小蕊分享（20）精读期刊问题描述及模型假设

摘要：研究背景与问题提出：数字内容产品（如网络文学、音乐、视频）的盗版问题日益严重，传统版权保护模式存在确权难、取证难、诉讼周期长、成本高等问题，导致版权保护成本与收益失衡，削弱了版权所有者维权的动机。区块链技术因其不可篡改、可追溯等特性，被认为能有效降低版权保护成

分享兴趣，传播快乐，增长见闻，留下美好！

亲爱的您，这里是

LearningYard

新学苑。

今天小编为大家带来“精读期刊《数字出版供应链下区块链投资与版权保护策略》问题描述及模型假设”。

欢迎您的访问！

Share interest, spread happiness, increase knowledge, and leave beautiful.

Dear, this is the LearingYard Academy!

Today, the editor brings the "Problem Description and Model Assumptions in the In-depth Reading of the Journal Article ‘Blockchain Investment and Copyright Protection Strategies in the Context of the Digital Publishing Supply Chain’".

Welcome to visit!

一.思维导图（Mind Mapping)

二.精读内容（Intensive reading content）

（一）、问题描述（Problem Description）

1. Research Background and Problem Statement

The issue of piracy of digital content products (such as online literature, music, and videos) is becoming increasingly severe. Traditional copyright protection models suffer from problems such as difficulty in rights confirmation, evidence collection, long litigation cycles, and high costs. This leads to an imbalance between the costs and benefits of copyright protection, weakening the motivation of copyright owners to safeguard their rights. Blockchain technology, with its characteristics of immutability and traceability, is considered to be able to effectively reduce the costs of copyright protection. However, investing in blockchain itself also incurs costs (such as research and development, and equipment procurement). Therefore, enterprises need to strike a balance between the saved copyright protection costs and the blockchain investment costs.

2.研究目标：本文构建了一个由出版商、销售平台和消费者组成的数字出版供应链，探讨在两种版权保护模式（传统版权保护和区块链下的版权保护）下，出版商如何定价、平台如何设定版权保护强度，以及这些决策如何影响供应链绩效。研究重点包括：

比较两种模式下各主体的均衡决策和利润。分析平台投资区块链的条件。设计契约（如成本分担契约）以协调供应链，提高区块链投资动机。考察区块链投资对消费者剩余和社会福利的影响。

2. Research Objectives

This paper constructs a digital publishing Supply chain composed of publishers, sales platforms, and consumers. It explores how publishers set prices and how platforms determine the intensity of copyright protection under two copyright protection models (traditional copyright protection and blockchain-based copyright protection), as well as how these decisions affect supply chain performance. The research focuses include:

Comparing the equilibrium decisions and profits of each entity under the two models.Analyzing the conditions under which platforms invest in blockchain.Designing contracts (such as cost-sharing contracts) to coordinate the supply chain and enhance the motivation for blockchain investment.Examining the impact of blockchain investment on Consumer surplus and social welfare.

3.供应链结构：供应链包含三个主体：

出版商（S）：提供数字产品版权，决策产品价格p。销售平台（P）：负责销售数字产品，并决策版权保护强度λ（打击盗版）。消费者：购买正版产品或使用盗版产品。

利润分配：平台获得收入比例θ，出版商获得1−θ，其中θ∈(0,1)。在基本模型中，θ为外生参数；在拓展部分，θ由出版商内生决策。

3. Supply Chain Structure

The supply chain consists of three entities:Publishers (S): Provide the copyrights of digital products and decide on the product price p.Sales Platforms (P): Are responsible for selling digital products and deciding on the intensity of copyright protection λ (to combat piracy).Consumers: Purchase legitimate products or use pirated products.

（二）、模型假设（Model Assumptions)

1.消费者行为假设：

消费者总数量归一化为1，每个消费者最多消费一单位正版产品（L）或盗版产品（C），或不消费（效用为0）。消费者分为两类：正版消费者（G）：规模为a∈(0,1)，具有高道德水准或高违法成本，从不使用盗版产品。普通消费者（O）：规模为1−a，对价格敏感，会在正版与盗版之间选择。盗版产品与正版产品质量无差异（即功能相同，仅合法性不同）。

1. Consumer Behavior Assumptions

The total number of consumers is normalized to 1. Each consumer can consume at most one unit of a legitimate product (L) or a pirated product (C), or choose not to consume (with a utility of 0).

Consumers are divided into two categories:

Legitimate Consumers (G): Accounting for a proportion of a∈(0,1), they have high moral standards or high illegal costs and never use pirated products.

Ordinary Consumers (O): Accounting for a proportion of 1−a, they are price-sensitive and will choose between legitimate and pirated products.

The quality of pirated products is the same as that of legitimate products (i.e., they have the same functionality, differing only in legality).

2. 消费者效用函数：

正版消费者购买正版的净效用：正版消费者使用盗版的净效用：
普通消费者使用盗版的净效用：

其中λ>0为平台设定的版权保护强度。λ越大，盗版效用越低，打击盗版效果越强。

2. Consumer Utility Functions

Net utility of legitimate consumers purchasing legitimate products:

Net utility of legitimate consumers using pirated products:

Net utility of ordinary consumers using pirated products:

Here, λ>0 represents the intensity of copyright protection set by the platform. A larger λ results in a lower utility from pirated products and a stronger effect in combating piracy.

3.消费者决策规则：

消费者基于效用最大化选择行为。定义临界值：根据与的大小关系，分两种情形：情形1：

普通消费者更倾向于购买正版，所有消费者都考虑是否购买正版。

情形2：

普通消费者更倾向于使用盗版，只有正版消费者考虑购买正版。

3. Consumer Decision Rules

Consumers choose their behavior based on utility maximization.

Define critical values: Based on the comparison between [specific values or expressions], there are two scenarios:Scenario 1:

Ordinary consumers are more inclined to purchase legitimate products, and all consumers consider whether to purchase legitimate products.Scenario 2:

Ordinary consumers are more inclined to use pirated products, and only legitimate consumers consider purchasing legitimate products.

4.正版产品需求函数：根据上述情形，正版产品需求D为：