摘要：本节构建并分析了两种核心的版权保护模式：传统版权保护模型与区块链技术下的版权保护模型。通过构建由出版商、销售平台和消费者组成的三级供应链博弈，并采用逆向归纳法进行求解，本研究旨在揭示不同技术条件下各方成员的最优决策行为及其对供应链绩效的深层影响。

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Today, the editor brings the "Intensive Reading of the Journal Article 'Two Copyright Protection Models under the Digital Publishing Supply Chain: Blockchain Investment and Copyright Protection Strategies'".

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一.思维导图（Mind Mapping)

二.精读内容（Intensive reading content）

本节构建并分析了两种核心的版权保护模式：传统版权保护模型与区块链技术下的版权保护模型。通过构建由出版商、销售平台和消费者组成的三级供应链博弈，并采用逆向归纳法进行求解，本研究旨在揭示不同技术条件下各方成员的最优决策行为及其对供应链绩效的深层影响。

This section constructs and analyzes two core copyright protection models: the traditional copyright protection model and the blockchain-based copyright protection model. By constructing a three-tier supply chain game involving publishers, sales platforms, and consumers, and employing backward induction for solution, this study aims to uncover the optimal decision-making behaviors of various stakeholders under different technological conditions and their profound impacts on supply chain performance.

（一）、传统版权保护模型（Traditional Copyright Protection Model）

在传统版权保护模型中，平台不引入区块链技术，而是依赖于版权登记、盗版监控与诉讼等常规手段进行版权保护。这些活动会产生显著的运营成本，本研究假设其版权保护成本函数为

，其中λ代表平台选择的版权保护强度，k则为版权保护成本系数。k值越大，意味着实施相同保护强度所付出的成本越高，即版权保护的效率越低。在此模型下，

它在获取销售分成的同时，必须承担因版权保护而产生的成本。决策顺序遵循典型的斯坦克尔伯格博弈：平台作为领导者率先决定版权保护强度 λ，出版商作为跟随者根据观察到的 λ来制定产品价格 p，最终消费者根据 p 和 λ形成市场需求D。

In the traditional copyright protection model, platforms do not adopt blockchain technology but rely on conventional means such as copyright registration, piracy monitoring, and litigation for copyright protection. These activities incur significant operational costs. This study assumes the copyright protection cost function to be [Here, the specific function should be inserted if available in the original text], where λ represents the intensity of copyright protection chosen by the platform, and k denotes the copyright protection cost coefficient. A higher k value indicates higher costs for implementing the same level of protection, implying lower efficiency in copyright protection.Under this model, while earning sales commissions, the platform must also bear the costs associated with copyright protection. The decision-making sequence follows a typical Stackelberg game: the platform, as the leader, first decides on the copyright protection intensity λ. Subsequently, the publisher, as the follower, sets the product price p based on the observed λ. Finally, consumers form the market demand D based on p and λ.

通过严谨的逆向求解，本研究得到了一个关键发现，即模型的均衡状态完全由成本系数k的大小主导，并存在一个临界值k1。当成本系数较小(k

Through rigorous backward solution, this study has made a key discovery: the equilibrium state of the model is entirely dominated by the magnitude of the cost coefficient k, and there exists a critical value k1. When the cost coefficient is small (k

然而，当成本系数较大(k>k1)时，版权保护变得极其不经济，平台的最优策略是彻底放弃保护。面对盗版泛滥而平台无所作为的市场环境，出版商意识到其正版产品仅能吸引那群规模为α、具有高版权意识的核心消费者。于是，出版商转而采取撇脂定价策略，旨在从这群对价格相对不敏感的铁杆用户身上榨取最大剩余价值。这一结论揭示了一个反直觉却深刻的经济现象：在特定条件下，市场需求的萎缩反而会引致企业提价，而非降价。

However, when the cost coefficient is large (k > k1), copyright protection becomes highly uneconomical, and the platform's optimal strategy is to abandon protection entirely. Faced with a market environment where piracy is rampant and the platform takes no action, publishers realize that their legitimate products can only attract a core group of α highly copyright-conscious consumers. Consequently, publishers adopt a skimming pricing strategy aimed at extracting maximum surplus value from this group of relatively price-insensitive loyal users. This conclusion reveals a counterintuitive yet profound economic phenomenon: under specific conditions, a contraction in market demand can lead to price increases rather than decreases by firms.

进一步的比较静态分析（推论1）表明，在低成本系数区间，各方的利润均随着k的增大而递减，因为高昂的成本抑制了保护力度，进而损害了市场扩张潜力。而在高成本系数区间，各方利润则与k无关，只随着正版消费者规模α的扩大而增长。

Further comparative static analysis (Corollary 1) indicates that in the low-cost coefficient range, the profits of all parties decrease as k increases because high costs inhibit protection efforts, thereby undermining market expansion potential. In the high-cost coefficient range, however, the profits of all parties are independent of k and only increase with the expansion of the legitimate consumer base α.

（二）、区块链技术下的版权保护模型（Blockchain-Based Copyright Protection Model）

区块链技术下的版权保护模型描绘了另一番图景。在此模式下，平台选择投资区块链。该技术的革命性在于，它能够通过其不可篡改、可追溯的特性，几乎以零可变成本实现版权保护。模型通过将版权保护成本系数k设定为零来体现这一优势，这意味着平台可以无成本地实施任意高的版权保护强度λ。然而，引入区块链技术需要一笔先期的固定投入，例如研发与设备采购成本，记为F。

The blockchain-based copyright protection model presents a different scenario. In this mode, the platform chooses to invest in blockchain technology. The revolutionary aspect of this technology lies in its ability to achieve copyright protection at virtually zero variable cost through its immutable and traceable characteristics. The model reflects this advantage by setting the copyright protection cost coefficient k to zero, implying that the platform can implement any desired level of copyright protection intensity λ at no cost. However, introducing blockchain technology requires an upfront fixed investment, such as research and development and equipment procurement costs, denoted as F.

其成本项由可变的保护成本替换为固定的投资成本。

The cost term is replaced from variable protection costs to fixed investment costs.

在此模型下，均衡结果展现出简洁而强大的特征。对于平台而言，由于增加版权保护强度λ不再带来边际成本，其最优策略是实施尽可能强的保护，具体表现为将λ设定为任何大于1/2的值。这种极限保护策略能够彻底清除盗版市场，迫使所有普通消费者转向购买正版产品。对于出版商而言，一个没有盗版竞争且囊括了所有消费者的完美市场已然形成，其最优决策便是对该统一市场进行垄断定价，将价格定为

Under this model, the equilibrium results exhibit simplicity and robustness. For the platform, since increasing the copyright protection intensity λ no longer incurs marginal costs, its optimal strategy is to implement the strongest possible protection, specifically by setting λ to any value greater than 1/2. This extreme protection strategy completely eliminates the piracy market, forcing all ordinary consumers to purchase legitimate products. For the publisher, a perfect market free from piracy competition and encompassing all consumers is formed, leading to an optimal decision of monopolistic pricing for this unified market, setting the price at

在此基础上，各方的均衡利润也变得清晰明了。

Based on this, the equilibrium profits of all parties become clear.

由此可见，区块链技术的战略意义在于，它通过将高昂的可变成本转化为固定的投资成本，从根本上改变了平台的决策逻辑与市场的竞争格局。平台不再受制于成本与保护力度之间的权衡，从而能够为出版商创造一个最大化的一体化正版市场。然而，平台自身能否从这项投资中获利，则完全取决于其从扩张后的市场中所分得的收入，是否能够覆盖那笔固定的区块链投资成本F。

Thus, the strategic significance of blockchain technology lies in its fundamental transformation of the platform's decision-making logic and market competition landscape by converting high variable costs into fixed investment costs. Platforms are no longer constrained by the trade-off between costs and protection efforts, enabling them to create a maximally integrated legitimate market for publishers. However, whether the platform can profit from this investment depends entirely on whether the revenue it earns from the expanded market can cover the fixed blockchain investment cost F.

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本文由LearningYard新学苑原创，如有侵权，请联系删除。

参考资料：百度百科，deepseek

参考文献：甄烨,田佳乐,王文利.数字出版供应链下区块链投资与版权保护策略[J].系统管理学报,2024,33(3):589-600.

翻译：文心一言

编辑：熙

排版：熙

审核：qin

来源：LearningYard学苑