摘要：Pak Hung Au is an associate professor at the Department of Economics of the HKUST. He obtained his BA (Double Honors) in Economics
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北大经院工作坊第1029场
微观理论经济学工作坊
主讲人：
Pak Hung Au (香港科技大学副教授）
吴庆功（香港科技大学助理教授）
主持老师：
（北大经院）吴泽南、石凡奇
（北大国发院）胡岠
参与老师：
（北大经院）胡涛
（北大国发院）汪浩、邢亦青
（北大光华）翁翕、刘烁
时间：
2024年12月26日（周四）
10:00-12:10
地点：
北京大学经济学院302会议室
报告一：
Price Discrimination and Quality Signaling
主讲人简介：
Pak Hung Au is an associate professor at the Department of Economics of the HKUST. He obtained his BA (Double Honors) in Economics and Mathematics at University of British Columbia and his PhD degree at Northwestern University. He worked at Shanghai University of Finance and Economics and Nanyang Technological University before joining HKUST. His research interests include industrial organization, contract theory, information economics and experimental economics.
摘要：
We study the implications of adopting price discrimination when price is also a tool for signaling product quality. Specifically, a seller with uncertain quality can collect data about the consumer's value for quality, and price according to the result of information acquisition. We find that, contrary to the standard price discrimination model without the need to signal quality, both the profit and efficiency can be improved if the seller acquires less consumer information. The equilibrium information policy is shown to induce quasi-perfect price discrimination: the consumer purchases at a price equal to his valuation if and only if his valuation exceeds a cutoff above the marginal cost.
报告二：
Interim Strategy-proof Mechanisms
主讲人简介：
Qinggong Wu is a microeconomic theorist. His recent works focus on designing simple mechanisms for complex environments. Qinggong graduated from the University of Michigan.
摘要：
In this paper, we examine mechanism design under the criterion of interim strategy-proofness (ISP), which extends the concept of strategy-proofness to settings with interdependent values. ISP stipulates that for each agent, given her beliefs about the types of other agents, truthful reporting is always the optimal strategy, regardless of the strategies employed by others. An ISP mechanism is resilient to strategic ignorance among agents and also robust against informational ignorance regarding higher-order beliefs. In a binary voting model, we characterize the set of all ISP mechanisms and demonstrate that the flexibility of ISP mechanism design is constrained by the degree of preference interdependence in the environment. Additionally, we identify a class of mechanisms that are ISP across all environments.
供稿：科研与博士后办公室
美编：初夏
责编：度量、雨禾、雨田
来源：北京大学经济学院