摘要：《Journal of Risk and Insurance》为季刊，每年4期，每期发表文章8-10篇左右。2024年影响因子为2.1，是风险管理与保险领域的顶级权威学术期刊。该期刊主要发表保险经济学和风险管理主题的理论和实证方面的学术论文，可以为保险市场的实
声明：本系列文章基于原期刊目录和摘要内容整理而得，仅限于读者交流学习。如有侵权，请联系删除。
期刊介绍：
《Journal of Risk and Insurance》为季刊，每年4期，每期发表文章8-10篇左右。2024年影响因子为2.1，是风险管理与保险领域的顶级权威学术期刊。该期刊主要发表保险经济学和风险管理主题的理论和实证方面的学术论文，可以为保险市场的实践、决策和监管以及企业和家庭风险管理提供重要的信息。
本期看点：
●示范法传播：美国保险监督官协会（NAIC）示范法（model laws）传播中，法律的复杂性、与现有法律差异、认证合规要求和近期修订是影响各州采用的关键因素，且会受地理和意识形态邻近州的影响。
●保险定价中的公平性问题：保险公司被禁止基于某些保单持有人的特征进行歧视。尽管从模型中排除被禁止的变量可以防止直接歧视，但却无法解决代理歧视问题。
●政府担保：公共担保对保险公司融资风险的敏感性影响较小，但对于评级为A−的保险公司，未受担保业务的保费增长显著低于受担保业务。
●子女数量增加会提高老年父母拥有私人保险的可能性，且在对子女依赖度低、有更多替代资源的老年人中影响更显著。逆向选择和信息渠道可能是潜在的影响机制。
●高风险池化：通过对总人口中1%的人群进行补偿，保险公司选择性地拒绝慢性病患者的动机大幅降低。与再保险进行比较，发现高风险池化（HRP）在减少选择动机方面更为有效。
●UBI保险：在基于个人驾驶数据的汽车保险（Usage-Based Insurance, UBI）中，首次续保时，基于使用量保险的客户比传统保险的客户更倾向于调整保险覆盖范围（但在第二次续保时这种差异消失）。获得更高折扣的客户在首次（年度）续保时更有可能增加保险额度或添加与驾驶行为无直接关联的全保选项。收到更多负面反馈（例如频繁急刹车）的客户也更可能提高保险覆盖范围。
※ 本期目录
●The market for model laws: The diffusion of NAIC model laws
●A fair price to pay: Exploiting causal graphs for fairness in insurance
●Market discipline and government guarantees: Evidence from the insurance industry
●Children as insurance revisited: Impact of children on private insurance adoption among older parents
●Utilizing large-scale insurance data sets to calibrate sub-county level crop yields
●Supplementing risk adjustment with high-risk pooling using historical data for identifying the high risks
●Do higher insurance premiums provoke larger reported losses? An experimental study
●Insurtech, sensor data, and changes in customers' coverage choices: Evidence from usage-based automobile insurance
The market for model laws: The diffusion of NAIC model laws
示范法市场：NAIC示范法的传播
作者
Charlotte S. Alexander（佐治亚理工学院斯凯勒商学院），Martin F. Grace（天普大学福克斯商学院与管理学院；佐治亚州立大学罗宾逊商学院），Jingshu Luo（密西西比大学工商管理学院）
摘要：The National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) issues model laws to promote uniformity in the US state-based insurance regulatory system. In this paper, we study the diffusion of 197 NAIC model laws, examining the adoption patterns and influencing factors. Employing a network algorithm, we uncover the underlying network over which model laws spread. The NAIC plays a central role in this network, and its influence increases over time. Additionally, we explore factors affecting states' model law adoptions from three perspectives: the laws' attributes, the states' internal characteristics, and external influences. We find that a law's attributes play a key role. Model laws characterized by low complexity, distinct from existing state laws, mandated for accreditation compliance, and recently amended are more likely to be adopted. While we do not find significant impacts of various state-internal characteristics, our results reveal that states follow geographic and ideological neighbors in adopting model laws.
美国保险监督官协会（NAIC）制定示范法，以促进美国以州为基础的保险监管体系的统一性。本文研究了197部NAIC示范法的传播，分析其采纳模式及影响因素。通过运用网络算法，我们揭示了示范法传播背后的网络关系。NAIC在这一网络中处于核心地位，其影响力随时间不断增强。此外，我们从三个角度探讨影响各州采纳示范法的因素：法律本身的属性、各州内部特征以及外部影响。研究发现，法律属性起着关键作用。那些复杂性低、与现有州法差异明显、为认证合规所要求以及最近修订过的示范法更有可能被采纳。尽管我们未发现各州内部特征的显著影响，但研究结果表明，各州在采纳示范法时会效仿地理位置相近和意识形态相似的邻州。
A fair price to pay: Exploiting causal graphs for fairness in insurance
公平的代价：利用因果图促进保险公平
作者
Olivier Côté（拉瓦尔大学精算学院），Marie-Pier Côté（拉瓦尔大学精算学院），Arthur Charpentier（魁北克大学蒙特利尔分校数学学院）
摘要：In many jurisdictions, insurance companies are prohibited from discriminating based on certain policyholder characteristics. Exclusion of prohibited variables from models prevents direct discrimination, but fails to address proxy discrimination, a phenomenon especially prevalent when powerful predictive algorithms are fed with an abundance of acceptable covariates. The lack of formal definition for key fairness concepts, in particular indirect discrimination, hinders effective fairness assessment. We review causal inference notions and introduce a causal graph tailored for fairness in insurance. Exploiting these, we discuss potential sources of bias, formally define direct and indirect discrimination, and study the theoretical properties of fairness methodologies. A novel categorization of fair methodologies into five families (best-estimate, unaware, aware, hyperaware, and corrective) is constructed based on their expected fairness properties. A comprehensive pedagogical example illustrates the implications of our findings: the interplay between our fair score families, group fairness criteria, and discrimination.
在许多司法管辖区，保险公司被禁止基于某些保单持有人的特征进行歧视。尽管从模型中排除被禁止的变量可以防止直接歧视，但却无法解决代理歧视问题——当强大的预测算法被输入大量可接受的协变量时，这一现象尤为突出。由于关键的公平概念（特别是间接歧视）缺乏正式定义，公平性评估面临挑战。本文回顾了因果推断的相关概念，并提出了一个专门用于保险公平性的因果图。基于此，我们讨论了潜在的偏差来源，正式定义了直接和间接歧视，并研究了公平方法的理论属性。我们基于其预期的公平属性创新性地将公平方法分为五类：最佳估计（best-estimate）、公平无知（unaware）、公平知晓（aware）、高度公平知晓（hyperaware）和纠正性方法（corrective）。最后，我们通过一个全面的教学示例，展示了这些研究发现的影响，包括我们定义的几类公平评分、群体公平性标准以及歧视之间的相互作用。
Market discipline and government guarantees: Evidence from the insurance industry
市场约束和政府担保：来自保险业的证据
作者
Yiling Deng（阿肯色中央大学经济、金融与保险及风险管理系）， J. Tyler Leverty（威斯康星大学麦迪逊分校威斯康星商学院）， Kenny Wunder（阿拉巴马大学弗豪斯商学院）， George Zanjani（阿拉巴马大学弗豪斯商学院学）
摘要：We identify the effect of public guarantees on market discipline by exploiting the variation in US state guarantees of property–casualty insurer obligations. We find that guaranty funds have little effect on the risk-sensitivity of insurer financing overall, with the exception of rating changes at the key threshold level of A.M. Best's A− rating. For insurers rated A− before a downgrade, we find that premium growth in business not covered by state guarantees falls in relation to growth in business covered by state guarantees. We estimate this difference in growth to be as high as 14.9% for commercial insurers.
我们利用美国各州对财产和意外险保险公司债务担保的变化，来确定公共担保对市场约束的影响。我们发现，担保基金对保险公司融资的风险敏感性总体影响不大，但A.M.Best评级A-的关键阈值水平的评级变化除外。对于降级前评级为A-的保险公司，我们发现，不受国家担保覆盖的业务的保费增长与受国家担保覆盖的业务的增长相比有所下降。我们估计，商业保险公司的增长差异高达14.9%。
Children as insurance revisited: Impact of children on private insurance adoption among older parents
子女作为保险的再审视：子女对老年父母购买私人保险的影响
作者
Zhaoxue Ci（中南财经政法大学文澜商学院，新结构经济学研究中心）
摘要：The old-age security motive for fertility implies that children are substitutes for parents' old-age insurance. However, demographic dynamics and the evolution of social welfare schemes may challenge this notion. Meanwhile, as population aging is placing heavy pressure on the social security systems, private insurance has become a crucial supplement for hedging risks. In light of the present trends, this research examines the impact of the number of children on private insurance adoption among older parents in China. This research exploits the “Later, Longer, Fewer” campaign to instrument variations in the number of children. Instrumental variable estimates reveal that the likelihood of older parents having private insurance increases with the number of children they have. The positive effect is more pronounced among older adults, who are less reliant on children and have more access to alternative resources. Further analyses indicate that adverse selection and information channels are potential mechanisms.
生育的养老保障动机意味着子女是父母老年保险的替代品。然而，人口动态变化以及社会福利计划的演变可能会对该观点提出挑战。与此同时，随着人口老龄化对社会保障体系施加了沉重压力，私人保险已经成为对冲风险的重要补充。鉴于当前的趋势，本研究考察了子女数量对中国老年父母购买私人保险的影响。本研究利用“晚育、长育、少育”作为工具变量，以识别子女数量的变化。工具变量估计结果显示，老年父母拥有私人保险的可能性随着子女数量的增加而提高。这种正向影响在对子女依赖程度较低且能够更多获取其他资源的老年人中更为显著。进一步的分析表明，逆选择和信息渠道是潜在的作用机制。
Utilizing large-scale insurance data sets to calibrate sub-county level crop yields
利用大规模保险数据集来校准县级以下层面的作物产量
作者
Francis Tsiboe（美国农业部经济研究局）， Dylan Turner（美国农业部经济研究局）， Jisang Yu（堪萨斯州立大学农业经济系）
摘要：Crop yields are crucial for research on agricultural risk and productivity but are typically only available at highly aggregated levels. Yield data at more granular levels of observation have the potential to enhance econometric identification and improve statistical power but are typically inaccessible. Crop insurance contracts offered via the US Federal Crop Insurance Program (FCIP) are priced, in part, based on past yields of the farm meaning year-to-year variation in premium rates has the potential to provide insight into how yields vary over time. This paper introduces methods to use observed FCIP rating parameters to calibrate yields for insurance transactions lacking such data. These methods are validated with 148,243 farm-level observations from Kansas for which yields are known. The calibrated yields are applied empirically to examine the impact of asymmetric information in the FCIP via choice of insurance unit structure and the extent to which legislative changes mitigated this effect.
作物产量对于农业风险和生产力研究至关重要，但通常仅在高度汇总的层面可用。更细致层面的产量数据有可能增强计量经济学的识别能力并提高统计功效，但通常难以获取。通过美国联邦作物保险计划（FCIP）提供的作物保险合同在定价时部分基于农场的过往产量，这意味着年度间保费率的变化有可能揭示产量随时间的变化情况。本文介绍了如何利用观察到的FCIP定价参数来校准缺乏此类数据的保险交易的产量。这些方法通过来自堪萨斯州的148,243个农场层面的观测数据进行了验证，这些数据的产量是已知的。校准后的产量被实证应用于研究FCIP中的不对称信息通过保险单位结构选择所产生的影响，以及立法变化在多大程度上缓解了这种影响。
Supplementing risk adjustment with high-risk pooling using historical data for identifying the high risks
高风险池化对风险调整的补充——利用历史数据识别高风险个体
作者
Michel Oskam（伊拉斯谟卫生政策与管理学院；鹿特丹伊拉斯谟大学鹿特丹健康经济学中心）， Richard C. van Kleef（伊拉斯谟卫生政策与管理学院；鹿特丹伊拉斯谟大学鹿特丹健康经济学中心）， René C. J. A. van Vliet（伊拉斯谟卫生政策与管理学院；鹿特丹伊拉斯谟大学鹿特丹健康经济学中心）
摘要：Many regulated health insurance markets with community-rated premiums rely on risk adjustment (RA) to mitigate insurer-incentives to risk select. However, insurers remain typically undercompensated for chronically ill enrollees. We use historical data on health spending and risk adjuster information to identify individuals undercompensated by the Dutch RA model of 2021 and find a selective group (1% of the population) with an average annual undercompensation of €6,050. We supplement the RA model with a risk sharing modality called high-risk pooling (HRP) to organize residual-based compensations towards insurers for the identified group to reduce the mean undercompensation to zero. The effects are evaluated on subgroups defined by chronic disease, finding a 42% reduction of their average undercompensation. Therefore, through compensating 1% of the population, the insurer-incentives to select against chronically ill individuals substantially diminish. These results are compared to outlier-risk sharing (reinsurance), proving HRP to be more effective at reducing selection incentives.
许多具有社区评级保费的受监管健康保险市场依赖于风险调整（RA）来减轻保险公司选择风险的动机。然而，保险公司对慢性病患者的补偿通常仍然不足。我们使用卫生支出的历史数据和风险调整信息来识别2021年荷兰RA模型补偿不足的个体，并发现一个平均年补偿不足6050欧元的选择性群体（占人口的1%）。我们通过引入一种名为高风险池化（HRP）的风险分担方式来补充风险调整（RA）模型，以组织对已识别群体的基于剩余的补偿，从而将平均补偿不足额降低至零。我们对慢性病定义的亚组进行评估，发现其平均补偿不足额减少了42%。因此，通过对总人口中1%的人群进行补偿，保险公司选择性地拒绝慢性病患者的动机大幅降低。这些结果与异常风险分担（再保险）进行了比较，证明高风险池化（HRP）在减少选择动机方面更为有效。
Do higher insurance premiums provoke larger reported losses? An experimental study
较高的保费会引发更高的损失申报额吗？一项实验研究
作者
William G. Morrison（劳里埃大学 经济系）， Bradley J. Ruffle（麦克马斯特大学 经济系）
摘要：We investigate whether the price paid for insurance explains dishonesty in reporting an insurance claim. In our laboratory experiment, participants earn money in a real-effort task but risk losing some of this income through one of four randomly assigned, privately observed loss amounts. Before observing their loss, participants indicate their reservation price for insurance that pays an indemnity equal to their stated loss. Participants are insured if their randomly assigned premium is less than their stated reservation price. This mechanism provides data on each participant's consumer surplus from insurance. After receiving their cash earnings minus their assigned loss in private, participants report their loss. We find that the insured report modestly but statistically insignificant larger losses than the uninsured. Among the insured, we find no clear evidence that their reporting of excess losses increases in the randomly assigned price of insurance or decreases in the consumer surplus from insurance.
我们研究了保险支付价格是否能解释保险理赔申报中的不诚实行为。在我们的实验室实验中，参与者通过一项实际付出努力的任务赚钱，但面临着四种随机分配的私人可观测损失金额之一，而导致部分收入损失的风险。在观察到自己的损失之前，参与者需表明他们为一份能按申报损失金额进行赔偿的保险所愿意支付的保留价格。如果随机分配给参与者的保费低于其申报的保留价格，他们就会购买保险。这一机制为每位参与者从保险中获得的消费者剩余提供了数据。在私下收到扣除分配损失后的现金收入后，参与者报告他们的损失。我们发现，与未投保者相比，已投保者报告的损失金额略高，但统计上并不显著。在已投保者中，我们没有发现明确的证据表明，他们报告的超额损失会随着保险价格的随机分配而增加，或者随着保险带来的消费者剩余而减少。
Insurtech, sensor data, and changes in customers' coverage choices: Evidence from usage-based automobile insurance
保险科技、传感器数据与客户保险覆盖选择的变化：来自基于使用量汽车保险的证据
作者
Miremad Soleymanian（西蒙弗雷泽大学比迪商学院）， Charles B. Weinberg（不列颠哥伦比亚大学索德商学院）， Ting Zhu（西拉法叶普渡大学克兰纳特管理学院）
摘要：In this paper, we examine the role of usage-based auto insurance on customers' decisions to change their insurance coverage at the renewal. Using a sample of 135,540 customers, we study whether usage-based insurance (UBI) can facilitate the upselling and cross-selling efforts of the firm, possibly leading to higher coverage choices and additional insurance product purchases. Our results suggest that UBI customers are more likely to change their coverage choice than non-UBI customers at first (but not second) renewal. Both price discounts and the information provided by UBI affect the customers' coverage changes. Among UBI customers, those who get higher UBI discounts are more likely to both increase their insurance coverage (upselling) and add the comprehensive coverage option (cross-selling), which is not directly related to driving behavior at the time of first (annual) renewal. Moreover, customers who have received more negative feedback (daily hard brakes) are more likely to increase their insurance coverage.
本文研究了基于个人驾驶数据的汽车保险（Usage-Based Insurance, UBI）对客户在续保时调整保险覆盖范围的影响。我们以135,540名客户为样本，探讨基于个人驾驶数据的保险是否能够助力企业实现向上销售（upselling）和交叉销售（cross-selling），从而促使客户选择更高额度的保险覆盖或购买额外的保险产品。研究发现，在首次续保时，使用基础保险的客户比非使用基础保险的客户更倾向于调整保险覆盖范围（但在第二次续保时这种差异消失）。价格折扣以及UBI提供的信息都会影响客户的保险覆盖调整。在UBI客户中，获得更高折扣的客户在首次（年度）续保时更有可能增加保险额度（向上销售）或添加与驾驶行为无直接关联的全保选项（交叉销售）。此外，那些收到更多负面反馈（例如频繁急刹车）的客户也更可能提高保险覆盖范围。
【保险学术前沿】文章推荐：全球保险市场趋势与预测：寿险与非寿险
来源：13个精算师
