。依据显示原理，制造商需要设计一揽子契约菜单，以此实现对回收商的信息甄别，并激励回收商付出最优努力，其事件发生顺序具体为回收商i先获知自身能力信息θi并向制造商报告该信息，制造商根据回收商i报告的能力信息提供一组支付契约，回收商i决定是否接受契约，若接受则根据契约确定努力水平，最后制造商依据回收绩效支付报酬。

1. In the context of reverse supply chains, the capability endowment of recyclers is highly confidential business information of enterprises, and manufacturers usually cannot obtain this information accurately. Therefore, this paper further studies the situation of information asymmetry regarding recyclers' capabilities. Based on the revelation principle, manufacturers need to design a package of contract menus to achieve information screening of recyclers and incentivize recyclers to make optimal efforts. The specific sequence of events is as follows: first, recycler i obtains its own capability information θi and reports this information to the manufacturer; then, the manufacturer provides a set of payment contracts based on the capability information reported by recycler i; next, recycler i decides whether to accept the contract; if it accepts, it determines the level of effort according to the contract; finally, the manufacturer pays remuneration based on the recycling performance.

2.针对回收渠道竞争关系，在能力信息不对称的情况下，制造商仅知晓回收商i的市场分布，根据相关公式可得出竞争关系下制造商的期望效用函数，同时也能定义出真实回收能力为θi的回收商向制造商谎报或如实报告能力信息时，接受对应契约的期望效用函数。此时制造商的契约设计规划问题以最大化自身期望效用为目标，并存在参与约束、逆向选择激励相容约束和道德风险激励相容约束，参与约束确保回收商i接受契约，逆向选择激励相容约束保障回收商i如实报告能力信息的期望效用不低于谎报时的期望效用，道德风险激励相容约束则意味着回收商i会选择使自身期望效用最大化的努力水平。通过求解该规划问题得到命题4，明确了能力信息不对称且竞争关系下，制造商为回收商i提供的最优契约、回收商i的最优努力水平以及双方的最优期望效用的具体表达式。

2. Regarding the competitive relationship in recycling channels, under the condition of asymmetric capability information, manufacturers only know the market distribution of recycler i. The manufacturer's expected utility function under the competitive relationship can be derived based on relevant formulas, and at the same time, the expected utility function for recycler i (with actual recycling capability θi) to accept the corresponding contract when it misreports or truthfully reports its capability information to the manufacturer can also be defined. At this point, the manufacturer's contract design planning problem aims to maximize its own expected utility, and there exist participation constraints, adverse selection incentive compatibility constraints, and moral hazard incentive compatibility constraints. The participation constraint ensures that recycler i accepts the contract; the adverse selection incentive compatibility constraint ensures that the expected utility of recycler i when truthfully reporting its capability information is not lower than that when it misreports; the moral hazard incentive compatibility constraint means that recycler i will choose the effort level that maximizes its own expected utility. By solving this planning problem, Proposition 4 is obtained, which clarifies the specific expressions of the optimal contract provided by the manufacturer to recycler i, the optimal effort level of recycler i, and the optimal expected utility of both parties under the conditions of asymmetric capability information and competitive relationship.

3.对于回收渠道合作关系，在能力信息不对称的条件下，同样可构建制造商的期望效用函数以及回收商i在选择对应契约时，谎报或如实报告能力信息的期望效用函数。制造商的契约设计规划问题依旧以最大化自身期望效用为目标，且约束条件与竞争关系下类似，包括参与约束、逆向选择激励相容约束和道德风险激励相容约束。求解该规划问题得到命题5，清晰呈现了能力信息不对称且合作关系下，制造商为回收商i提供的最优契约、回收商i的最优努力水平以及双方的最优期望效用的具体形式。

3. Regarding the cooperative relationship in recycling channels, under the condition of asymmetric capability information, the manufacturer's expected utility function and the expected utility function of recycler i (when it misreports or truthfully reports its capability information while selecting the corresponding contract) can also be constructed. The manufacturer's contract design planning problem still aims to maximize its own expected utility, and the constraint conditions are similar to those under the competitive relationship, including participation constraints, adverse selection incentive compatibility constraints, and moral hazard incentive compatibility constraints. By solving this planning problem, Proposition 5 is obtained, which clearly presents the specific forms of the optimal contract provided by the manufacturer to recycler i, the optimal effort level of recycler i, and the optimal expected utility of both parties under the conditions of asymmetric capability information and cooperative relationship.

4.基于命题4和命题5的结果，对能力信息不对称下各参数的影响及信息结构变化的作用展开静态比较分析，得出推论5至推论8。推论5指出能力信息不对称下最优回收绩效分享比例在不同关系下随各参数变化的规律，且该比例与回收商能力类型相关，制造商选择实力强的回收商时需采取更有力激励措施，同时要根据竞争强度调整激励强度以保障供应链整体利益；推论6表明无论竞争还是合作关系，回收商i的最优努力水平随各参数变化的趋势，且能力更强的回收商会付出更大努力，体现了最优契约的激励作用；推论7对比了能力信息对称与不对称情形，发现信息不对称会导致激励强度和努力水平向下扭曲，而“高端不扭曲”现象表明制造商签约大型回收商对提升回收业务配置效率有积极意义；推论8分析了能力信息不对称下回收商获取信息租金的情况，除最弱能力者外，其他回收商均能获得额外信息租金，且信息租金与回收商能力、渠道竞争和合作强度相关，制造商需在信息租金和产出绩效间权衡决策。

4. Based on the results of Proposition 4 and Proposition 5, a static comparative analysis is conducted on the impact of various parameters and the effect of changes in information structure under asymmetric capability information, leading to Corollaries 5 to 8. Corollary 5 points out the law of how the optimal recycling performance sharing ratio changes with various parameters under different relationships when there is asymmetric capability information, and this ratio is related to the type of recycler's capability. When manufacturers choose recyclers with strong capabilities, they need to adopt more robust incentive measures, and at the same time adjust the incentive intensity according to the level of competition to protect the overall interests of the supply chain; Corollary 6 shows the trend of how the optimal effort level of recycler i changes with various parameters regardless of whether it is a competitive or cooperative relationship, and recyclers with stronger capabilities will exert greater efforts, which reflects the incentive effect of the optimal contract; Corollary 7 compares the scenarios of symmetric and asymmetric capability information, and finds that information asymmetry will lead to a downward distortion of incentive intensity and effort level. However, the "no distortion at the high-end" phenomenon indicates that manufacturers signing contracts with large-scale recyclers has positive significance for improving the allocation efficiency of recycling operations; Corollary 8 analyzes the situation of recyclers obtaining information rent under asymmetric capability information. Except for those with the weakest capabilities, other recyclers can all obtain additional information rent, and this information rent is related to recyclers' capabilities and the intensity of channel competition and cooperation. Manufacturers need to make trade-off decisions between information rent and output performance.

5.在回收模式决策分析方面，由于模型均衡解较为复杂，仅从理论上分析渠道作用强度或回收商回收能力及市场分布相同的情况。推论9表明当k = t = x0 > 0时，合作关系下的最优回收绩效分享比例、回收商i的最优努力水平及其最优期望效用均不低于竞争情形，且合作与竞争关系下的努力水平差和期望效用差随x0增大而增大，说明相同作用强度下制造商在合作关系中会给予更高激励，回收商也会提高努力水平。当两回收商回收能力及市场分布相同时，给定相关函数可得到命题6，指出制造商最优期望效用随竞争或合作强度系数增大而增大，且制造商回收模式选择不仅与竞争和合作强度有关，还取决于回收能力θ，结合具体案例可知，随着回收能力变化，制造商应相应调整回收模式，选择竞争或合作渠道以提高回收效率和经济效益，因此建议制造商在合理评估市场经营环境和回收商能力的基础上选择回收模式，确保最佳回收效益。

5. In terms of the analysis of recycling mode decision-making, due to the complexity of the model's equilibrium solution, only the scenarios where the channel effect intensity is the same or the recycling capabilities and market distributions of recyclers are the same are analyzed theoretically. Corollary 9 indicates that when k=t= x₀> 0, the optimal recycling performance sharing ratio, the optimal effort level of recycler i, and its optimal expected utility under the cooperative relationship are all not lower than those under the competitive scenario. Moreover, the differences in effort levels and expected utility between the cooperative and competitive relationships increase as x₀ increases. This shows that under the same effect intensity, manufacturers will provide higher incentives in the cooperative relationship, and recyclers will also increase their effort levels. When the recycling capabilities and market distributions of the two recyclers are the same, Proposition 6 can be obtained by given relevant functions. It points out that the manufacturer's optimal expected utility increases with the increase of the competition or cooperation intensity coefficient, and the manufacturer's choice of recycling mode is not only related to the intensity of competition and cooperation but also depends on the recycling capability θ. Combined with specific cases, it can be seen that as the recycling capability changes, manufacturers should adjust the recycling mode accordingly and choose competitive or cooperative channels to improve recycling efficiency and economic benefits. Therefore, it is suggested that manufacturers choose the recycling mode on the basis of a reasonable assessment of the market operating environment and recyclers' capabilities to ensure the best recycling benefits.

三、知识补充（Supplementary Knowledge）

1. 回收商能力禀赋：回收商自身具备的、影响其回收效率与效果的固有能力，属于企业保密商业信息。

1. Recycler's capability endowment: The inherent capabilities that recyclers possess, which affect their recycling efficiency and effectiveness, and belong to the confidential business information of enterprises.

2. 契约菜单：制造商设计的一组不同支付方案，用于甄别回收商能力并激励其付出最优努力。

2. Contract menu: A set of different payment plans designed by manufacturers, which is used to screen the capabilities of recyclers and incentivize them to make optimal efforts.

3. 信息租金：能力信息不对称下，除最弱能力回收商外，其他回收商因掌握私有能力信息而获得的额外收益。

3. Information rent: Under the asymmetry of capability information, except for recyclers with the weakest capabilities, other recyclers obtain additional benefits by possessing private capability information.

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