精读复刻论文灵敏度分析(3)

摘要：This issue of the tweet will introduce the sensitivity analysis of the intensive reading and reproduction paper "Research on Green

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“喆学（79）：精读复刻论文

《考虑公平偏好和绿色创新的绿色供应链策略研究》

灵敏度分析(3)”

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Today, the editor brings you the article

Zhexue (79): Intensive reading and reproduction

of the paper

"Research on green supply chain strategy

considering fairness preference and green innovation"

"Sensitivity analysis(3)"

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本期推文将从思维导图、精读内容、知识补充三个方面介绍精读复刻论文《考虑公平偏好和绿色创新的绿色供应链策略研究》的灵敏度分析。

This issue of the tweet will introduce the sensitivity analysis of the intensive reading and reproduction paper "Research on Green Supply Chain Strategies Considering Fairness Preferences and Green Innovation" from three aspects: mind mapping, intensive reading content, and knowledge supplement.

一、思维导图（Mind Maps）

二、精读内容（Intensive reading content）

1.MM组合策略的制造商利润、销售商利润和系统总利润(Manufacturer profit, seller profit and total system profit of MM combination strategy)

对制造商推动绿色创新且制造商公平偏好（MM）组合策略中的制造商利润、销售商利润和系统总利润的制造商公平偏好系数进行一阶求导。MM组合策略中，制造商利润、销售商利润和系统总利润均随着制造商公平偏好系数增大而降低，降低制造商公平偏好程度有助于提升供应链节点企业和系统的利润。

The manufacturer's fair preference coefficients of manufacturer profit, seller profit and system total profit in the manufacturer's fair preference (MM) combination strategy for promoting green innovation are first-order derived. In the MM combination strategy, the manufacturer's profit, seller profit and system total profit all decrease as the manufacturer's fair preference coefficient increases. Reducing the manufacturer's fair preference degree is helpful to improve the profits of supply chain node enterprises and systems.

2. RM组合策略的制造商利润、销售商利润和系统总利润(Manufacturer profit, seller profit and total system profit of RM combination strategy)

对销售商推动绿色创新且制造商公平偏好（RM）组合策略中的制造商利润、销售商利润和系统总利润的制造商公平偏好系数进行一阶求导。RM组合策略中，制造商利润、销售商利润和系统总利润均随着制造商公平偏好系数增大而降低，降低制造商公平偏好程度有助于提升供应链节点企业和系统的利润。

The first-order derivative of the manufacturer's profit, seller's profit and total system profit in the combination strategy of the seller promoting green innovation and the manufacturer's fairness preference (RM) is taken. In the RM combination strategy, the manufacturer's profit, seller's profit and total system profit all decrease as the manufacturer's fairness preference coefficient increases. Reducing the manufacturer's fairness preference degree is helpful to improve the profits of supply chain node enterprises and systems.

3. MR组合策略的制造商利润、销售商利润和系统总利润(Manufacturer profit, seller profit and total system profit of MR combination strategy)

对制造商推动绿色创新且销售商公平偏好（MR）条件下的制造商利润、销售商利润和系统总利润的销售商公平偏好系数进行一阶求导。MR组合策略中，制造商利润和系统总利润均随着销售商公平偏好系数增大而降低，但销售商利润与销售商公平偏好系数之间的相关关系受到绿色创新努力成本系数的影响。

The first-order derivative of the manufacturer's profit, seller's profit and total system profit under the condition of the seller's fair preference (MR) is taken. In the MR combination strategy, both the manufacturer's profit and the total system profit decrease as the seller's fair preference coefficient increases, but the correlation between the seller's profit and the seller's fair preference coefficient is affected by the green innovation effort cost coefficient.

4. RR组合策略的制造商利润、销售商利润和系统总利润(Manufacturer profit, seller profit and total system profit of RR combination strategy)

对销售商推动绿色创新且销售商公平偏好（RR）条件下的制造商利润、销售商利润和系统总利润的销售商公平偏好系数进行一阶求导。RR组合策略中, 制造商利润随着销售商公平偏好系数增大而降低，销售商利润随着销售商公平偏好系数增大而增大，系统总利润与销售商公平偏好系数无关。

The first-order derivative of the seller's fair preference coefficient of the manufacturer's profit, seller's profit and system total profit under the condition that the seller promotes green innovation and the seller's fair preference (RR) is taken. In the RR combination strategy, the manufacturer's profit decreases as the seller's fair preference coefficient increases, the seller's profit increases as the seller's fair preference coefficient increases, and the system total profit is unrelated to the seller's fair preference coefficient.

4.结论(Conclusion)

在绿色创新中，降低销售商的公平关切能提升制造商利润，但对销售商影响不确定。销售商的公平偏好虽增自利，却损制造商利。双方可通过合作与信息共享降低偏好，增利润。制造商在自身推动创新时需注意销售商偏好对自利的影响。若销售商推动创新，双方需共担成本，平衡偏好。系统利润视角下，增公平偏好不增利润，尤其在MR、MM、RM策略下，应合作降偏好，用激励机制分利，减关注。RR策略下，可忽略销售商偏好。简言之，制造商和销售商应在绿色创新中寻求平衡，以优化整体利益。

三、知识补充（Knowledge supplement）

制造商在平衡绿色创新与销售商利益时，可以采取以下策略：

Manufacturers can adopt the following strategies to balance green innovation and the interests of sellers:

1.战略合作：与销售商建立长期合作关系，共同规划和实施绿色创新项目。

1. Strategic cooperation: Establish long-term cooperation with sellers to jointly plan and implement green innovation projects.

2.信息共享：通过共享市场信息、技术进展和创新成本，增强透明度，减少误解和猜疑。

2. Information sharing: Enhance transparency and reduce misunderstandings and suspicions by sharing market information, technological progress and innovation costs.

3.成本共担：在绿色创新项目中，制造商可以与销售商共同承担部分成本，减轻销售商的负担。

3. Cost sharing: In green innovation projects, manufacturers can share part of the costs with sellers to reduce the burden on sellers.

4.激励机制：设置合理的激励机制，如利润分享、奖励计划等，以鼓励销售商参与绿色创新。

4. Incentive mechanism: Set up reasonable incentive mechanisms, such as profit sharing, reward plans, etc., to encourage sellers to participate in green innovation.

5.公平偏好管理：理解和尊重销售商的公平偏好，通过协商和调整，使其在可接受的范围内。

5. Fair preference management: Understand and respect the fairness preferences of sellers, and keep them within an acceptable range through negotiation and adjustment.

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翻译：谷歌翻译

参考资料：谷歌、Chat GPT