摘要：《国际组织》（International Organization）是一份分析政府和非政府组织运行的同行评审学术期刊、由Springer出版。该刊涵盖整个政治经济学领域，重点关注国际组织的政策和结构。2022年该刊影响因子为7.8，在国际关系的96种期刊中排名

期刊简介

《国际组织》（International Organization）是一份分析政府和非政府组织运行的同行评审学术期刊、由Springer出版。该刊涵盖整个政治经济学领域，重点关注国际组织的政策和结构。2022年该刊影响因子为7.8，在国际关系的96种期刊中排名第1。

本期目录

1 达摩克利斯的错觉：权力意识放大了世界政治中的威胁感知

The Damocles Delusion: The Sense of Power Inflates Threat Perception in World Politics

2 叛乱组织性别治理的决定因素

The Determinants of Insurgent Gender Governance

3 战争中的拉锯：恐怖组织间竞价的异质效应

Tug of War: The Heterogeneous Effects of Outbidding Between Terrorist Groups

4 核禁忌：不使用核武器的逻辑与未来

Nuclear Shibboleths: The Logics and Future of Nuclear Nonuse

5 国外气候行动：评估跨境气候转移的群众支持

Climate Action from Abroad: Assessing Mass Support for Cross-Border Climate Transfers

6 现代战争中的自相残杀式胁迫

Fratricidal Coercion in Modern War

内容摘要

达摩克利斯的错觉：权力意识放大了世界政治中的威胁感知

题目：The Damocles Delusion: The Sense of Power Inflates Threat Perception in World Politics

作者：Caleb Pomeroy，多伦多大学助理教授。

摘要：权力意识如何影响一国对威胁的感知？根据心理学家对权力的研究进展，本文发现国家的权力意识会放大其对威胁的感知。权力意识刺激了国家在决策过程中直觉思维的生成，这些直觉思维包括依赖性直觉和认知捷径，如启发式思维和先验观念。换言之，正如国际关系心理学研究所表明的那样，这些机制往往会放大国家对威胁的感知，因为大国常常通过直觉而非理性来评估其所面临的威胁。来自中国和美国的实验证据、对俄罗斯精英阶层调查进行的再分析，以及对冷战时期美国外交政策中精英群体的大规模文本分析，都为这一理论预期提供了支持。这些发现有助于从心理学角度解答那些长期存在的理论难题：国家从“制衡不足”到“过度扩张”，以及由此带来的全新问题。如在处于崛起而非衰落状态的国家中，决策者可能更容易感受到威胁带来的恐惧。同时，本文提出一种“颠倒第一意象”的观点，以此对国际政治心理学理论提出自上而下的挑战与质疑。本文认为，决策者的心理动态也是均势形成的因变量，同时对重回大国竞争的世界具有重要影响。

How does power affect threat perception? Drawing on advances in psychological research on power, I find that the sense of state power inflates the perception of threats. The sense of power activates intuitive thinking in the decision-making process, including a reliance on gut feelings and cognitive shortcuts like heuristics and prior beliefs. In turn, as psychological IR research shows, these mechanisms tend to inflate threat perception. The powerful assess threats from the gut rather than the head. Experimental evidence from the US and China, a reanalysis of a survey of Russian elites, and a large-scale text analysis of Cold War US foreign policy elites lend support to this expectation. The findings help to psychologically reconcile enduring theoretical puzzles—from “underbalancing” to “overextension”—and generate entirely new ones, like the possibility that decision makers of rising, not declining, states feel more fear. Together, the paper offers a “first image reversed” challenge to bottom-up accounts of psychological IR. Decision-maker psychology is also a dependent variable shaped by the balance of power, with important implications for a world returning to great power competition.

叛乱组织性别治理的决定因素

题目：The Determinants of Insurgent Gender Governance

作者：Tessa Devereaux，牛津大学新学院赫伯特-尼古拉斯初级研究员。

摘要：什么情况下叛乱分子会在冲突中挑战性别规范？这样做能够获得什么？基于1950-2019年137个武装组织的原始数据集，本文认为，武装组织挑战性别习俗是为了重塑其在地方的权力关系。40%的叛乱组织会干预平民的性别习俗，这种策略相当普遍，其普及程度堪比征税或提供基础安全保障。研究发现，武装组织会利用现存的性别不平等问题，通过惩处家暴（9%的武装组织采用）、取消嫁妆（15%的武装组织采用）以及强制推行着装要求（11%的武装组织采用）等方式使特定人群大权独揽，从而削弱当地精英的力量。本文将跨国分析与对伊斯兰马格里布基地组织以及马里境内马卡纳组织两个伊斯兰主义团体的定性案例研究相结合，从上述分析中可知，在两个具有共同意识形态、目标和社会背景的组织中，地方精英的策略如何推动性别治理。

Under what conditions do insurgents challenge gender norms in the midst of conflict? And what do they gain by doing so? Using an original data set of 137 armed groups fighting between 1950 and 2019, I argue that armed groups challenge gender customs to reshape local power relations. With 40 percent of rebel groups regulating civilian gender customs during civil war, this strategy is remarkably widespread, comparable to taxation or the provision of basic security in its prevalence. I demonstrate that armed groups exploit pre-existing gender grievances, using strategies like punishing domestic violence (9 percent of groups), banning dowries (15 percent), and enforcing dress codes (11 percent) to empower targeted subsections of the population and undermine local elites. I combine cross-national analysis with qualitative case studies of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and Katiba Macina, two Islamist groups in Mali. This allows me to demonstrate how the approach to local elites drives gender governance in two groups with a shared ideology, goals, and societal context.

战争中的拉锯：恐怖组织间竞价的异质效应

题目：Tug of War: The Heterogeneous Effects of Outbidding Between Terrorist Groups

作者：Casey Crisman-Cox，德克萨斯农工大学助理教授。

摘要：本文引入一种动态竞价博弈模式，在博弈中，双方使用暴力进行拉锯战，以此争夺不断变化的公众支持。本文利用来自巴勒斯坦民众对哈马斯和法塔赫两个组织的支持情况的新收集数据，将该模型嵌入到对这两个组织间典型竞价关系的分析中。竞争具有异质性影响，本文的研究证明，群体间的竞争能够抑制暴力行为的发生。当面临哈马斯的竞争时，法塔赫使用了比哈马斯不进行恐怖主义活动时更多的恐怖主义手段，但来自法塔赫的竞争会使哈马斯减少攻击次数。同样的，让哈马斯更有能力或更有兴趣竞争会使总体的恐怖主义暴力活动增加，但让法塔赫更有能力或更有兴趣参与竞争则会抑制双方暴力行为的发生。竞争对这类暴力行为产生的抑制作用是通过一场不对称的较量表现出来的，在这一类较量中，本文还发现，法塔赫能够更有效地利用恐怖主义活动来提升其公众支持率，即使哈马斯发动袭击的成本更低。在此基础上，本文进一步证明竞价理论与暴力的衡量指标和竞争激励机制之间存在的正相关、负相关或无相关关系都是相匹配的。

We introduce a dynamic game of outbidding where two groups use violence to compete in a tug-of-war fashion for evolving public support. We fit the model to the canonical outbidding rivalry between Hamas and Fatah using newly collected data on Palestinian public support for these groups. Competition has heterogeneous effects, and we demonstrate that intergroup competition can discourage violence. Competition from Hamas leads Fatah to use more terrorism than it would in a world where Hamas abstains from terrorism, but competition from Fatah can lead Hamas to attack less than it otherwise would. Likewise, making Hamas more capable or interested in competing increases overall violence, but making Fatah more capable or interested discourages violence on both sides. These discouragement effects of competition on violence emerge through an asymmetric contest, in which we find that Fatah uses terrorism more effectively to boost its support, although Hamas has lower attack costs. Expanding on these results, we demonstrate that outbidding theory is consistent with a positive, negative, or relationship between measures of violence and incentives to compete.

核禁忌：不使用核武器的逻辑与未来

题目：Nuclear Shibboleths: The Logics and Future of Nuclear Nonuse

作者：Stacie E. Goddard，韦尔斯利学院米尔德里德·莱恩·肯珀政治学教授；Colleen Larkin，加利福尼亚大学全球冲突与合作研究所 (IGCC) 技术与国际安全博士后研究员。

摘要：托马斯·谢林认为：“过去半个世纪中最引人注目的事件是一个未曾发生的事件。我们有幸享受了长达六十年没有因愤怒而动用核武器的时光”。对此，他又提出一个问题：“我们还能再坚持另外的五十年吗？”当代技术革新、核扩散、加速的现代化进程以及核军演使谢林提出的问题更加迫在眉睫。近年来，学界中涌现出大量研究，这些研究试图检验不使用核武器政策所具有的持久性。学者们主要关注方法论的创新，这为未来对不使用核武器问题的研究提供了大量有力的证据。然而，本文认为这些研究在理论上存在缺陷：它们将不使用核武器的机制简化为一种“理性主义”与“规范主义”的二分法，这掩盖了每个理论框架中分析核（不）使用的不同路径。在理性主义的分析框架之下，当前的文献存在概念混淆的问题，这些研究将本来截然不同的机制——成本与可信度——视为单一的因果关系。而在规范主义的理论框架下，学者们将规范视为一种结构性的机制，从而忽视了规范的竞争机制。本文的研究表明，通过分析不同的因果路径能够洞见学者们对不使用核武器的未来截然不同的预期，在拥有精确制导核武器的世界中更是如此。

Thomas Schelling argued that “The most spectacular event of the past half century is one that did not occur. We have enjoyed sixty years without nuclear weapons exploded in anger.” To this, he added a question: “Can we make it through another half dozen decades?” Contemporary technological innovation, weapons proliferation, increased modernization efforts, and nuclear saber-rattling have made Schelling's question an urgent one. Recently, there has been an explosion in scholarship attempting to test the resilience of nonuse. These scholars have focused primarily on methodological innovations, generating an impressive body of evidence about the future of nonuse. Yet we argue that this literature is theoretically problematic: it reduces mechanisms of nuclear nonuse to a “rationalist” versus “normative” dichotomy which obscures the distinct pathways to nuclear (non)use within each theoretical framework. With rationalist theories, the current literature commits the sin of conflation, treating what should be distinct mechanisms—cost and credibility—as a single causal story. With normative theories, scholars have committed a sin of omission, treating norms as structural and overlooking mechanisms of norm contestation. We show that teasing out these different causal pathways reveals radically different expectations about the future of nonuse, especially in a world of precision nuclear weapons.

国外气候行动：评估跨境气候转移的群众支持

题目：Climate Action from Abroad: Assessing Mass Support for Cross-Border Climate Transfers

作者：Nikhar Gaikwad，哥伦比亚大学政治学系助理教授；Federica Genovese，牛津大学政治学与国际关系教授；Dustin Tingley，哈佛大学政府学教授。

摘要：专家们认为，发达国家向发展中国家转移资源是国际气候政策行动的核心所在。然而，在各国努力应对提供和接受气候政策资金所带来的政治难题之际，了解为何选民支持或反对国际气候融资至关重要。本文聚焦于捐助国与受援国民众，探究其支持跨境气候转移的动因。理论上，本文关注重点是对资金补偿性目的的强调、采取减缓性措施而非适应性措施的倾向、对捐助国与受援国合作伙伴关系的优先考虑这三个因素带来的影响，因为这三个因素能够带来规范与物质上的收益，进而使一国在更广泛的选民联盟中获得民众对跨境气候转移政策的支持。在美国和印度进行的配对调查实验证明了上述因素与捐助国和受援国公民支持意愿的相关性。总的来说，本文的研究结果解释了气候转移协议所具有的国内政治经济属性，这些属性能够为跨境气候合作赢得公众支持。

Experts argue that resource transfers from developed to developing countries are central to international climate policy efforts. Yet as countries grapple with the political difficulties of provisioning and accepting climate funds, understanding why voters support or oppose international climate finance becomes critical. Focusing on domestic audiences in both donor and recipient countries, we investigate the determinants of public support for cross-border climate transfers. Theoretically, we focus on the effects of emphasizing the compensatory purposes of funding, favoring mitigation over adaptation activities, and prioritizing partnerships between donor and recipient agents—three factors that generate both normative and material benefits, and thus build support among broader coalitions of voters. Paired survey experiments in the United States and India corroborate the relevance of these transfer features for citizens in donor and recipient countries. Taken together, our findings shed light on the domestic political-economy attributes of transfer agreements that can unlock support for cross-border climate cooperation.

现代战争中的自相残杀式胁迫

题目：Fratricidal Coercion in Modern War

作者：Jason Lyall，达特茅斯学院首任詹姆斯·赖特跨国研究讲座教授兼政府系副教授；Yuri Zhukov，乔治城大学外交学院和政府系副教授。

摘要：军队有时会使用自相残杀的胁迫手段对自己的部队成员使用暴力和恐吓，以迫使不愿作战的士兵参战。这种做法将如何影响军队的作战状态？这仍是一个悬而未决的问题。本文采用混合方法研究了这种自相残杀的胁迫行为，使用（1）基于数百万份解密的人员档案构建的二战中苏联步兵师的月度面板数据；（2）列宁格勒战役中步兵师的配对比较数据；以及（3）（1939-2011年间）75场冲突里526场陆地战争及其结果的跨国数据，以评估这种行为的普遍性。本文提供了三组实证研究结论。首先，胁迫手段可以阻止一些士兵逃离战场，但这些手段以更高的伤亡率与更低的参战主动性为代价。其次，战时和战前的胁迫手段（如大规模镇压和军官清洗运动）会对士兵的行为产生相似且不断强化的影响。第三，自相残杀式胁迫手段带来的增强作战决心、削弱士兵主动性的效果在不同交战国以及不同战争中普遍存在。这种自相残杀式的胁迫手段运用士兵的恐惧心理使其服从，迫使作战决心不同的士兵遵守统一的战场行为规范。但这种手段的实际效用存疑。总体而言，使用自相残杀式胁迫手段的国家赢得战争的可能性更小。

Armies sometimes use fratricidal coercion—violence and intimidation against their own troops—to force reluctant soldiers to fight. How this practice affects battlefield performance remains an open question. We study fratricidal coercion using a mixed-methods strategy, drawing on (1) monthly panel data on Soviet Rifle Divisions in World War II, built from millions of declassified personnel files; (2) paired comparisons of Rifle Divisions at the Battle of Leningrad; and (3) cross-national data on 526 land battles and war outcomes from 75 conflicts (1939–2011) to assess generalizability. We offer three sets of empirical findings. First, coercion keeps some soldiers from fleeing the battlefield, but at the cost of higher casualties and reduced initiative. Second, wartime and prewar coercion (such as mass repression and officer purges) affect soldiers’ behavior in similar, mutually reinforcing ways. Third, the resolve-boosting, initiative-dampening effects of fratricidal coercion generalize across belligerents and wars. Fratricidal coercion generates compliance through fear, compelling soldiers with variable levels of resolve to conform to a uniform standard of battlefield behavior. But the net utility of this approach is dubious. On balance, countries employing fratricidal coercion are less likely to win wars.

译者：管怡，国政学人编译员，澳门大学国际关系与公共政策专业硕士研究生。

审校 | 赖永祯

排版 | 范世一

本文源于《国际组织》2025年第1期，本文为公益分享，服务于科研教学，不代表本平台观点。如有疏漏，欢迎指正。

来源：国政学人