周日静学（267）：博士论文4.4 算例分析

摘要：This issue's tweet will introduce the doctoral dissertation 《Research on technology innovation cooperation strategy of new energy

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今天小编为您带来博士论文《双积分政策下考虑信息不对称的新能源汽车供应链技术创新合作策略研究》4.4算例分析。

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Today, the editor brings the "4.4 Example analysis

of the doctoral dissertation 《Research on technology innovation cooperation strategy of new energy vehicle supply chain considering information asymmetry under the double credit policy》”.

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内容摘要：Abstract

本期推文将从思维导图、精读内容、知识补充三个方面介绍博士论文《双积分政策下考虑信息不对称的新能源汽车供应链技术创新合作策略研究》4.4算例分析。

This issue's tweet will introduce the doctoral dissertation 《Research on technology innovation cooperation strategy of new energy vehicle supply chain considering information asymmetry under the double credit policy》 from three perspectives: mind mapping, detailed content analysis, and supplementary knowledge, focusing on 4.4 example analysis.

思维导图：Mind mapping

精读内容：Intensive reading content

本小节通过算例分析说明参数不同取值对新能源汽车供应链最优策略的影响。

This subsection analyzes example cases to illustrate how different parameter values affect the optimal strategy of the new energy vehicle supply chain.

首先，作者以小鹏汽车为例，设置市场规模参数的取值；以双积分政策中关于纯电动汽车新能源积分的计算方法为例，设置技术创新得分系数的取值；最后，根据工信部发布的报告设置新能源积分交易价格。

First, the author takes XPeng Motors as an example to set the value of the market size parameter; then, using the calculation method of new energy credits for pure electric vehicles under the dual-credit policy as an example, sets the value of the technological innovation score coefficient; finally, the value of the new energy credit trading price is set based on reports released by the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT).

其次，将各个参数带入函数中，得到新能源汽车供应链的最优策略，并对结果进行说明。从表4.2可以看出，相较于没有实施双积分政策，实施双积分政策后，新能源汽车的技术创新、制造商的利润、供应商的利润、新能源汽车供应链的利润都得到提高。当新能源汽车供应链中存在消费者技术偏好信息不对称时，信息不对称会影响新能源汽车供应链的最优策略。当消费者的技术偏好为θL时，信息不对称将大大削弱双积分政策对技术创新的激励作用，甚至有可能出现双积分政策下的技术创新低于没有双积分政策但信息对称情形下的最优技术创新。

Second, the parameters are substituted into the functions to obtain the optimal strategy of the new energy vehicle supply chain, and the results are explained. As shown in Table 4.2, compared with the case without the dual-credit policy, the implementation of the dual-credit policy improves technological innovation in new energy vehicles, the profits of manufacturers, the profits of suppliers, and the overall profit of the new energy vehicle supply chain. When there is consumer technology preference information asymmetry in the new energy vehicle supply chain, such asymmetry affects the optimal strategy. When consumers’ technology preference is θL, information asymmetry will significantly weaken the incentive effect of the dual-credit policy on technological innovation, and it may even result in technological innovation under the dual-credit policy being lower than the optimal technological innovation achieved under information symmetry without the dual-credit policy.

最后，作者分析了参数变化对新能源汽车供应链最优策略的影响。分析了双积分政策的影响、信息不对称对供应链最优策略的影响、双积分政策和信息不对称对技术创新的影响、双积分政策和信息不对称对各方利润的影响。最后进行总结，在信息不对称的情况下，当消费者技术偏好较高时，具有信息优势的制造商利润增加，而处于信息劣势的供应商利润下降。显然，导致供应商利润降低的原因在于：供应商为了获取消费者真实的技术偏好信息而给制造商支付了信息租金。在双积分政策下，供应商为获取消费者技术偏好信息支付的信息租金增加，而且信息租金随着积分交易价格或技术创新得分系数的提高而增加，供应商为了获得消费者的技术偏好信息愿意支付的信息租金增加。换言之，供应商为了获取消费者技术偏好私人信息的意愿增强，而且随着积分交易价格或技术创新得分系数的提高，供应商获取制造商私人信息的意愿增强。

Finally, the author analyzes the impact of parameter changes on the optimal strategy of the new energy vehicle supply chain. The analysis covers the effect of the dual-credit policy, the impact of information asymmetry on the supply chain’s optimal strategy, the combined influence of the dual-credit policy and information asymmetry on technological innovation, and their impact on the profits of different parties. The conclusion is that, under information asymmetry, when consumers’ technology preference is relatively high, the manufacturer with an information advantage sees an increase in profit, while the supplier with an information disadvantage experiences a decline in profit. The reason for the supplier’s reduced profit is clear: in order to obtain consumers’ true technology preference information, the supplier must pay information rent to the manufacturer. Under the dual-credit policy, the information rent paid by the supplier to obtain consumers’ technology preference information increases, and this rent rises further as the credit trading price or the technological innovation score coefficient increases. In other words, the supplier’s willingness to acquire consumers’ private information on technology preference strengthens, and this willingness further increases as the credit trading price or the technological innovation score coefficient rises.

知识补充：Knowledge supplement

积分交易 Credit trading

积分交易是指通过积分的积累和兑换实现的商业活动，市场规模庞大，但面临着使用价值低和法律合规等挑战。积分市场经过多年的发展，已经形成了一个庞大的生态系统。根据公开数据，电信运营商、航空公司和银行等行业普遍采用积分回馈机制，市场规模粗略估计达到千亿级。通用积分模式的出现，使得不同领域的商家能够实现积分的通积、通兑和通用，降低了传统积分的沉淀损失，为商家和消费者创造了双赢局面。

Credit trading refers to commercial activities carried out through the accumulation and redemption of credits. The market is large in scale but faces challenges such as low usage value and legal compliance. After years of development, the credit market has evolved into a vast ecosystem. According to public data, industries such as telecommunications, airlines, and banking widely adopt credit reward mechanisms, and the market size is roughly estimated to reach the scale of hundreds of billions. The emergence of a universal credit model enables merchants across different sectors to achieve credit accumulation, redemption, and general use, reducing the loss caused by the accumulation of unused traditional credits and creating a win–win situation for both merchants and consumers.

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