摘要：When you shop at any retailer or supermarket these days, you'll find yourself generally funneled to self-checkout, where you're st
The quality and value of what customers get for their dollar these days has regressed across the board.
如今，顾客花费金钱所得到的产品的质量和价值已经全面下降。
Yet it's customer experience that has suffered most as the basic core services like support and checkout have all been ripped up so companies can try to make more money with less.
然而，客户体验受到的影响最大，因为支持和结帐等基本核心服务都已被撕毁，因此公司可以尝试用更少的钱赚更多的钱。
When you shop at any retailer or supermarket these days, you'll find yourself generally funneled to self-checkout, where you're stuck watching people in front of you awkwardly fumble finding barcodes, bagging their own groceries, and panicking whenever the machine shouts at them or the screen freezes.
如今， 当您在任何零售商或超市购物时，您都会发现自己通常会转向自助结账，在那里您被困在眼前的人笨拙地摸索着寻找条形码、装袋自己的杂货，每当机器对他们大喊大叫或屏幕冻结时就会惊慌失措。
There's usually only one worker who's overseeing everything, and whenever a problem occurs, everyone has to wait on them for a resolution - all of which translates to a longer wait time, higher margin for error, and frustration.
通常只有一名工人监督所有事情，每当出现问题时，每个人都必须等待他解决 - 这意味着更长的等待时间、更高的错误率和挫败感。
To add insult to injury, you had no choice in any of this as a consumer.
更糟糕的是，作为消费者，你对此别无选择。
Even if you wanted to go back to the normal checkout aisles where cashier scans and bags for you.
即使你想回到正常的结账通道，收银员会为你扫描和装袋。
You can't because those aisles are either closed or they're so short staffed that the lines there are even longer than those at self-checkout.
你不行，因为那些过道要么关闭了，要么人手太少，以至于那里的排队时间甚至比自助结账处的排队时间还要长。
All of this tech suddenly appeared nationwide in the mid-2010s.
所有这些技术在 2010 年代中期突然在全国范围内出现。
Since the debut of self-checkout, Retailers from Kroger and Walmart to Target and Home Depot have all publicly gaslighted that self-checkout is faster and that these machines are not there to replace workers, but to instead free them to be more productive.
自从自助结账机问世以来， 从 Kroger 和 Walmart 到 Target 和 Home Depot 等零售商都公开宣称， 自助结账机速度更快， 而且这些机器并非为了取代工人，而是为了让工人更有效率。
They stuck to this script year after year, despite the continuous backlash and disapproval, and their stocks collectively grew as Wall Street applauded these investments, believing that tech innovation would unlock unprecedented efficiencies and profits for these age-old, overhead intensive businesses.
尽管遭到持续的强烈反对和非议，他们仍然年复一年地坚持这个剧本，随着华尔街对这些投资的赞赏，他们的股票也集体上涨，他们相信技术创新将为这些历史悠久、管理费用密集型的企业带来前所未有的效率和利润。
Fast forward just 5 years and self-checkout has largely been a flop.
仅仅五年之后，自助结账基本上就失败了。
Most retailers have backtracked, ripping out their machines and going back to human cashiers.
大多数零售商已放弃这一举措，拆除机器并重新使用人工收银员。
While a few chains have continued to gaslight that self-checkout is still the future.
尽管一些连锁店仍在继续宣传自助结账仍是未来的趋势。
The reality is that even they are scaling back, restricting the conditions in which consumers can use these machines.
现实情况是， 甚至他们也在缩减规模，限制消费者使用这些机器的条件。
Self-checkout has been a flop not just in the U.S, but also overseas and all of these retailers are hoping to sweep things under the rug while the market obsesses over AI.
自助结账不仅在美国遭遇了失败，在海外也同样如此， 趁着市场对人工智能痴迷不已， 所有这些零售商都希望将这种现象掩盖起来。
Ultimately, the retail industry is just as confused as everyone else, as there's been no clarity in the data.
归根结底， 零售业和其他行业一样感到困惑，因为数据并不清晰。
Is getting rid of a few part-time cashiers making $10 to $15 an hour actually even meaningful business-wise, if you're spending millions of dollars on loss prevention, security, and self-checkout technology.
如果您在防损、安全和自助结账技术上花费了数百万美元，那么从商业角度来看，解雇一些每小时赚 10 到 15 美元的兼职收银员是否真的有意义呢？
Did retailers who installed self-checkout machines end up saving more money or improving their profits?
安装自助结账机的零售商最终是否节省了更多资金或提高了利润？
And how did such a conservative, disciplined industry get caught up in this hype?
那么，这样一个保守、自律的行业怎么会陷入这种炒作呢？
What does the future hold in business?
商业的未来将会怎样？
Asked 9 experts, and you'll get 10 answers.
询问 9 位专家，你会得到 10 个答案。
Analysts will say inflation is down one month and then up the next.
分析师会说通货膨胀率这个月下降，下个月又上升。
It's the same constant whiplash with unemployment, jobs reports, and the health of the economy.
失业、就业报告和经济健康状况同样持续受到冲击。
Could someone please invent a crystal ball?
有人可以发明水晶球吗？
Until then, over 41,000 businesses have future proofed their business with NetSuite by Oracle, the number one cloud ERP bring accounting, finance, inventory and HR into one fluid platform with one unified business management suite.
到目前为止，已有超过 41,000 家企业通过 Oracle 的 NetSuite 为其业务做好了未来准备，这款排名第一的云 ERP 通过一个统一的业务管理套件将会计、财务、库存和人力资源整合到一个流畅的平台中。
There's one source of truth giving you the visibility and control you need to make quick decisions.
有一个事实来源为您提供做出快速决策所需的可视性和控制力。
With real-time insights and forecasting, you're peering into the future with actionable data.
通过实时洞察和预测，您可以通过可操作的数据洞察未来。
When you're closing the books in days, not weeks, you're spending less time looking backwards and more time on what's next.
当你在几天而不是几周内结账时，你花在回顾过去上的时间就更少了，而花在考虑下一步工作上的时间就更多了。
Modern MBA is small at the moment, but as soon as we scale, we'll need and use NetSuite.
现代 MBA 目前规模较小，但一旦扩大规模，我们就会需要并使用 NetSuite。
Today we're stitching things manually and it's gotten harder to assess our business health.
如今，我们都是手动缝制物品，评估业务健康状况变得越来越困难。
We need to track production costs to run payroll compliant with multiple states, and to evaluate profit and loss by team and project.
我们需要跟踪生产成本以运行符合多个州的工资单，并评估团队和项目的盈亏。
As a corporation, we pay tax throughout the year and it's a nightmare jumping from system to system just to get one answer.
作为一家公司，我们全年都要纳税，为了得到一个答案而从一个系统跳到另一个系统简直是一场噩梦。
These are capabilities that only NetSuite provides, and it's a platform that we intend to take every advantage of.
这些功能只有 NetSuite 才能提供，我们打算充分利用这个平台。
Whether your company is earning millions or even hundreds of millions, NetSuite helps you respond to immediate challenges and seize your biggest opportunities.
无论您的公司收入是数百万还是数亿美元，NetSuite 都能帮助您应对眼前的挑战并抓住最大的机遇。
Speaking of opportunity, download the CFO's guide to AI and Machine Learning at netsuite.com/modern MBA. The guide is free to you at NetSuite.com/ModernMBA.
说到机会，请访问 netsuite.com/modern MBA 下载 CFO 的 AI 和机器学习指南。您可以在 NetSuite.com/ModernMBA 免费获取该指南。
NetSuite.com/ModernMBA.
NetSuite.com/ModernMBA。
Retail is a tough industry.
零售业是一个艰难的行业。
It's a capital-intensive, high overhead business where even the giants squeeze out 4-8% operating margins a year.
这是一项资本密集型、管理费用较高的业务，即便是巨头每年也只能获得 4-8% 的营业利润率。
Whether it's peddling fresh produce, daily essentials or cheap toys, retail generates incredible cash flow as the industry leaders gross more in a single year than even some Big Tech companies.
无论是兜售新鲜农产品、日常必需品还是廉价玩具，零售业都能产生令人难以置信的现金流，因为行业领导者一年的总收入甚至比一些大型科技公司还要高。
But gross earnings are not the same as net 60-70% of every dollar that a retailer earns goes to buying products, even with economies of scale.
但即使存在规模经济，总收入仍与零售商每赚一美元的净收入之 60-70% 不同，因为零售商每赚一美元，净收入中 60-70% 都要用于购买产品。
The product costs for the leaders with the best volume and the greatest wholesale discounts like Walmart and Costco still end up in the 60 to 70% range.
沃尔玛和好市多等销量最大、批发折扣最大的零售商的产品成本仍然在 60% 到 70% 之间。
If anything, their product costs are generally higher as these giants have to spread themselves thin to carry something for everyone.
无论如何，他们的产品成本通常较高，因为这些巨头必须分散自己的精力来为每个人提供产品。
On the flip side, the more specialized a retailer is like in home improvement or in organic produce, the lower their product costs will be.
另一方面， 零售商在家庭装修或有机农产品方面的专业程度越高，其产品成本就越低。
But once again, they're still in that 60-70% range, with only 20% gross profit left after paying for the goods and getting them delivered to the stores.
但是， 他们的利润率仍然在 60-70% 之间，在支付货款并将货物送到商店后， 只剩下 20% 的毛利润。
Retailers have to clamp down on everything else to squeeze out profit.
零售商必须压制其他一切手段来获取利润。
They generally hire low-skill workers at minimum wages, pay below-market rents as anchor tenants, control hours, and rely on part time seasonal staff to stock shelves, handle sales, and maintain space around the clock.
他们通常以最低工资雇用低技能工人，作为主力租户支付低于市场的租金，控制营业时间，并依靠兼职季节性员工来补货、处理销售并全天候维护空间。
For every dollar that retailers earn, They generally spend another 15-30% on labor, which leaves an operating margin of just a few single digits.
零售商每赚一美元，一般还要花费 15-30% 的劳动力，这使得营业利润率仅为几个个位数。
There's little profits in this line of work and it's been this way for decades, with tiny margins and high overhead.
这个行业利润很低， 几十年来一直如此，利润微薄， 成本高昂。
Retailers, by nature, are conservative, careful, and frugal.
零售商本质上是保守、谨慎和节俭的。
There's no such thing as fast growth in this industry.
这个行业不存在快速增长这一说。
They don't have the margins to make moonshot bets every quarter, and they have to be financially disciplined with their asset heavy, people-intensive volume model.
他们没有足够的利润来每个季度进行大胆的尝试，而且他们必须在重资产、重人力的批量模式中严格遵守财务纪律。
As a result, retailers excel as defensive, reliable investments.
因此，零售商是出色的防御性、可靠投资。
But in the zero interest environment of the 2010s, investors want an upside, not security.
但在2010年代的零利率环境下，投资者想要的是上涨，而不是安全。
It was in this period when tech companies skyrocketed, as their stocks consistently outperformed those of any other industry year after year.
正是在这一时期， 科技公司股价一路飙升，年复一年地超过其他任何行业的股票。
Even though most tech startups lost money, their fundamentals compared to retailers were incredible, with massive 70+% operating margins.
尽管大多数科技初创公司都处于亏损状态，但与零售商相比， 它们的基本面令人难以置信，营业利润率高达 70% 以上。
Tech was the exact opposite of retail.
科技与零售正好相反。
In the early 2010s, every retailer focused on the same strategies.
2010 年代初期，每家零售商都专注于相同的策略。
Their goal was to open up more stores, to add loyalty programs, to expand product variety and to drive more in-store traffic.
他们的目标是开设更多商店、增加忠诚度计划、扩大产品种类并吸引更多店内客流量。
Consumer confidence was fragile exiting the Great Recession and retailers were focused on getting them back in the door and spending.
摆脱经济大衰退后，消费者信心十分脆弱，零售商致力于让消费者重返商场并进行消费。
There were no grand speeches of innovation or radical ideas about the future, but everything changed in 2016.
虽然没有宏大的创新演讲， 也没有关于未来的激进想法，但2016年一切都发生了变化。
Suddenly, every retailer overnight began talking about automation and technology.
突然之间，每一家零售商都开始谈论自动化和技术。
Despite having zero issues with it before, the checkout aisle became the industry's public enemy number one.
尽管之前没有出现过任何问题，但收银台现在却成了该行业的头号公敌。
This was the Amazon effect.
这就是亚马逊效应。
It was in 2016 when Amazon launched its futuristic store where customers could walk in, take the items they want right off the shelves, and walk right out.
2016 年， 亚马逊推出了其未来主义商店， 顾客可以走进去，直接从货架上取下他们想要的商品，然后直接走出来。
With computer vision, deep learning, smart sensors, and the same autonomous technology that was fueling the self-driving and IoT hype at the time, Amazon boasted that it had revolutionized retail by opening the first store in history.
凭借计算机视觉、深度学习、智能传感器以及当时推动自动驾驶和物联网炒作的相同自主技术，亚马逊宣称它通过开设历史上第一家商店彻底改变了零售业。
Without checkout, customers would never need to wait in line again.
没有结账，顾客就不需要再排队等候了。
Labor costs would be dramatically lower, as this technology would directly replace cashiers and checkout aisles.
由于这项技术将直接取代收银员和结账通道，因此劳动力成本将大幅降低。
Everything was automated and these stores only needed 1 or 2 workers on hand to restock shelves as needed.
一切都实现了自动化，这些商店只需要 1 或 2 名工人来根据需要补充货架。
In this fast growing era of in-Demand digital everything like Uber and DoorDash, it wasn't a stretch to imagine that customers would be willing to pay a greater premium and spend even more than before with such extreme convenience.
在这个 Uber 和 DoorDash 等数字化一切需求旺盛的快速增长时代，不难想象，为了享受如此极致的便利， 客户愿意支付更高的价格， 甚至比以前花更多的钱。
And from the business side, what had once been an unavoidable, error prone, variable cost could now be eliminated permanently with this one-time investment in hardware and software.
从业务角度来看，曾经不可避免的、容易出错的变动成本现在可以通过对硬件和软件的一次性投资永久消除。
Given Amazon's track record, the media hype and the all-time-high positive sentiment towards tech, the public believed every word out of Jeff Bezos's mouth, even though the first store was really nothing more than a proof-of-concept.
鉴于亚马逊的业绩记录、媒体的炒作以及人们对科技的高度积极情绪，公众相信杰夫·贝佐斯说的每一个字，尽管第一家商店实际上只不过是一个概念验证。
Retailers overnight got spooked.
零售商一夜之间被惊慌失措所困扰。
If Amazon opened up more of these stores, it would be hard for their customers to go back to waiting in line at their stores, and they would look like dinosaurs in comparison.
如果亚马逊开设更多这样的商店，他们的顾客将很难再在他们的商店排队等候，相比之下， 他们看起来就像恐龙一样。
At the same time, there was no way that a retailer could ever catch up to Amazon's engineering talent.
与此同时，零售商根本无法赶上亚马逊的工程人才。
There was some initial speculation in the industry that Amazon Go was just a testing ground, and that Amazon's actual goal was just to eventually license out this tech to these retailers for a fee.
业内最初有人猜测，Amazon Go 只是一个试验场，亚马逊的真正目标只是最终以收费方式将这项技术授权给这些零售商。
But those hopes were dashed when Amazon suddenly acquired Whole Foods a year later.
但一年后，亚马逊突然收购全食超市，这些希望破灭了。
Whole Foods provided a huge customer base, supply chain, perishable expertise, and a nationwide presence - and Amazon could embed its technology and aggressive Silicon Valley data driven approach into retail directly.
Whole Foods 提供了庞大的客户群、供应链、易腐食品专业知识和全国影响力，而亚马逊可以将其技术和积极的硅谷数据驱动方法直接嵌入到零售业中。
With a purchase price of $14 billion, the biggest acquisition to date in company history, it was clear that Amazon wasn't going to settle for being a back end software vendor.
此次收购价格为 140 亿美元，是该公司历史上最大的一笔收购，显然亚马逊不会满足于成为后端软件供应商。
Jeff Bezos had killed off bookstores before and he was now taking on supermarkets head on.
杰夫·贝佐斯曾经消灭过书店，现在他正正面迎战超市。
There was no one else in the world more qualified and more committed to disrupting the remaining retail giants.
世界上没有人比他更有资格、更致力于颠覆剩余的零售巨头。
Eight years later, we know now that the supposed groundbreaking technology behind Amazon Go was not actually real.
八年后，我们现在知道，Amazon Go 背后所谓的突破性技术实际上并不真实。
All Amazon had done was to replace local human cashiers with a thousand remote workers in India, who had to manually review the footage to see what items customers actually picked up and walked out.
亚马逊所做的只是用印度的一千名远程工作人员取代当地的人工收银员，这些工作人员必须手动查看录像以查看顾客实际拿起并带走的商品。
With seven out of every ten transactions needing to be manually verified by this remote team, this meant only 30% of the sales were actually automated.
每十笔交易中就有七笔需要由这个远程团队手动验证，这意味着只有 30% 的销售实际上是自动化的。
Beyond the issues of accuracy, the technology from the lens of hardware and software was not actually scalable.
除了准确性问题之外，从硬件和软件的角度来看，该技术实际上是不可扩展的。
A single Amazon Go store required thousands of state-of-the-art cameras and fiber internet.
一家 Amazon Go 商店需要数千台最先进的摄像头和光纤互联网。
Amazon has since quietly retreated back to conventional checkout and local human cashiers for Whole Foods and for its own stores.
此后，亚马逊已悄然恢复了为全食超市和其自有商店提供传统结账和本地人工收银员的服务。
And in the past year, they've laid off hundreds of employees from its Amazon Go teams, closed down the vast majority of its stores across the US and Europe, and ripped out the cashierless just-walk-out turnstiles and Whole Foods.
在过去的一年里， 他们解雇了 Amazon Go 团队的数百名员工，关闭了美国和欧洲的绝大多数商店，并拆除了无收银员的旋转闸门和全食超市。
But back in 2016, no one had any idea at the time that Jeff Bezos was just blowing smoke.
但回顾 2016 年，当时没有人知道杰夫·贝佐斯只是在吹牛。
It wasn't just retailers who were spooked, but also Wall Street, who began demanding answers.
不仅零售商感到惊慌，华尔街也开始要求给出答案。
For better or worse, Amazon had become a forcing function.
不管怎样，亚马逊已经成为一种强制功能。
They had established a standard and identified a specific area for automation that everyone else in retail suddenly needed to live up to.
他们制定了一项标准，并确定了自动化的特定领域，零售业的其他所有人都突然需要达到这一标准。
How would the industry leaders like Kroger, Costco, and Home Depot compete with Amazon's new people-light, high-automation stores?
克罗格、好市多、家得宝等行业领导者将如何与亚马逊的新型无人零售、高度自动化商店竞争？
Could they ever transition to make their checkout self-service, just like Amazon Go?
他们是否可以转型，实现结账自助服务，就像 Amazon Go 一样？
And within a year, self-checkout became priority number one for the entire industry.
一年之内，自助结账就成为整个行业的首要任务。
It was a gold rush without the gold for leaders like Walmart, Kroger, and target.
对于沃尔玛、克罗格和塔吉特等领先企业来说，这是一场没有黄金的淘金热。
They were eager to demonstrate that they weren't actually dinosaurs waiting to be disrupted, but instead equally capable of adapting to the latest trends and creating their own proprietary technology.
他们急于证明自己并不是等待被颠覆的恐龙，而是同样有能力适应最新趋势并创造自己的专有技术。
In return, they could maintain their valuations and grow the appeal of their stock in what was a tech-dominant market.
作为回报，他们可以维持自己的估值，并在科技主导的市场中提升其股票的吸引力。
Yet, retailers of all sizes were under pressure to show progress toward self-checkout.
然而，各种规模的零售商都面临着展示自助结账进展的压力。
Smaller chains like Dollar General and Sprouts didn't have the war chest of a Walmart or Kroger to throw millions of dollars hiring engineers and building machines.
Dollar General 和 Sprouts 等规模较小的连锁店并不像沃尔玛或 Kroger 那样拥有雄厚的资金来投入数百万美元聘请工程师和制造机器。
They also didn't have the incentive or the urgency to reinvent themselves in the eyes of Wall Street as some progressive, modernized corporation.
他们也没有动力或紧迫感在华尔街眼中将自己重塑为某种进步的、现代化的公司。
They only needed to reach this bar, not exceed it.
他们只需要达到这个标准，而不需要超越它。
Ultimately, the clock was ticking, and the industry as a whole needed to get self-checkout up and running ASAP to remain competitive.
最终，时间在流逝，整个行业需要尽快建立并运行自助结账系统以保持竞争力。
They would never be fully automated and entirely cashierless like Amazon, but if they could get customers to scan and bag their own groceries, if they could start removing the existing checkout aisles and start hiring less cashiers, then everyone would, in theory, be closer towards realizing this future.
它们永远不会像亚马逊那样实现完全自动化和无收银员，但如果他们可以让顾客自己扫描和打包杂货，如果他们可以开始消除现有的结账通道并开始雇用更少的收银员，那么从理论上讲， 每个人都会更接近实现这个未来。
The fastest option was to outsource and there were two companies who were eager to provide the hardware and software shovels for this faux gold rush.
最快的选择是外包，有两家公司渴望为这场假淘金热提供硬件和软件铲子。
ATMs were the earliest and most successful example of retail automation, where customers could self-service themselves on machines, and banks in turn could hire less tellers.
ATM 是零售自动化最早、最成功的例子，顾客可以在机器上自助服务，银行也可以减少雇用柜员的人数。
In the US, there was NCR and in Europe there was Diebold next door.
在美国有 NCR，在欧洲有隔壁的 Diebold。
Both companies made their fortunes building and selling ATMs to banks, but there's only so many banks in the world who need ATMs and so much innovation to be had with cash withdrawals and check deposits.
两家公司都是通过制造和向银行销售 ATM 机发家致富的，但世界上需要 ATM 机的银行数量有限，而且在现金提取和支票存款方面也需要大量的创新。
By the late 90s, the ATM market had been completely saturated.
到了 90 年代末，ATM 市场已经完全饱和。
As a result, growth was slow through the 2000s and both companies desired to introduce self-service to other industries.
因此，21 世纪增长缓慢，两家公司都希望将自助服务引入其他行业。
Places like airports, car rentals, concerts, and hospitals were all opportunities where staff could be easily replaced with a machine.
机场、汽车租赁、音乐会和医院等地方都存在可以轻松用机器取代工作人员的机会。
But NCR and Diebold were only vendors and suppliers.
但 NCR 和 Diebold 仅仅是供应商和供货商。
They could only follow the wind, and most retailers were not willing to risk the resources necessary to undertake a project of the scale.
他们只能跟着风向走，大多数零售商不愿意冒险投入必要资源去承担如此规模的项目。
NCR settled for DVD kiosks, believing that they could fill the hole in movie rental with Blockbuster's bankruptcy.
NCR 选择经营 DVD 亭，相信这样可以填补 Blockbuster 破产后电影租赁市场的空缺。
But all of that went up in the air with Netflix and streaming earnings fluctuated for both companies through the 2000s as the company struggled to find growth beyond banking.
但随着 Netflix 的出现，这一切都化为泡影，由于该公司努力寻找银行业务以外的增长点，两家公司的流媒体收入在 21 世纪都出现波动。
Despite grossing billions of dollars a year, there still isn't a lot of profit in this line of work.
尽管每年的收入达到数十亿美元，但这一行业的利润仍然不多。
After designing the machines, outsourcing the manufacturing, writing software, and maintaining the hardware at scale after deployment, operating margins for both NCR and Diebold were as low as the retailers themselves.
在设计机器、外包制造、编写软件以及部署后大规模维护硬件之后，NCR 和 Diebold 的营业利润率与零售商本身一样低。
The first real win came in 2012, four years before Amazon Go, when NCR won an initial deal with Walmart, who had the capital, incentive, and interest to pursue self-checkout.
第一次真正的胜利发生在 2012 年， 即 Amazon Go 推出的四年前，当时 NCR 赢得了与沃尔玛的初步交易，沃尔玛拥有推行自助结账的资本、动力和兴趣。
Walmart, through history, has been aggressively anti-union, and its executives were always upfront about exploring ways to cut hours, eliminate workers, and to reduce overhead.
纵观历史，沃尔玛一直积极反对工会，其高管也一直在积极探索缩短工作时间、裁员和降低管理费用的方法。
But as mentioned before, the rest of the retail industry wasn't convinced that these investments were worthwhile or repeatable at a smaller scale.
但如前所述，零售业的其他部分并不相信这些投资是值得的，或者可以在小规模上重复。
And all of that changed in 2016 with Amazon Go.
2016 年，随着 Amazon Go 的推出，这一切发生了改变。
Suddenly, everyone wanted self-checkout, and it became NCR and Diebold's fastest growing division.
突然之间，每个人都想要自助结账，它成为了 NCR 和 Diebold 发展最快的部门。
Diebold retail business doubled in a single year, and for NCR, that growth was channeled across multiple years as it took longer for the deals and deployments to materialize.
Diebold 零售业务在一年内增长了一倍，而对于 NCR 而言， 由于交易和部署需要更长的时间才能实现， 因此这种增长需要多年的时间。
Like any good shovel seller, both companies openly fanned the flames to drive urgency.
就像任何优秀的铲子销售商一样，这两家公司都公开煽风点火，以制造紧迫感。
They proclaimed that their machines were necessary to winning the next generation of shoppers, that millennials loved self-checkout, and that stores would be radically transformed in their layout.
他们宣称， 他们的机器对于赢得下一代购物者至关重要，千禧一代喜欢自助结账，商店的布局将发生彻底的改变。
And the best part was that these self-checkout machines could be productive 24 hours a day, whereas a human could only work eight hours at most.
最好的部分是， 这些自助结账机器可以全天 24 小时不间断工作，而人类最多只能工作 8 小时。
Everyone knew that NCR and Diebold would never match Amazon Go, but at the very least, they were the cheapest and fastest option.
每个人都知道 NCR 和 Diebold 永远无法与 Amazon Go 相提并论，但至少， 它们是最便宜、最快捷的选择。
But even though demand and sales grew rapidly, not even the shovel sellers were profitable.
但尽管需求和销量迅速增长，甚至连铲子卖家都还没有盈利。
It was a fake gold rush, and both NCR and Diebold actually lost money every year as they burned millions of dollars into R&D and sales, believing that this short term investment would have long term returns.
这是一场虚假的淘金热， NCR 和 Diebold 每年实际上都在亏损， 因为他们在研发和销售上投入了数百万美元，并相信这种短期投资会带来长期回报。
They never imagined that Amazon and the industry would do such a massive U-turn, and that retailers would now go so far as to rip out their deployments with the sunk costs.
他们从未想过亚马逊和整个行业会出现如此巨大的转变，零售商竟然会利用沉没成本来拆除他们的部署。
The other issue is that NCR and Diebold machines were always designed as a one-size-fits-all solution.
另一个问题是，NCR 和 Diebold 机器始终被设计为“一刀切”解决方案。
They were ultimately chasing a future that had not been proven.
他们最终追逐的是一个尚未被证实的未来。
Thus, while their machines excelled at replacing simple sequential workflows like checking into a flight or printing a boarding pass at the airport, self-checkout was a beast of its own.
因此， 虽然他们的机器擅长取代简单的顺序工作流程， 例如在机场办理登机手续或打印登机牌，但自助结账本身却是一项艰巨的任务。
Every retailer has hundreds, if not thousands of different SKUs that change regularly, along with their own systems, programs, catalogs, and policies.
每个零售商都有数百甚至数千个不同的 SKU，并且会定期变化，同时还有自己的系统、程序、目录和政策。
These machines needed to be able to follow all of these things and to be updated whenever these items changed.
这些机器需要能够跟踪所有这些事物，并在这些事物发生变化时进行更新。
But given the rapid speed at which retailers adopted, purchased, and rolled out these machines, it was all trial by fire, and NCR and Diebold needed to provide even greater support, maintenance, and services post-sale, all of which chewed into their profits.
但考虑到零售商采用、购买和推出这些机器的速度非常快，这一切都是一次严峻的考验，NCR 和 Diebold 需要在售后提供更大的支持、维护和服务，所有这些都会侵蚀他们的利润。
Revenue has regressed as their customers have generally churned or opted to maintain their installations instead of expanding, and their stocks have fallen as both companies find themselves in the same situation today that they were in ten years ago and 20 years ago, looking for growth beyond ATMs.
由于客户普遍流失或选择维持其设施而非扩张， 两家公司的收入出现倒退，而股价也出现下跌， 因为两家公司发现自己今天的处境与十年前、二十年前相同，都在寻求 ATM 以外的增长。
Walmart was the earliest and the most aggressive, having invested in self-checkout technology long before Amazon.
沃尔玛是最早、最积极的一家企业，早在亚马逊之前就投资了自助结账技术。
Without any unions to slow them down, they were the most capable and ruthless of all retailers.
在没有任何工会阻止他们的情况下，他们成为了所有零售商中最有能力和最无情的。
In 2017, the same year in which Amazon purchased Whole Foods, Walmart had completed rolling out self-checkout in every store.
2017 年， 即亚马逊收购全食超市的同一年，沃尔玛已在每家商店完成自助结账的推广。
Their goal was to eliminate workers entirely, and there was no gaslighting about a better customer experience.
他们的目标是彻底消除工人，并且不会大肆宣扬更好的客户体验。
Self-checkout at the front changes the labor model dramatically inside the store.
前台自助结账彻底改变了商店内部的劳动模式。
"Our focus is really on changing the work when you change the work, you can create leverage inside the profit and loss versus us just cutting hours because that's a short term play." But when we look at the hard numbers, it's not clear at all that the removal of human cashiers has netted any meaningful benefits to Walmart's fundamentals.
“我们的重点实际上是改变工作方式， 当你改变工作方式时，你就可以在利润和亏损中创造杠杆， 而不是仅仅削减工作时间， 因为那只是短期行为。 ” 但是，当我们看硬数据时，根本不清楚取消人工收银员是否给沃尔玛的基本面带来了任何有意义的好处。
When you look at the average number of hourly employees per store, there was a brief period after the standardization of self-checkout where the company did hire less workers.
当你查看每家商店的平均小时工数量时，你会发现在自助结账标准化之后的一段短暂时期内， 公司确实雇用了较少的员工。
But these days, Walmart is actually hiring just as many people per store as it was before self-checkout.
但如今，沃尔玛每家门店雇用的员工数量实际上与自助结账之前一样多。
And that's strange, because there's actually fewer Walmart stores these days than there were a decade ago.
这很奇怪，因为现在沃尔玛商店的数量实际上比十年前要少。
If you're only keeping your highest-performing, most productive stores on paper, you should be hiring less people to operate these assets that you know very well.
如果您只在纸面上保留业绩最高、生产力最高的商店，那么您应该雇用更少的人来运营这些您非常了解的资产。
When we isolate labor costs and we look at SG&A as a percentage of revenue, we actually find that Walmart is spending even more than before on labor and administration, even if they're not hiring more hourly workers than before.
当我们单独考虑劳动力成本并将销售、一般及行政费用作为收入的百分比时，我们实际上发现沃尔玛在劳动力和管理方面的支出比以前更多，即使他们没有比以前雇佣更多的小时工。
They're spending more dollars on support services and machines from NCR and greater corporate headcount.
他们在 NCR 的支持服务和机器上投入了更多资金，并增加了公司员工数量。
And since we know that NCR itself as a company, is not in a healthy position, the idea that the cost of self-checkout was simply flattening out over time in the near future seems foolish.
而且我们知道 NCR 公司本身的状况并不健康，因此认为自助结账成本在不久的将来会逐渐趋于平稳的想法似乎是愚蠢的。
NCR has to make its own money just like Walmart, and if they remain stagnant too long commercially, they'll eventually come to demand higher prices.
NCR 必须像沃尔玛一样自己赚钱，如果他们在商业上停滞不前太久，最终他们就会要求更高的价格。
Profit margins for Walmart have actually decreased after the standardization of self-checkout in 2017.
2017年自助结账标准化后，沃尔玛的利润率实际上有所下降。
While inflation is one potential explanation for the lower profits, the numbers don't really suggest that as the cost of sales as a percentage of revenue has grown slower than the cost of labor and administration.
虽然通货膨胀是利润下降的一个可能原因，但数字并没有真正表明这一点， 因为销售成本占收入的比例增长速度低于劳动力和管理成本的增长速度。
Even if Walmart is not hiring more cashiers specifically, the point remains and that the overhead is higher than ever, despite running fewer stores and without unions.
即使沃尔玛没有特意雇佣更多的收银员，但问题仍然存在，尽管经营的商店数量减少， 而且没有工会， 但管理费用仍然比以往任何时候都高。
Just in the past year, Walmart has ripped out self-checkout in select stores, returned to the conventional aisles, and human cashiers, divested many of the tech ventures that had started to better compete with Amazon on the side, and cited the need to return to basic, human-friendly service to grow profits.
就在过去的一年里，沃尔玛在部分门店取消了自助结账，恢复了传统货架和人工收银员，剥离了许多已经开始与亚马逊更好地竞争的科技企业，并表示需要恢复基本的、人性化的服务来增加利润。
Besides Walmart, we can also look at other big grocery chains like Kroger and Albertsons.
除了沃尔玛，我们还可以看看其他大型连锁杂货店，如 Kroger 和 Albertsons。
The difference is that Kroger and Albertsons workers are unionized and thus enjoy stronger protections, better benefits, and higher wages than those working at Walmart.
不同之处在于，Kroger 和 Albertsons 的员工都是工会成员，因此比沃尔玛的员工享有更强的保障、更好的福利和更高的工资。
While Walmart publicly talked about their desires to cut workers outright, Kroger and Albertsons could not because they had to maintain a positive relationship with their unions.
尽管沃尔玛公开表示希望直接裁员，但克罗格和艾伯森却不能， 因为他们必须与工会保持良好的关系。
Instead, they talked about self-checkout as a way to improve customer experience.
相反，他们讨论自助结账作为改善客户体验的一种方式。
And Kroger, like Walmart, wanted to show to Wall Street that they too were capable of innovation, and they pushed the notion of self-checkout to even greater heights as a direct response to Amazon's technology.
和沃尔玛一样， 克罗格也想向华尔街证明他们也具有创新能力，他们将自助结账的概念推向了更高的高度， 作为对亚马逊技术的直接回应。
Kroger rolled out Scan Bag and Go, where customers could use their phone to scan products, put them in their bag right afterwards, and then walk right out.
克罗格推出了“扫描购物袋并离开” 服务， 顾客可以使用手机扫描商品，然后立即将其放入购物袋，然后直接走开。
By 2018, self-checkout had been installed in every Kroger store.
到 2018 年，每家 Kroger 商店都安装了自助结账设备。
Scan, Bag and Go was available, and the company boasted that they had unlocked massive double digit productivity increases in all of their stores.
“扫描、装袋、带走”服务现已推出，该公司宣称，他们已在所有门店实现了两位数的生产力大幅提升。
Hilariously, Scan, Bag and Go was quietly killed off in 2022, lasting just four years after its launch.
有趣的是，Scan, Bag and Go 在推出仅四年后就于 2022 年悄然关闭。
Like Walmart, there's been no change in the number of hourly workers per store before or after the implementation of self-checkout.
与沃尔玛一样，在实施自助结账之前或之后，每家商店的计时工人数量没有变化。
There may be less cashiers, but not less staff, and the lower operating margins have nothing to do with inflation.
收银员可能会减少， 但员工不会减少，并且较低的营业利润率与通货膨胀无关。
Kroger's product costs as a percentage of revenue are actually lower than what they were a decade ago.
克罗格的产品成本占收入的百分比实际上比十年前的水平要低。
Labor and administrative costs, on the other hand, are actually higher than ever and have been for the past six years, despite the company forcing self-checkout on customers.
另一方面，尽管公司强制顾客自助结账，但劳动力和管理成本实际上比以往任何时候都高，并且过去六年来一直如此。
Kroger to this day continues to gaslight that self-checkout is the future and that it provides a better customer experience, despite the reality that the company's operating margins remain at their lowest.
尽管现实情况是公司的营业利润率仍处于最低水平，但克罗格至今仍在强调自助结账是未来的发展方向，并且能够提供更好的客户体验。
Albertsons has also hired, on average, about the same amount of workers per store before and after their implementation of self-checkout.
在实施自助结账之前和之后，Albertsons 每家店平均雇用的员工数量也大致相同。
Labor and administrative costs have certainly improved after, but that can also be attributed more to the continuous layoffs at headquarters and store closures.
此后劳动力和管理成本确实有所改善，但这也更多地归因于总部的不断裁员和门店关闭。
Sprouts has opened up more stores year after year, and the numbers demonstrate that they've hired fewer workers since their implementation of self-checkout in 2020.
Sprouts 每年都会开设更多门店，但数据显示， 自 2020 年实施自助结账以来， 他们雇用的员工数量却减少了。
Yet at the same time, despite hiring less people, labor and administrative costs have actually increased.
但与此同时， 尽管雇佣的员工减少了，但劳动力和管理成本实际上却增加了。
Overall, operating margins for sprouts are lower these days than what they were five years ago before self-checkout.
总体而言，目前 Sprouts 的营业利润率比五年前自助结账出现之前的水平要低。
And once again, it has nothing to do with inflation or product costs.
再说一次，这与通货膨胀或产品成本无关。
It's been the same case for even the discount stores like Dollar General and Dollar Tree.
甚至像 Dollar General 和 Dollar Tree 这样的折扣店也面临同样的情况。
Dollar General did not implement self-checkout until 2019, and their labor and administrative costs have remained the same in the years after.
Dollar General 直到 2019 年才实施自助结账，此后几年其劳动力和管理成本一直保持不变。
The company spent millions of dollars installing self-checkout machines, only to discover that removing human cashiers only dramatically increased shoplifting.
该公司花费了数百万美元安装自助结账机，结果却发现， 减少人工收银员只会大幅增加商店盗窃行为。
Dollar General had always run its stores with a skeleton crew to cut on labor costs, but now with self-checkout, they had removed the human at the front and without a staff member at the front to deter stealing, opportunistic thieves were walking through self-checkout with bags of stolen merchandise without consequences.
Dollar General 一直以来都以精简人员来经营门店， 以削减劳动力成本，但现在有了自助结账机， 他们就不再需要站在最前面的人工结账， 由于没有工作人员在最前面阻止偷窃，机会主义的小偷就可以拿着一袋袋偷来的商品走过自助结账机而不用承担任何责任。
Everything came to a head in 2024, when profits plummeted to a 16 year low over the rampant shoplifting, and Dollar General responded by killing off self-checkout entirely.
2024 年， 一切达到了顶峰， 由于猖獗的商店偷窃行为， 美元通用百货的利润跌至 16 年来的最低水平，而美元通用百货的应对措施是彻底取消自助结账。
They ripped out the machines at most stores, restored the checkout aisles, and invest more into human cashiers and staff.
他们拆除了大多数商店的机器，恢复了结账通道， 并在人工收银员和员工方面投入了更多资金。
With SG&A at an all time high and on a per store basis, Dollar General is now hiring more people than ever per store in company history.
由于销售、一般及行政开支达到历史最高水平且按每家店计算，Dollar General 现在每家店招聘的员工数量比公司历史上任何时候都要多。
It's the same situation with Dollar Tree, who is now spending more than ever in labor and administration in history to deter the theft that self-checkout.
Dollar Tree 的情况也一样，为了阻止自助结账机盗窃， 该公司目前在人力和管理方面的投入比历史上任何时候都要多。
Despite rolling out self-checkout in 2017, Target these days has more hourly workers per store than it did a decade ago.
尽管塔吉特在 2017 年就推出了自助结账服务，但如今每家店的计时工人数量比十年前还多。
Labor costs as a percentage of revenue has remained virtually unchanged for the past ten plus years, and annual profit margins are not any better today than they were back in the early 2010s.
在过去十多年里，劳动力成本占收入的百分比几乎没有变化，而且如今的年利润率并不比 2010 年代初好。
The only exception to date has been in home improvement, where Home Depot and Lowe's have both reported a decrease in labor costs since their respective implementation of self-checkout.
迄今为止唯一的例外是家居装修领域，家得宝和劳氏均报告称， 自从实施自助结账以来， 劳动力成本有所下降。
Their annual operating margins have also materially improved.
他们的年度营业利润率也大幅提高。
There's a couple of factors as to how this could be.
有几个因素可能导致这种情况的发生。
One is that theft at self-checkout is generally a crime of opportunity, meaning that people either intentionally or accidentally forget to scan something.
一是自助结账时的盗窃一般是机会犯罪，也就是说人们有意或无意地忘记扫描某些东西。
With home improvement, the high value items are generally so big and so bulky that that kind of theft would be impossible to hide, and the higher value, smaller products are already under lock and key and are already under added surveillance, meaning the opportunity for theft is just that much lower.
对于家居装修而言， 高价值的物品一般体积较大、较为笨重， 这种盗窃行为难以掩盖，而价值较高、体积较小的产品均已上锁并受到额外监控，因此发生盗窃的可能性要低得多。
The product value and order sizes at home improvement stores are also substantially greater than that of supermarkets, and chains like Home Depot and Lowe's have already sunk millions of dollars over the decades into loss prevention, whereas the grocery chains are just now starting their own investments.
家装店的产品价值和订单规模也远远高于超市，像家得宝和劳氏这样的连锁店几十年来已经在防损方面投入了数百万美元，而杂货连锁店现在才刚刚开始自己的投资。
While there are some who assert that the failures of self-checkout are cultural and psychological, it seems obvious that technology and machines have a long way to go before they can replace humans, even the ones that corporate America deems to be the most useless and replaceable - scanning groceries, packing orders, and talking to customers for $10-$15 an hour.
虽然有些人声称自助结账的失败是文化和心理因素造成的，但显然技术和机器还有很长的路要走才能取代人类，即使是美国企业认为最无用和最可替代的人类——扫描杂货、打包订单、以每小时 10 至 15 美元的价格与客户交谈。
来源：英语东
