周日静学（272）：博士论文5.3 信息共享机制设计

摘要：This issue's tweet will introduce the doctoral dissertation 《Research on technology innovation cooperation strategy of new energy

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今天小编为大家带来“博士论文《双积分政策下考虑信息不对称的新能源汽车供应链技术创新合作策略研究》5.3 信息共享机制设计”。

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Today, the editor brings the "5.3 Information sharing mechanism design of the doctoral dissertation 《Research on technology innovation cooperation strategy of new energy vehicle supply chain considering information asymmetry under the double credit policy》”.

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内容摘要：Abstract

本期推文将从思维导图、精读内容、知识补充三个方面介绍博士论文《双积分政策下考虑信息不对称的新能源汽车供应链技术创新合作策略研究》5.3 信息共享机制设计。

This issue's tweet will introduce the doctoral dissertation 《Research on technology innovation cooperation strategy of new energy vehicle supply chain considering information asymmetry under the double credit policy》 from three perspectives: mind mapping, detailed content analysis, and supplementary knowledge, focusing on 5.3 information sharing mechanism design.

思维导图：Mind mapping

精读内容：Intensive reading content

本小节介绍了需求预测信息不对称时，双积分政策对新能源汽车技术创新的激励作用无法达到最优，因此，新能源汽车供应链希望制造商和供应商共享需求预测信息，使双积分政策对技术创新的激励效果达到最优。

This section explains that when there is information asymmetry in demand forecasting, the dual-credit policy cannot achieve the optimal incentive effect on technological innovation in new energy vehicles. Therefore, the new energy vehicle supply chain expects manufacturers and suppliers to share demand forecasting information so that the dual-credit policy can exert its optimal incentive effect on technological innovation.

首先，作者说明了为什么要设置激励机制。对于供应商来说，信息共享可以为其带来利润的增加，供应商总是希望共享信息。对于制造商来说，只有需求预测信息共享带来利润增加时，制造商才会选择与供应商共享需求预测信息。当k0k2时，信息共享会使制造商利润受损，制造商不愿意共享信息。对新能源汽车供应链来说，当k0First, the author explains why it is necessary to establish an incentive mechanism. For the supplier, information sharing can increase its profits, so the supplier always prefers to share information. For the manufacturer, however, it will only choose to share demand forecasting information with the supplier if such sharing leads to an increase in its own profit. When k0k2, information sharing reduces the manufacturer’s profit, making the manufacturer unwilling to share information. For the new energy vehicle supply chain as a whole, when k0

其次，作者介绍了设置激励机制后的函数，并且基于前文的描述和假设，求解最优化问题，可以得到汽车制造商与供应商获得的利润，制造商和供应商的利润都随各自谈判能力的提高而增加。

Next, the author introduces the functions after establishing the incentive mechanism. Based on the previous descriptions and assumptions, the optimization problem is solved, and the profits of the automobile manufacturer and the supplier are obtained. The results show that the profits of both the manufacturer and the supplier increase as their respective bargaining power improves.

最后，通过计算得到命题5.5：①供应商总是会共享需求预测信息；②当k0k4时，制造商不会共享需求预测信息。并对命题5.5进行证明和解释。命题5.5表明：对于供应商来说，信息共享总是有利的，供应商总是有动机去促成信息共享合作。这是因为制造商向供应商分享需求预测信息，能够提高供应商应对需求不确定性的能力，促使供应商能够更准确地调整技术创新投资决策，进而可以获得更多的利润。对于制造商来说，是否选择与供应商共享需求预测信息，取决于供应商的技术创新成本系数。当供应商的技术创新成本系数较低时，制造商会主动共享需求预测信息。当供应商的技术创新成本系数一般时，可以通过设计基于讨价还价谈判的协调机制激励制造商共享需求预测信息。当供应商的技术创新成本系数较高时，制造商不会共享预测信息。Finally, by calculation we obtain Proposition 5.5: (1) the supplier will always share demand forecasting information; (2) when k0k4, the manufacturer will not share demand forecasting information. A proof and explanation of Proposition 5.5 are provided. Proposition 5.5 indicates that, for the supplier, information sharing is always beneficial—suppliers therefore always have an incentive to promote information-sharing cooperation. This is because when the manufacturer shares demand forecasts with the supplier, the supplier’s ability to cope with demand uncertainty is improved, enabling the supplier to adjust its technological-innovation investment decisions more accurately and thus obtain higher profits. For the manufacturer, the decision to share demand forecasting information depends on the supplier’s technological-innovation cost coefficient. If the supplier’s cost coefficient is low, the manufacturer will voluntarily share demand forecasting information. If the supplier’s cost coefficient is moderate, a bargaining-based coordination mechanism can be designed to incentivize the manufacturer to share forecasting information. If the supplier’s cost coefficient is high, the manufacturer will not share forecasting information.

知识补充：Knowledge supplement

谈判破裂 Negotiations brokedown

谈判破裂是外交术语，指谈判双方经多次协商仍无法达成共识，最终终止谈判进程。其前提是双方已无磋商空间，继续谈判失去实际意义。根据终止谈判时的态度差异，可分为友好破裂与对立破裂两类。前者表现为双方在理性沟通中承认利益分歧，以遗憾态度结束谈判，通常不破坏原有关系；后者则伴随情绪对立或言语冲突，易导致关系恶化。

The term breakdown of negotiations is a diplomatic expression referring to a situation in which both parties, after multiple rounds of consultation, are still unable to reach a consensus, ultimately resulting in the termination of the negotiation process. The premise is that both sides have exhausted the room for further discussion, making continued negotiations meaningless. Based on the differing attitudes at the time of termination, negotiation breakdowns can be classified into two types: amicable breakdown and antagonistic breakdown. The former occurs when both sides rationally acknowledge their differences in interests and end the negotiations with regret, usually without damaging their existing relationship. The latter, however, is accompanied by emotional confrontation or verbal conflict and often leads to a deterioration of relations.

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参考文献：[1] 马淼淼. 双积分政策下考虑信息不对称的新能源汽车供应链技术创新合作策略研究 [D]. 重庆: 重庆大学, 2023.