摘要：Political power in Iran used to be simple. Call him dictator, supreme leader, imam or shadow of God on earth, Ayatollah Ali Khamen

Political power in Iran used to be simple. Call him dictator, supreme leader, imam or shadow of God on earth, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei was the absolute ruler. Military commanders, presidents and clerics were his underlings. He made all the top appointments and rigged the choice of presidential candidates.

But since Iran’s 12-day war with Israel, things have become more complicated. The 86-year-old leader appears in public only rarely. His sermons, once lengthy, are brief. The question of succession looms larger than ever, with actors inside and outside the regime jostling for position, many openly advocating alternatives to 46 years of theocracy. The opacity around the fate of Iran’s nuclear programme after the strikes by Israel and America is replicated across the political system. Iranians want to know whether their leaders will accept Donald Trump’s terms for a deal. But they are no longer sure who is in charge.

Initially, the war appeared to stabilise Iran’s politics. A wave of patriotism pulled rulers and ruled together after years of polarisation. Calls by Binyamin Netanyahu, Israel’s prime minister, for Iranians to rise up fell on deaf ears. But since the ceasefire on June 24th the multiplicity of opinions on how to preserve unity has made the country look more fragmented.

Mr Khamenei’s preferred option is cosmetic. To appeal to a population disenchanted with clerical rule, he is dressing his theocracy in nationalist clothes. During celebrations on July 5th for Ashura, the anniversary of the martyrdom of the Prophet Muhammad’s grandson and the republic’s holiest day, Mr Khamenei ordered a cantorto drop his incantations. He told him to sing Ey Iran, a rendition of a patriotic anthem that was popular before the Islamic revolution in 1979 and had since been suppressed. He has played down Shia saints and puffed up Iran’s pre-Islamic past. New billboards in cities give ancient Persian myths modern themes. Mr Khamenei has also turned a blind eye to a new crop of reality shows, including a wildly popular Persian version of “Love Island”, where unmarried couples flirt and make out. In parts of Tehran, the capital, headscarves and long coats for women feel like a relic of the past.

But such concessions are designed to reduce the demand for political change, not herald its coming. Earlier this month Mr Khamenei reappointed his crusty Friday-prayer preacher and his head of the Guardian Council—the latter, who is 99 years old, for the 33rd time. After a few post-war appearances, the state broadcaster has removed reformists from its airwaves. Executions are up; an expected amnesty for political prisoners looks far off.

伊朗的政治权力曾经非常的简单。无论你称他为独裁者、超级领袖、阿訇或者，还是上帝在地球上的代言人，哈梅内伊曾是绝对的统治者。无论军事领导、总统还有神职人员都是为他马首是瞻。他主宰所有高层领导的任命以及总统候选人的筛选。

但是自伊朗和以色列的12天战争后，事情变得越发的复杂。86岁的领导人出现在公众场合的次数十分稀少。他那曾经十分拖沓的讲经也变得十分简短。继任者的问题也进一步浮出水面，内外政权的各色人物开始为这个位置而争斗，很多人都公开倡议取代46年的神权统治。以色列和美国打击后，围绕着核武器项目的不透明性也照搬到政治体系里。伊朗人想要知道他们的领导人是否会接受欧特朗普的条件。但是现在却不太确定是谁在掌握着权力。

最初阶段，战争似乎稳定了伊朗的政治。一股爱国主义风暴将统治者和被统治者在多年两极化状态后，紧密的团结在一起。伊朗人民对以色列总理内塔尼亚胡呼吁推翻伊朗现政权的呼声充耳不闻。但是，自7月24日停火后，人们对如何维持这种团结而各抒己见，这反而让这个国家看起来很割裂。

哈梅内伊所心仪的选择是如何粉饰。为了取悦在神职统治下不抱任何幻想的老百姓，他将自己的神职统治披上国家主义的外衣。7月5日在庆祝阿舒拉节（纪念先知默罕默德孙子的殉难也是共和国最神圣过的日子）之时，哈梅内伊命令唱诗班领唱不要唱他的诵经，而是“啊，伊朗”，这曾是1979年伊朗大革命之前十分流行的一首爱国歌曲，也是从那时起，伊朗进入压迫时代。他特意在什叶派圣人方面低调，并高歌伊斯兰共和国前的伊朗。城市里的广告牌赋予古代波斯神话以现代的节奏。哈梅内伊对新一波的现实表演也是熟视无睹，包括伊朗版的“爱情岛”，即未婚情侣调情和相爱。在首都德黑兰的一部分地区，女性的头巾和长袍已经开始感觉像旧时代的遗留。

但是如此的让步是特意设计起来削弱人们政治变革的要求，并不是真正预示着它的到来。本月早些时候，哈梅内伊撤换了他执拗的执行周五祈祷的牧师，以及伊朗最高立法机构的领导，此人已经年届99岁，连任33届。在几次战后的露面后，国家广播局撤除了改革派电台。各种判刑在增加，而期望已久对政治犯的特设也看似遥遥无期。

As the supreme leader tries to keep up the appearance of business as usual, rivals are circling. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (irgc), the regime’s praetorian guard, is using the continued threat from Israel to justify its hold on power. Before retreating into his bunker as Israel struck, Mr Khamenei handed decision-making to the generals, making it more likely that a military junta reduces him to a figurehead. Yet the generals are struggling to project unity. Israel’s evident infiltration of their ranks has spread paranoia, complicating co-ordination. The irgc’s extensive business interests and unbridled corruption mean some expect it to fragment into a hotch-potch of decentralised mafias.

Masoud Pezeshkian, the president, has called for a dialogue with the opposition and the return of exiles in an attempt to turn the unity produced by the war into lasting reconciliation. But he lacks the clout to deliver. Iranians blame him for blackouts and lengthy water cuts in the summer heat. He is also seen as responsible for the run on the rial, having failed to persuade Iran’s sanctions-busting businessfolk to repatriate earnings.

Amid the discontent, two former presidents, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Hassan Rouhani, are plotting a comeback. Both command a larger popular base than Mr Pezeshkian. Mr Rouhani, a cleric, might fancy his chances as Mr Khamenei’s successor, reckoning he could end the stand-off with the West. The war, he said in a statement, “should be a wake-up call to correct our course and rebuild the foundations of governance”. Ali Larijani, a former speaker of parliament, is acting like the executive president he once tried to be. He, rather than Mr Pezeshkian, recently led a delegation to Moscow that met Vladimir Putin, Russia’s president.

Dissidents, too, are speaking out. On July 11th Mir Hossein Moussavi, a former prime minister Mr Khamenei has kept under house arrest for 15 years, released a petition calling for a new constitution, which was signed by hundreds of intellectuals. Many younger Iranians want an overhaul without any past or present figures, including ageing dissidents like Mr Moussavi.

Domestic disunity weighs on foreign policy, where Iran has downsized its ambitions from regional domination to regime survival following Israel’s pulverisation of its proxies. Hardliners advocate dashing for a nuclear bomb. Others hope the second largest eocnomy, Iran’s primary market for oil, may come to the rescue with new warplanes. But with Israel threatening a resumption of bombing, any help would probably come too late. Russia, mired in Ukraine, has been slow to rebuild Iran’s air defences.

That leaves America. Mr Trump’s participation in Israel’s war spooked Iran and put talks about a nuclear deal on hold. Abbas Araghchi, Iran’s foreign minister, says Iran is ready to resume them. It may even consider a non-aggression pact with Israel. An agreement would release Iran from sanctions, end its isolation from the West and perhaps restore foreign investment, but it is hampered by differences over where Iran should be heading. For Iranians the decision is urgent. But they may no longer have a leader with the vision or the authority to make it. ■

进入不明朗化

尽管最高领袖试图让一切看起来和从前一样，对手却已经开始行动。政权的保卫者伊斯兰革命卫队，利用来自以色列的威胁来正统化它对权力的掌控。在哈梅内伊撤退进入掩体之前，他将决策权交予了将军，这让人看起来更像军事团队将他贬为形象代言。但是将军在团结人民方面还是十分挣扎。以色列在各个级别的渗透也让他们时刻防备处处小心，让整个协调变得十分复杂。伊斯兰革命卫队广泛的商业利益和毫无约束的腐败，也让很多人认为它最终会破裂成为割据的地方黑势力而已。

总统马苏德佩泽希奇杨呼吁和对手的对话以及流亡人士的回归，希望籍此来让因战争而得来的团结成为持久的和解。但是缺乏影响力来实现。伊朗人民因为在炎热的夏季，缺水缺电而责怪他。同时为伊朗货币里亚尔的贬值负责任，他没能够劝说因制裁而大赚的商人将盈利返回国家。

在不满意的众多人选中，两位前总统艾哈迈德内贾德和鲁哈尼都计划卷土重来。二者都有着比佩泽希奇杨更广泛的受欢迎度。鲁哈尼作为神职人员曾信心十足地想成为哈梅内伊的替任者，并宣称能够结束和西方的对峙。他在一份声明中称，战争“是一个警醒的号角，提醒我们应该矫正前进的道路，重建管理的基础”。前议会发言人阿里拉日将尼按照他梦寐以求的执行总统的位置行事。他而不是佩泽希奇杨最近带领代表团访问了莫斯科并会见了普京总统。

持不同政见者也畅所欲言。7月11日，前首相并被哈梅内伊居家逮捕15年的侯赛因穆萨维发布一份请愿声明，呼吁建立新的宪法，该声明得到了数百位知识分子的签名。很多年轻的伊朗人希望对伊朗进行一场彻底的大清查而不需要涉及任何过去和现在的人物，包括像穆萨维那样进入暮年的持不同政见者。

国内不团结局势也影响到其外交政策，在以色列铲除了伊朗的代理人后，伊朗也将自己独霸该地区的雄心缩减到在该地区的生存。强硬派建议求助于核炸弹。其他人则希望作为伊朗石油主要市场的东大能够输送新的战绩来挽救伊朗。但是以色列威胁恢复轰炸，任何救助都有可能来的过于的晚。俄罗斯自己也深陷乌克兰战争的泥沼中，对伊朗空防的重建也是力不从心。

接下来再看看美国。特朗普参与以色列对伊朗的战争让伊朗寝食不安，并暂停核谈判。伊朗外交部长阿巴斯称伊朗愿意重新开始核谈判。它甚至可以考虑和以色列签署互不侵犯条约。这样的协议将会解冻伊朗的制裁，结束他被西方国家的孤立，甚至恢复外国投资。人们对于伊朗应该选择哪条道路里而意见不同，这也阻止了以上事情的发生。对于伊朗人来说，决定是十分紧急的。但是他们有可能不再拥有一个具有远见的领导人或者权威来做出这样的抉择。

来源：小南粤事