文学文享（119）：泛读文献

摘要：Today, the editor will interpret and share "Four party evolutionary game analysis of stakeholders' participation in grassland ecol

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1 内容摘要（Content summary）

今天小编将从“思维导图、精读内容、知识补充”三个板块，解读分享文献《利益相关者参与内蒙古草原生态管理行动的四方演化博弈分析》。

Today, the editor will interpret and share "Four party evolutionary game analysis of stakeholders' participation in grassland ecological management in Inner Mongolia" from the three sections of "mind map, intensive reading content, and knowledge supplement".

2 思维导图（Mind mapping）

3 精读内容（Intensive reading content）

上期读到文章作者通过三条假设构建了内蒙古草原生态管理四方主体间博弈关系模型，并且分别为上级政府、下级政府、企业和牧民构建了策略空间，后续作者开始为模型设置所需的参数，主要有策略成本和策略收益两个部分，策略成本部分包含行政成本、机会成本、潜在损失和管理成本等。

In the last issue, I read that the author built a game relationship model among the four main bodies of grassland ecological management in Inner Mongolia through three hypotheses, and built a strategy space for the superior government, the subordinate government, enterprises and herdsmen. The subsequent author began to set the required parameters for the model, mainly including strategy cost and strategy revenue. The strategy cost part includes administrative cost, opportunity cost, potential loss and management cost.

策略收益部分主要有上级政府享受的社会收益总和、不同主体选择不同策略时的收益，以及选择正向策略时所收获的政府给予的生态补偿。在以上两个部分，作者都进行了适当假设，即成本和收益总是大于等于零，符合常规认识，且方便后续的模型数值计算。

The part of strategic benefits mainly includes the total social benefits enjoyed by the superior government, the benefits when different subjects choose different strategies, and the ecological compensation given by the government when choosing positive strategies. In the above two parts, the author has made appropriate assumptions, that is, the cost and benefit are always greater than or equal to zero, which is in line with the conventional understanding and convenient for the subsequent numerical calculation of the model.

设置完模型参数，作者构建了博弈支付矩阵，展示了演化博弈中四个主体进行不同策略选择时分别得到的收益，并使用不同的序号进行标识。四方演化博弈涉及到四个博弈主体，主体的不同策略选择可构成共十六种策略组合，较为复杂。

After setting the model parameters, the author constructs the game payment matrix to show the benefits obtained by the four players in the evolutionary game when they make different strategic choices, and uses different serial numbers to identify them. The four party evolutionary game involves four game players, whose different strategy choices can form a total of 16 strategy combinations, which is more complex.

虽然策略组合增加到了十六种，但后续的策略演化分析中，对单一主体的分析仍是寻找其选择不同策略时的期望收益与平均期望收益，而后构建复制动态方程并求其一阶导数。最终作者求得的式子中将大部分参数都约去，留下了下级政府决策概率和其自身成本收益等参数，可得出其监管策略只取决于这几种参数。

Although the number of strategy combinations has increased to 16, in the subsequent analysis of strategy evolution, the analysis of a single entity is still to find its expected return and average expected return when choosing different strategies, and then construct the replication dynamic equation and calculate its first derivative. Finally, most of the parameters are eliminated in the formula obtained by the author, leaving the lower level government decision-making probability and its own cost-benefit and other parameters. It can be concluded that its regulatory strategy only depends on these parameters.

由于上级政府自身成本收益等参数都是常量，只有下级政府决策概率是变量，故上级政府的策略选择变动主要跟下级政府的策略选择有关，作者后续给出了二者关系间的命题及证明，通过数学公式演算证明了二者间存在相对应的关系。

Since the cost-benefit and other parameters of the superior government are constant, and only the decision-making probability of the subordinate government is variable, the change of the strategy choice of the superior government is mainly related to the strategy choice of the subordinate government. The author subsequently gives the proposition and proof of the relationship between the two, and proves that there is a corresponding relationship between them through mathematical formula calculus.

最后作者绘制了上级政府策略选择的相位图，直观地展示了其策略选择与其余三个博弈主体策略选择间的关系。从图中可以看出上级政府策略选择主要与下级政府的策略选择有关，且存在一个分界点。

Finally, the author draws the phase diagram of the superior government's strategy choice, and intuitively shows the relationship between its strategy choice and the strategy choice of the other three game players. It can be seen from the figure that the strategic choice of the superior government is mainly related to the strategic choice of the subordinate government, and there is a dividing point.

4 知识补充（Knowledge supplement）

什么是复制动态方程？

What is replication dynamic equation?

演化博弈论是一种研究在群体中个体之间的相互作用和竞争的数学模型。在演化博弈论中，不同的策略会根据其在竞争中的成功程度而获得不同的收益。当个体之间的策略的选择不断变化时，演化博弈的复制动态方程可以用来描述不同策略之间的选择和比例的变化。复制动态方程提供了一种框架，用于研究演化博弈中的策略选择和变化。它可以帮助我们更好地理解各种群体行为的演化和变化，从而有助于我们设计更有效的政策和策略来解决各种社会问题。

Evolutionary game theory is a mathematical model to study the interaction and competition between individuals in a group. In evolutionary game theory, different strategies will get different benefits according to their success in the competition. When the choice of strategies among individuals is constantly changing, the replication dynamic equation of evolutionary game can be used to describe the change of choice and proportion between different strategies. Replicating dynamic equations provides a framework for studying the choice and change of strategies in evolutionary games. It can help us better understand the evolution and changes of various group behaviors, and help us design more effective policies and strategies to solve various social problems.

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参考资料：

翻译：DeepSeek