摘要：彼得森国际经济研究所所长亚当·S·波森（Adam S. Posen）在《外交事务》杂志网站4月9日刊文，对特朗普政府对华发动关税战的合理性与潜在后果提出质疑。文章指出，特朗普政府是基于对现实的误判才对中国发起关税战的，而这种做法实际上是在拿美国自己的经济冒险。

特朗普“关税大棒”一通乱挥，导致中美贸易摩擦升级，结局会是怎样？

海外一些研究者认为，最终受到更严重冲击的很可能不是中国，而是美国。

彼得森国际经济研究所所长亚当·S·波森（Adam S. Posen）在《外交事务》杂志网站4月9日刊文，对特朗普政府对华发动关税战的合理性与潜在后果提出质疑。文章指出，特朗普政府是基于对现实的误判才对中国发起关税战的，而这种做法实际上是在拿美国自己的经济冒险。

特朗普政府的“升级主导权”幻觉

特朗普政府认为，其掌握了所谓的“升级主导权”（escalation dominance）——也就是说，他们相信自己能不断加码施压、提高对手的成本，而对方却无法有效反击。

特朗普用这种策略来对付中国，乃至所有造成美国贸易逆差的国家。

The Trump administration believes it has what game theorists call escalation dominance over China and any other economy with which it has a bilateral trade deficit. Escalation dominance means "a combatant has the ability to escalate a conflict in ways that will be disadvantageous or costly to the adversary while the adversary cannot do the same in return."

美国财政部长斯科特·贝森特（Scott Bessent）也认同这种观点，他说：“中国这次的关税反制是个大错误。”

他以打牌为比喻，认为中国手里的牌就只有一对2。“中国对我们加税，我们又会受到多大影响呢？我们对中国的出口量只有他们对我们的五分之一，所以他们根本没胜算。”

"I think it was a big mistake, this Chinese escalation, because they're playing with a pair of twos. What do we lose by the Chinese raising tariffs on us? We export one-fifth to them of what they export to us, so that is a losing hand for them."

然而，这个逻辑是错的。

波森指出，贝森特用打扑克牌来比喻贸易，看似有理，实则充满误导。

因为扑克牌是一种零和游戏，“你赢我就输，你输我才能赢”。而贸易不是这样，贸易是正和的，是“你赚我也赚”的双赢关系。

在牌局中，如果你输了，你投进去的钱就没了；但在贸易中，你花出去的钱立马换回了商品和服务，钱并没有白花。

Bessent's poker analogy is misleading because poker is a zero-sum game: I win only if you lose; you win only if I lose. Trade, by contrast, is positive-sum: in most situations, the better you do, the better I do, and vice versa. In poker, you get nothing back for what you put in the pot unless you win; in trade, you get it back immediately, in the form of the goods and services you buy.

真正拥有“升级主导权”的是中国

波森认为，真正拥有“升级主导权”的其实是中国。首先，单看双边贸易差额来判断谁在贸易战中更有优势，顺差的一方（中国）显然比逆差的一方（美国）更具主动权。

But this logic is wrong: it is China that has escalation dominance in this trade war.

Even if you focus solely on the bilateral trade balance, as the Trump administration does, it bodes poorly for the United States in a trade war with China. ...The advantage lies with the surplus economy, not the deficit one.

波森强调，对中国来说，减少对美出口最多只是少赚点外汇，但美国这边损失的却是许多维系经济命脉的关键商品，比如药品原材料、廉价芯片、重要矿产等。

这些商品短期内很难找到替代来源，在美国本土生产的成本也令人望而却步，所以如果贸然切断与中国的贸易，对美国来说将是极其危险的。

China, the surplus country, is giving up sales, which is solely money; the United States, the deficit country, is giving up goods and services it does not produce competitively or at all at home.

Given that the US economy is entirely dependent on Chinese sources for vital goods (pharmaceutical stocks, cheap electronic chips, critical minerals), it is wildly reckless not to ensure alternate suppliers or adequate domestic production before cutting off trade.

对于中国等顺差国来说，钱是可以替代的：如果少了这部分收入，中国可以通过减少开支、开拓新市场、全社会共同承担，或者动用储蓄（比如通过财政刺激）来应对。

顺差国通常储蓄都多于投资，有一定的缓冲能力。所以即使对美出口减少，中国也不会面临关键商品短缺的风险，还能通过扩大内需或出口到其他国家来弥补这一部分损失，调整起来相对比较容易。

Money is fungible: if you lose income, you can cut back spending, find sales elsewhere, spread the burden across the country, or draw down savings (say, by doing fiscal stimulus).

China, like most countries with overall trade surpluses, saves more than it invests. The adjustment would be relatively easy. There would be no critical shortages, and it could replace much of what it normally sold to the United States with sales domestically or to others.

然而像美国这样的逆差国，通常是花的钱比存下的钱多。在贸易战中，它们会因为关税上升而不得不减少进口一些自己需要的商品，这些商品成本变高，也不容易找到替代品。

因此，贸易战对美国的冲击很可能集中体现在某些行业、地区或者家庭身上。他们可能会遇到货物短缺的情况，有些甚至是生活或生产的必需品，短时间内根本找不到替代来源。

Countries with overall trade deficits, like the United States, spend more than they save. In trade wars, they give up or reduce the supply of things they need (since the tariffs make them cost more), and these are not nearly as fungible or easily substituted for as money.

Consequently, the impact is felt in specific industries, locations, or households that face shortages, sometimes of necessary items, some of which are irreplaceable in the short term.

另外，像美国这样的逆差国，还依赖从其他国家引进资金。一旦国际社会对美国政府的可信度或者营商环境产生怀疑，就像特朗普政府现在这样，随意加税、导致供应链不稳定，资本就可能撤离，美国债务的利率也会随之上升。

而且大家也不再相信美国政府会遵守协议，这就让通过谈判来缓解紧张局势变得更加困难。

结果是，美国的制造和生产能力不但得不到提升，反而可能会倒退。

Deficit countries also import capital—which makes the United States more vulnerable to shifts in sentiment about the reliability of its government and about its attractiveness as a place to do business. When the Trump administration makes capricious decisions to impose an enormous tax increase and great uncertainty on manufacturers' supply chains, the result will be reduced investment into the United States, raising interest rates on its debt.

Americans and foreigners would no longer trust the US government to live up to any deal, making a negotiated settlement or agreement to deescalate difficult to achieve. As a result, US productive capacity would decline rather than improve.

美国或自食其果

波森警告说，如果美国真的大幅减少甚至完全停止从中国进口商品，很可能会重演上世纪70年代和新冠疫情期间的“滞胀”（stagflation）局面——经济萎缩与通货膨胀加剧同时发生。

The supply shock from drastically reducing or zeroing out imports from China, as Trump purports to want to achieve, would mean stagflation, the macroeconomic nightmare seen in the 1970s and during the COVID pandemic, when the economy shrank and inflation rose simultaneously.

简而言之，波森认为如果中美之间爆发大规模贸易战，美国可能会承受比中国更严重的经济冲击。虽然特朗普政府在表面上看起来强硬、掌握主动，但实际上，美国的经济很可能反而被动地受制于中国是否决定升级贸易战。

The Trump administration may think it's acting tough, but it's in fact putting the US economy at the mercy of Chinese escalation.

编辑：左卓

见习编辑：裴禧盈

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