摘要:This issue of tweets will introduce the literature review of the intensive reading journal article "The Impact of Demand Uncertain
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“喆学(95):精读期刊论文
《需求不确定性对绿色技术采用的消费者补贴的影响》
文献综述(1)”
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"Zhexue (95): Intensive reading of journal articles
"The impact of demand uncertainty on consumer subsidies for green technology adoption"
Literature Review(1)"
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本期推文将从思维导图、精读内容、知识补充三个方面介绍精读期刊论文《需求不确定性对绿色技术采用的消费者补贴的影响》文献综述。
This issue of tweets will introduce the literature review of the intensive reading journal article "The Impact of Demand Uncertainty on Consumer Subsidies for Green Technology Adoption" from three aspects: mind map, intensive reading content, and knowledge supplement.
一、思维导图(Mind Maps)
二、精读内容(Intensive reading content)
(1)报童模型(Newsvvendor Model)
首先提到了一些经典文献,然后介绍了Kocabıyıko˘glu和Popescu(2011)提出的“失销率的弹性”来扩展价格设定新闻商的假设。接着提到Kaya和Özer(2012)的文献综述,关注供应链中的库存风险共享。与这些研究不同,本文的研究涉及政府这一额外参与者,增加了分析的复杂性。最后,尽管前人研究分别分析加性和乘性模型,本文得出的结论适用于两种需求模型。
First, some classic literature is mentioned, and then the "elasticity of lost sales rate" proposed by Kocabıyıko˘glu and Popescu (2011) is introduced to expand the assumptions of price setting news. Then, the literature review of Kaya and Özer (2012) is mentioned, focusing on inventory risk sharing in the supply chain. Different from these studies, this paper involves an additional participant, the government, which increases the complexity of the analysis. Finally, although previous studies analyzed additive and multiplicative models separately, the conclusions drawn in this paper are applicable to both demand models.
在传统的新闻商模型中,生产成本通常被视为生产额外单位从原料到成品的可变成本。然而,在资本密集型行业(如电动汽车)中,制造设施的单位容量投资成本通常远高于单位可变成本。因此,本文将供应商的生产数量定义为一种容量投资决策。
In traditional newsmaker models, production costs are usually viewed as the variable cost of producing additional units from raw materials to finished product. However, in capital-intensive industries such as electric vehicles, the unit capacity investment cost of manufacturing facilities is often much higher than the unit variable cost. Therefore, this paper defines the supplier's production quantity as a capacity investment decision.
(2)政府补贴(Government subsidies)
与本文相关的另一研究方向,即关注疫苗领域的社会福利和政府补贴中提到Arifo˘glu等人(2012)研究了产量不确定性对流感疫苗供应链效率的影响,表明在供应和需求模型中,均衡需求可能大于社会最优需求。Taylor和Xiao(2014)则研究了一个单一供应商的随机需求模型,探讨捐赠者如何通过销售和采购补贴来改善疫苗的可得性。
Another research direction related to this article, which focuses on social welfare and government subsidies in the vaccine field, mentioned that Arifo˘glu et al. (2012) studied the impact of production uncertainty on the efficiency of the influenza vaccine supply chain, indicating that in the supply and demand model, equilibrium demand may be greater than the social optimal demand. Taylor and Xiao (2014) studied a stochastic demand model with a single supplier and explored how donors can improve the availability of vaccines through sales and procurement subsidies.
接着讨论了关于绿色技术补贴设计的相关研究。Carlsson和Johansson-Stenman(2003)研究了瑞典电动汽车采用的社会效益,认为该技术在净社会福利方面的前景较为悲观。Avci等人(2014)则表明,电动汽车的社会和环境效益取决于电力网的清洁程度。Benthem等人(2008)则提出了一个优化加利福尼亚州太阳能补贴政策的模型。Atasu等人(2009)关注制造商的反应,研究了回收补贴和产品回收计划,并优化系统的社会福利。这些研究大多假设行业参与者非战略性地行动。
This is followed by a discussion of relevant research on the design of green technology subsidies. Carlsson and Johansson-Stenman (2003) studied the social benefits of electric vehicle adoption in Sweden and concluded that the technology has a pessimistic outlook in terms of net social welfare. Avci et al. (2014) showed that the social and environmental benefits of electric vehicles depend on the cleanliness of the power grid. Benthem et al. (2008) proposed a model to optimize California's solar subsidy policy. Atasu et al. (2009) focused on manufacturers' responses, studied recycling subsidies and product take-back programs, and optimized the social welfare of the system. Most of these studies assume that industry participants act non-strategically.
与上述研究相比,本文的工作着眼于设计最优政策,以达到特定的采纳目标,并评估系统中的福利分配。与Lobel和Perakis(2013)类似,本文也考虑了采纳水平目标,但不同的是,本文纳入了行业的战略性反应。此外,Raz和Ovchinnikov(2015)研究了公共利益商品的价格设定新闻商模型,比较了政府干预机制,并研究了不同条件下系统的福利、价格和供应量协调情况。与这些研究不同,本文主要关注需求不确定性对系统中各方的影响,并明确建模制造商对补贴政策的战略性反应。
Compared with the above studies, this work focuses on designing optimal policies to achieve specific adoption goals and evaluate the welfare distribution in the system. Similar to Lobel and Perakis (2013), this paper also considers the adoption level target, but the difference is that this paper incorporates the strategic response of the industry. In addition, Raz and Ovchinnikov (2015) studied the price setting news maker model of public interest goods, compared government intervention mechanisms, and studied the welfare, price and supply coordination of the system under different conditions. Unlike these studies, this paper focuses on the impact of demand uncertainty on all parties in the system and explicitly models the strategic response of manufacturers to subsidy policies.
三、知识补充(Knowledge supplement)
绿色技术补贴政策中,为什么需要考虑制造商的战略反应?
Why do we need to consider the strategic response of manufacturers in green technology subsidy policies?
1.利润最大化行为:制造商会根据补贴政策调整生产和定价策略,以实现利润最大化。如果政策未能考虑到这些反应,可能会导致补贴没有达到预期效果
1. Profit maximization behavior: Manufacturers will adjust their production and pricing strategies according to subsidy policies to maximize profits. If the policy fails to take these reactions into account, it may result in subsidies not achieving the desired effect.。
2.价格和产量调整:制造商可能会通过提高价格或减少产量来抵消补贴的影响,这会使消费者受益减少,进而影响技术的普及和社会福利。
2. Price and output adjustments: Manufacturers may offset the impact of subsidies by raising prices or reducing output, which will reduce the benefits to consumers and in turn affect the popularization of technology and social welfare.
3.技术创新推迟:制造商可能会在补贴存在的情况下推迟技术创新,依赖补贴来保持竞争力,导致创新进程放缓,影响长期效益。
3. Delayed technological innovation: Manufacturers may delay technological innovation in the presence of subsidies and rely on subsidies to remain competitive, which will slow down the innovation process and affect long-term benefits.
4.资源分配失衡:如果补贴政策没有考虑制造商的战略反应,可能导致资源(如资金和生产能力)的分配不合理,无法有效推动绿色技术的推广。
4. Imbalanced resource allocation: If the subsidy policy does not take into account the strategic response of manufacturers, it may lead to unreasonable allocation of resources (such as funds and production capacity) and fail to effectively promote the promotion of green technologies.
5.确保政策效果:通过考虑制造商的反应,政策设计可以更精确地实现预定目标,避免制造商采取策略性行为破坏政策效果,确保绿色技术真正得到推广。
5. Ensure policy effectiveness: By considering the reactions of manufacturers, policy design can achieve predetermined goals more accurately, avoid manufacturers taking strategic actions that undermine policy effects, and ensure that green technology is truly promoted.
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翻译:谷歌翻译
参考资料:谷歌、Chat GPT
参考文献:Maxime C. Cohen, Ruben Lobel, Georgia Perakis. The Impact of Demand Uncertainty on Consumer Subsidies for Green Technology Adoption [J], Management Science, 2016, 62(5): 1235-1258.
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