摘要：《和平研究杂志》(Journal of Peace Research)是一份跨学科的、国际同行评议的和平研究学术双月刊。《和平研究杂志》致力于在全球范围内关注冲突与缔造和平。该刊鼓励广泛的和平概念，但重点关注暴力的起因和冲突的解决。该刊2022年影响因子为3.
期刊简介
《和平研究杂志》(Journal of Peace Research)是一份跨学科的、国际同行评议的和平研究学术双月刊。《和平研究杂志》致力于在全球范围内关注冲突与缔造和平。该刊鼓励广泛的和平概念，但重点关注暴力的起因和冲突的解决。该刊2022年影响因子为3.713，近5年影响因子为4.555。
本期目录
1 利用抗议活动数据预测武装冲突
Predicting armed conflict using protest data
2 非洲抗议活动的镇压、反弹和持续时间
Repression, backlash, and the duration of protests in Africa
3 受到主流群体的强烈反对？多数群体对少数族裔参与警察工作的回应
Dominant group backlash? Majority responses to minority participation in the police
4 针对平民的暴力活动和公民对国家的支持：治理和意识形态的调节作用
Violence against civilians and public support for the state: The moderating role of governance and ideology
5 侵犯人权和公众对制裁的支持
Human rights violations and public support for sanctions
6 领导人的相似性与国际冲突
Leader similarity and international conflict
7 国内问责与不遵守国际法：来自美洲人权法院的证据
Domestic accountability and non-compliance with international law: Evidence from the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
8 军事化国家的建设干预与脆弱国家的生存
Militarized state-building interventions and the survival of fragile state
9 祸福相依？评估外国直接投资对非洲冲突的本地影响
Blessing or curse? Assessing the local impacts of foreign direct investment on conflict in Africa
10 前反叛组织中女性的当选
The election of former rebel women
内容摘要
利用抗议活动数据预测武装冲突
题目：Predicting armed conflict using protest data
作者：Espen Geelmuyden Rød，乌普萨拉大学和平与冲突研究系访问研究员；Håvard Hegre，乌普萨拉大学和平与冲突研究系研究员；Maxine Leis，乌普萨拉大学和平与冲突研究系博士研究生。
摘要：作为一种强度较低的政治冲突，抗议活动可能会引发国内的武装冲突。因此，武装冲突预警系统应该将抗议活动数据作为预警参考依据。然而，由于大多数抗议活动不会升级为武装冲突，本文的预测模型首先需要理论支撑。本文使用的模型基于与抗议-镇压动态变化、政治体制以及经济发展相关的三个理论。在这些理论基础上，本文使用了九个模型，同时利用政治暴力预警系统（ViEWS）在次国家层级上对非洲国内武装冲突进行预测。预测结果表明，与考虑冲突发生历史的基线模型相比，纳入抗议数据的模型预测冲突发生率以及冲突开始时间的准确率显著提高。此外，研究结果还表明，基于理论的抗议模型优于将所有抗议事件一视同仁的简单模型，这显示了理论在冲突预测中的核心地位。
Protest is a low-intensity form of political conflict that can precipitate intrastate armed conflict. Data on protests should therefore be informative in systems that provide early warnings of armed conflict. However, since most protests do not escalate to armed conflict, we first need theory to inform our prediction models. We identify three theoretical explanations relating to protest-repression dynamics, political institutions and economic development as the basis for our models. Based on theory, we operationalize nine models and leverage the political Violence Early Warning System (ViEWS) to generate subnational forecasts for intrastate armed conflict in Africa. Results show that protest data substantially improves conflict incidence and onset predictions compared to baseline models that account for conflict history. Moreover, the results underline the centrality of theory for conflict forecasting: our theoretically informed protest models outperform naive models that treat all protests equally.
非洲抗议活动的镇压、反弹和持续时间
题目：Repression, backlash, and the duration of protests in Africa
作者：Jacob S Lewis，华盛顿州立大学政治哲学与公共事务学院助理教授；Brandon Ives，首尔大学国际关系与政治学助理教授。
摘要：本文研究了近期对抗议活动的镇压行为与未来抗议活动持续时间之间的关系。大量研究探讨了镇压行为如何影响异议，这些研究重点关注异议活动的多重维度，例如未来相关事件的数量和是否升级为暴力活动，却较少关注异议活动的另一个层面——抗议的持续时间。本文的假设是，近期对抗议活动的镇压行为是影响未来抗议活动持续时间加长的关键因素。这种预期源于一种参与者类型的机制。近期对抗议活动的镇压行为可能会引起社会上更多的不满情绪，但同时也会增加抗议的风险。不满情绪和抗议风险同时增加时，抗议者的数量也会增加，这些抗议者也是愿意进行更长时间抗议的风险接受者。本文使用武装冲突发生地点与来自事件数据项目的数据，结合分层负二项回归模型，评估了近期对抗议活动的镇压行为与后续抗议活动持续时间之间存在的相关性。研究发现，与近期未遭到镇压的三次抗议活动相比，在最近三次抗议活动中遭到镇压的地方举行抗议活动的持续时间更长。这一研究结果和参与者类型机制以及有关镇压行为对个体异质性影响的现有研究相匹配。
This article investigates the relationship between recent repression of protest and the duration of future protests. A rich scholarship examines how repression impacts dissent, highlighting dissent dimensions such as the number of future events and violent escalation. Less examined is another dimension of dissent – protest duration. We hypothesize that recent repression of protests is pivotal for longer duration of future protest events. Our expectation stems from a participant type mechanism. Recent repression of protest may generate more societal grievances but also increase protesting risks. A simultaneous jump in grievances and risks may increase the number of people protesting who are also risk-acceptant and willing to protest for longer durations. The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project data and hierarchal negative binomial models are used to estimate the association between recent repression of protest and subsequent protest duration. Compared to having none of the most recent three protests repressed, a protest in a location where the last three protests were repressed has a substantively longer duration. The results are consistent with the participant type mechanism and existing literature on repression’s heterogeneous effects on individuals.
受到主流群体的强烈反对？多数群体对少数族裔参与警察工作的回应
题目：Dominant group backlash? Majority responses to minority participation in the police
作者：Matthew Nanes，圣路易斯大学政治学副教授。
摘要：安全部门的改革通常涉及将边缘群体纳入警察队伍。学界围绕这种包容边缘化群体的行为带来的好处进行了广泛讨论，但关于这种行为对主流群体的影响却讨论甚少。本文认为，接触其他（族裔）群体的警察可以增加主流公民群体对这些群体的信任，这可以为进一步的改革打开大门，并增加和平的可能性。本文讨论了以色列的主流公民群体对外部族裔警察的反应。首先，通过调查实验，本文发现并没有任何证据能够表明，接触阿拉伯（边缘化）警官会导致犹太（主流）平民的强烈反对。随后，通过对六年里针对每个警察局警官身份进行的多次调查和面板数据，本文发现与阿拉伯警察的接触与犹太人对阿拉伯人信任的增加存在相关关系。这种信任既包括在日常生活中犹太人愿意与阿拉伯人比邻而居的情况，也包括他们对阿拉伯人政治暴力动机的看法。总之，这些研究发现与主流群体强烈反对边缘群体可能破坏和平局面的担忧相矛盾，同时使警察融合改革作为和平进程的重要组成部分成为可能。
Security sector reform often involves integrating marginalized groups into the police. Extensive discussion surrounds the benefits of inclusion to the marginalized group, but we know little about impacts on the dominant group. I argue that exposure to out-group police can increase dominant group civilians’ trust in the out-group, opening the door for further reforms and increasing the likelihood of peace. I explore dominant group citizens’ responses to out-group police officers in Israel. First, using a survey experiment, I find no evidence that exposure to Arab (marginalized) police officers leads to backlash by Jewish (dominant) civilians. Then, drawing on multiple surveys and panel data on the identity of officers at every station over six years, I find that exposure to Arab police is associated with increased trust in Arabs among Jews. This trust extends to both everyday situations like willingness to live next door to an Arab and to beliefs about Arabs’ intentions to commit political violence. Collectively, these results contradict fears that backlash by the dominant group might spoil peace, opening the door for police integration as an important part of peace processes.
针对平民的暴力活动和公民对国家的支持：治理和意识形态的调节作用
题目：Violence against civilians and public support for the state: The moderating role of governance and ideology
作者：Gabriella Levy，华盛顿大学政治学助理教授。
摘要：为什么即使国家武装部队在内战期间对平民实施暴力时，仍然有部分公民支持政府？本文认为，在这种情境下，个人对国家的支持是由其对暴力、治理以及意识形态所持有的态度相互作用所塑造的。基于动机推理相关研究，本文认为与国家意识形态的相似性和国家的有效治理可以减轻军事暴力活动对平民支持率的负面影响。与之相反，叛乱分子的暴力行为反而能够提升民众对政府的正向态度。拉丁美洲民意项目于2005-2011年间在哥伦比亚进行了为期7年的调查，这一调查分析表明，个人对国家武装力量暴力活动的反应取决于其认可的意识形态是否与国家意识形态相一致。具体而言，在意识形态与总统相似的人群中，平民在军事上受害的事件在其对军队和国家政府的支持上产生的负面影响较小。也有不同证据表明，国家治理的质量，尤其是国家提供防范犯罪的安全保障的质量，会影响人们遭遇军事暴力时的应对方式。虽然现有研究主要关注暴力行为以及治理在平民看待国家时产生的影响，但上述研究结果表明，要想建立一个更完整的理论来解释人们为何支持对平民使用暴力活动的政府，不仅需要了解暴力活动本身，还需要了解国家的治理和意识形态。
When state armed forces engage in violence against civilians during civil wars, why do some citizens continue to support the government? I argue that individuals’ support for the state in such contexts is shaped by the interplay between their perceptions of violence, governance and ideology. Drawing on research concerning motivated reasoning, I suggest that ideological similarity with and effective governance from the state can alleviate the negative effect of military violence against civilians on support for the state and, conversely, augment the positive effect of insurgent abuse on attitudes toward the government. Analysis of seven years of surveys fielded by the Latin American Public Opinion Project in Colombia between 2005 and 2011 suggests that individuals’ responses to victimization by the state’s armed forces depend on whether the individuals are ideologically aligned with the state. More specifically, among people who have an ideology similar to that of the president, military victimization has a less negative effect on support for the armed forces and for the national government. There is also mixed evidence that the quality of state governance, particularly the provision of security from crime, shapes the ways people respond to victimization. While existing studies primarily focus on the effects of either violence or governance on attitudes toward the state, these findings indicate that a more complete theory of why people support governments which engage in violence against civilians requires an understanding of not only violence but also of governance and ideology.
侵犯人权和公众对制裁的支持
题目：Human rights violations and public support for sanctions
作者：Barış Arı，东英吉利大学政治、哲学与语言学院政治学讲师；Burak Sonmez，伦敦大学社会研究所定量社会科学讲师。
摘要：呼吁对侵犯人权者采取惩罚性行为的公众舆论压力往往是实施国际制裁的推动力。然而，学界对不同类型的虐待行为如何影响公众支持、制裁的成本和效果以及制裁对目标人群和领导层造成的不同损失却研究甚少。本文通过分析共同作用的道德因素和和成本效益计算的情境因素，填补了这一研究空白。并认为，在工具性问题和道德性问题之间，不存在简单二分的权衡。侵权行为的发生背景、道德性以及工具性因素之间的相互作用共同影响着偏好的形成。本文的配对联合分析实验结果表明，受访者是否支持实施制裁取决于侵犯人权行为的种类及这些行为被感知的显著性。个体也会倾向于在惩罚领导层的同时对目标人群进行庇护，但假如目标人群中的大多数人对侵犯人权的行为抱着支持的态度，集体惩罚就会变得易于接受。对犯罪者采取惩罚措施的期望虽然放大了惩罚领导层的吸引力，却降低了可能伤害国内民众的道德担忧。
Public pressure to take punitive action against human rights violators is often a driving force behind international sanctions. However, we know little about the way in which public support is shaped by varying types of abuse, the costs and effectiveness of sanctions and the differential harm they inflict upon the target population and leadership. Our study specifically addresses this gap by unpicking contextual factors that jointly sway the perception of morality and the cost-benefit calculus. We propose that there is no simple trade-off between instrumental and moral concerns. The context within which violations take place and the interactions between moral and instrumental dimensions shape preference formation. Findings from our paired conjoint experiment suggest that whether respondents support imposing sanctions depends on the category of human rights abuse and its perceived salience. Individuals also prefer sheltering the target population while punishing the leadership, but collective punishment becomes less unacceptable if the majority of the target population support the human rights infringements. The desire to do something against the perpetrators amplifies the appeal of punishing the leadership but assuages the moral concerns of harming the population.
领导人的相似性与国际冲突
题目：Leader similarity and international conflict
作者：Matthew DiLorenzo，欧道明大学政治学与地理学系副教授；Bryan Rooney，兰德公司政治学家。
摘要：在解释一国外交政策的行为模式时，学界越来越强调领导人个人传记中所具有的特征。本文拓展了这一视角，以研究领导者个人背景特征的（不）相似性在二元层面上如何影响国际冲突的结果。信任与不定性是解释冲突的关键，因为这两个因素与解释承诺和信息一类的战争原因有关。心理学研究表明，个人和群体之间的相似感可以增进二者间的信任与合作。因此，本文假设背景和生活经历越相似的领导者会形成更牢固的社会纽带，从而更加信任彼此。所以，彼此拥有更多相似之处的领导人能够更好处理双方的外交争端，进而避免冲突的发生。本文使用了领导者经验和属性描述（LEAD）数据集以及1946-2004年间类似的政治二元组合中国际冲突爆发的数据，创建了一种新的对比分析领导者相似性的测量方法，以检验上述假设。本文发现，即使将各种可观测和不可观测数据考虑在内，在相同的敌对情况下，背景更为相似的两位领导人之间发生国家间军事争端的可能性要小得多。这些研究结果不仅有助于了解国际冲突的决定性因素，同时能够推动冲突研究中心理学方法与理性主义方法的结合。
Scholars increasingly emphasize personal biographical characteristics of leaders in explaining patterns of foreign policy behavior. This article extends insights from this agenda to study how (dis)similarities in the background characteristics of leaders at the dyadic level shape international conflict outcomes. Trust and uncertainty are central to explaining conflict via their connections to commitment- and information-related causes of war. Psychological research provides evidence that perceived similarities between individuals and groups can foment trust and cooperation. We hypothesize that leaders who share more similar backgrounds and life experiences form stronger social bonds and are more trusting of one another. As such, leaders who have more in common with one another should be able to better manage diplomatic disputes and avoid conflict. We test this hypothesis using a new measure of dyadic-leader-level similarity created with the Leader Experience and Attribute Descriptions (LEAD) dataset and data on international conflict onset in politically relevant dyads throughout the period 1946–2004. We find that pairs of leaders with more similar backgrounds are significantly less likely to experience militarized interstate disputes at all levels of hostility even after accounting for a variety of observable and unobservable determinants of conflict. The findings contribute to our understanding of the determinants of international conflict and help advance research on linkages between psychological and rationalist approaches to studying conflict.
国内问责与不遵守国际法：来自美洲人权法院的证据
题目：Domestic accountability and non-compliance with international law: Evidence from the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
作者：Francesca Parente，克里斯托弗·纽波特大学政治学助理教授。
摘要：国内公众的偏好往往影响领导人是否遵守国际法律裁决，人权学者往往认为这些偏好有助于执法和司法。然而，公众支持人权保护并不意味着他们会普遍支持国际法院下令采取的补救措施。当领导人同时面临来自国际法院和国内公众竞相施加的压力时，会发生什么？以美洲人权法院（一个在拉丁美洲运作的区域性人权法院）为背景，本文探讨了这一问题。本文认为，不合规的行为有时可能是民主领导人根据民意情况调整合规行为的结果，尤其是当涉案人有较高的社会影响力时。具体而言，本文认为对裁决结果的遵守与下届总统选举时间的邻近程度相关。因此，政府需要对公众意见以及公众对裁决所牵涉的行为者的态度做出更多回应。本文使用美洲法院所有涉及军方裁决的原始数据来验证这一观点。研究表明，如果公众不支持军方，那么在临近选举时，政府遵守规定的概率就会增加；但是，如果公众支持军方，那么政府遵守规定的概率就会降低。本文的研究结果表明，将公众态度纳入现有的国际法遵守模式至关重要。
Domestic public preferences often shape leaders’ decisions to comply with international legal rulings. Human rights scholars usually assume these preferences favor enforcement and justice. However, just because the public supports human rights does not mean they universally support remedies ordered by international courts. What happens when leaders face competing compliance pressures from an international court and domestic public? I examine this question in the context of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, a regional human rights court that operates primarily in Latin America. I argue that non-compliance may sometimes result from democratic leaders adjusting compliance behavior according to public opinion, especially when the implicated actor is popular. In particular, I argue that compliance is a function of proximity to the next presidential election, therefore necessitating greater responsiveness to the public’s opinions, and the public’s attitudes toward the actor implicated by the ruling. I test my argument on an original dataset of all Inter-American Court rulings implicating the military. I show that if the public does not support the military, the probability of compliance increases closer to an election; however, if the public does support the military, the probability of compliance decreases. My findings suggest the importance of incorporating the public’s attitudes into existing models of compliance with international law.
军事化国家的建设干预与脆弱国家的生存
题目：Militarized state-building interventions and the survival of fragile states
作者：Kelly Matush，佛罗里达州立大学政治学系助理教授；David A Lake，加州大学圣地亚哥分校政治学教授。
摘要：军事化的国家建设干预（MSIs）必须实现两个目标，而这两个目标往往相互冲突。在撤退时，干预国必须留下一个能够独立生存、独立治理其领土的国家。然而，只有在希望以自己偏好的方式改变目标国政策时，一国才会对其他国家进行干预。在试图平衡这两个目标的过程中，干预国通过支持一个支持率不那么高的领导人来“拉动”政策向其偏好的方向发展，代价是留下一个并不比其他国家更有可能长期维持下去的国家。本文通过研究1956-2006年间大国和国际组织在濒临崩溃的国家中实施的所有MSI，以检验这一理论，并找到了干预者进行这种权衡的证据。与本文提出的理论相符，平均而言，本文发现MSI对国家存活率不存在显著性影响。本文还发现，让目标国政策更接近外部势力政策的MSI对目标国的生存有负面影响，不导致目标国政策变化的干预则没有负面影响。这一结论削弱了当前许多有关国际干预行动的文献持有的乐观态度。同时，本文发现潜在的干预者面临的严峻的失衡局面，如果他们把失败国家的政策朝着自己偏好的方向引导，这个国家在未来更有可能再次失败。
Militarized state-building interventions (MSIs) must fulfill two often conflicting goals. At the time of withdrawal the intervenor must leave in place a state able to survive on its own and govern its territory. States only intervene in other states, however, when they aspire to change the policy of the target in ways they prefer. In attempting to balance these objectives, the intervenor ‘pulls’ policy in its preferred direction by supporting a less popular leader at the cost of leaving behind a state that is no more likely to survive over time than its peers. We test our theory and find evidence for this trade-off by examining all MSIs by great powers and IOs in failed states from 1956 to 2006. Consistent with the theory, we find that MSIs do not on average have any significant effect on state survival. We also find that MSIs that move the target state’s policy closer to that of the external power have a negative effect on survival, but interventions that do not result in a change in policy do not. This argument and finding temper the optimism of much of the contemporary literature on international interventions. Potential intervenors face a stark trade-off. If they draw the policy of the failed state towards their own preferences, then that state will be more likely to fail again in the future.
祸福相依？评估外国直接投资对非洲冲突的本地影响
题目：Blessing or curse? Assessing the local impacts of foreign direct investment on conflict in Africa
作者：Samuel Brazys，都柏林大学政治与国际关系学院的副教授；Indra de Soysa：挪威特隆赫姆科技大学的政治学教授；Krishna Chaitanya Vadlamannati：都柏林大学政治与国际关系学院副教授。
摘要：学界中关于外国直接投资（FDI）与当地社会政治发展的问题争论不休。自由主义者认为，外国直接投资为东道国社会带来了经济机会和/或是国内和平与安全的推动力。批判者则认为，外国直接投资具有剥削性质，会增加东道国暴力风险的发生条件。本文从政治经济学的角度出发，认为讨论外国直接投资是否存在问题，关键取决于外国直接投资如何影响东道国当地的利益集团。因此，虽然所有形式的外国直接投资都会遭到东道国内部的反对，但只有采掘业的外国直接投资才会升级为大规模战争，这是由于采掘业与东道国内的政治行为者几乎没有利害关系。基于近期对采掘业外国直接投资问题的研究，本文引入了所有行业的外国直接投资的省级地理参考数据，并使用来自四个不同地理参照冲突数据库的综合数据，以评估地方冲突。通过使用地点-时期固定效应和类双重差分法，本文发现所有行业的外国直接投资都会加剧当地冲突。而除了采掘业外国直接投资外，大多数外国直接投资行业引发的冲突都不会演变为内战。
The question of foreign direct investment (FDI) and socio-political development is debated heavily. Liberals believe that FDI brings economic opportunities and/or increased incentives for peace and security among host societies. Critics suggest that FDI is exploitative, leading to conditions that increase the risk of violence. We take a political economy perspective that views FDI as problematic depending on how FDI affects politically powerful local interests. As such, all forms of FDI should meet domestic opposition, but only FDI in the extractive sector, where domestic political actors have little at stake, escalates to major war. Building on recent work which examines this question pertaining to extractive sector FDI, we introduce sub-national, geo-referenced data on FDI in all sectors for evaluating local conflict using combined data from four distinct geo-referenced conflict databases. Using site-period fixed effects with a difference-in-difference like approach, we find that FDI in all sectors increases local conflict. Conflicts induced by most FDI sectors fall short of becoming civil war, except for extractive sector FDI.
前反叛组织中女性的当选
题目：The election of former rebel women
作者：Elizabeth L Brannon，印第安纳大学政治学系助理教授。
摘要：冲突结束后，由于所在叛乱组织转型成为政党，选举前组织内成员担任党内职务，许多前战斗人员因此获得了战利品。然而，这些机会是否只留给身为男性的前战斗人员？这一问题尚未定论。本文讨论了选民何时、为何会支持前叛乱组织的女性竞选政治职位。研究认为，这些女性的当选情况取决于她们在叛乱组织中的角色，以及其在冲突中使用暴力的情况。本文引入了1970年至2020年间数据集，这些数据集包括叛乱组织中女性在党派选举中的结果。结果表明，女性在叛乱组织中担任战斗人员和领导者时，其党派选举的结果会更为乐观。反之，叛乱组织中的女性在战争期间与恐怖主义和性暴力的联系更深时，其在冲突后的党派选举水平较低。本文还检验了叛乱组织中女性的角色和暴力的联系之间的相互作用，结果表明，无论叛乱组织中女性的精英角色如何，其选举机会都会受到极端暴力形式的消极影响，这显示了叛乱组织中女性身上的负面性污名非常突出。研究结果还表明，虽然许多前叛乱组织中的女性在战后被边缘化，但也有少数人获得了政治利益。
After conflict, many ex-combatant men experience the spoils of war as their rebel groups transition into political parties and elect former members to party seats. However, it is unclear whether these opportunities are reserved only for male ex-combatants. This article considers when and why voters might support former rebel women running for political office. It argues that the election of these women will depend on their roles within rebel groups, as well as their use of violence during conflict. The article presents a novel dataset on the election of former rebel women to rebel parties from 1970 to 2020. The results indicate that women’s roles as combatants and leaders in rebel groups are associated with higher levels of election for rebel women. In contrast, rebel women’s ties to violent tactics such as terrorism and sexual violence during war are associated with a lower level of election for rebel women after conflict. The interactions between rebel women’s roles and ties to violence are tested; the results suggested that, regardless of elite roles, rebel women’s electoral chances are hurt by extreme forms of violence, demonstrating the salience of the negative stigmas attached to violent women. The findings also demonstrate that while many former rebel women are marginalized after war, a select few experience political gains.
编译：管怡，国政学人编译员，澳门大学国际关系与公共政策专业。
审校 | 赖永祯 张潇文
排版 | 程心一 刘洹彤
本文源于Journal of Peace Research, Volume 62 Issue 1, January 2025. 本文为公益分享，服务于科研教学，不代表本平台观点。如有疏漏，欢迎指正。
来源：国政学人
